學術產出-Issues & Studies

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題名 Decentralization Reform in Post-Mao China: A Framework of Choice
作者 Hu, Xiao-Bo
關鍵詞 minimum decentralization;optimum decentralization;choice;political benefits;economic reform;broadened rationality
日期 1996-09
上傳時間 21-Sep-2016 14:38:09 (UTC+8)
摘要 This article presents an analytical framework that studies why a Leninist central government is willing to share its economic power with localities. From the choice theoretic perspective, it identifies different central leaders’ preferences, traces the exogenous factors in the larger political and economic environment that frame their choices, and examines the rationale of the actual policies that result from their choices as modified by the competing interests of other relevant factors. It argues that central decisionmakers choose different policies in accordance with their own interests through available institutional channels to deal with succession struggles and legitimacy crises. Decentralization in this sense is regarded as one of the strategies of state control in economic reforms. It maintains that exploration of how the Chinese elites attempt to maintain control over the economy and how Chinese economic policies enter into the power struggle is fundamental to an understanding of Chinese economic reforms. This framework highlights the center’s perspective of decentralization reforms.
關聯 Issues & Studies,32(9),41-68
資料類型 article
dc.creator (作者) Hu, Xiao-Bo
dc.date (日期) 1996-09
dc.date.accessioned 21-Sep-2016 14:38:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 21-Sep-2016 14:38:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 21-Sep-2016 14:38:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102140-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This article presents an analytical framework that studies why a Leninist central government is willing to share its economic power with localities. From the choice theoretic perspective, it identifies different central leaders’ preferences, traces the exogenous factors in the larger political and economic environment that frame their choices, and examines the rationale of the actual policies that result from their choices as modified by the competing interests of other relevant factors. It argues that central decisionmakers choose different policies in accordance with their own interests through available institutional channels to deal with succession struggles and legitimacy crises. Decentralization in this sense is regarded as one of the strategies of state control in economic reforms. It maintains that exploration of how the Chinese elites attempt to maintain control over the economy and how Chinese economic policies enter into the power struggle is fundamental to an understanding of Chinese economic reforms. This framework highlights the center’s perspective of decentralization reforms.
dc.format.extent 2561156 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Issues & Studies,32(9),41-68
dc.subject (關鍵詞) minimum decentralization;optimum decentralization;choice;political benefits;economic reform;broadened rationality
dc.title (題名) Decentralization Reform in Post-Mao China: A Framework of Choice
dc.type (資料類型) article