| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Jin-Wen | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2000-11 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 5-Oct-2016 16:55:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 5-Oct-2016 16:55:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 5-Oct-2016 16:55:24 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102653 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article develops a two-level game model to depict the sovereignty dispute across the Taiwan Strait. It shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo undermines cross-Strait stability, and that a moderate leader besieged by hard-liners in a nondemocratic regime reacts most radically to external pressures. These arguments are then empirically verified. Such findings deviate from Robert Putnam’s claim that international cooperation is enhanced by a greater domestic demand to change the status quo, and also call for a distinction between two-level games that are zero-sum and nonzero-sum. By implication, the author suggests that cross-Strait stability can be improved by concurrent power transitions, centripetal political institutions, and a nonzero-sum distribution of payoffs. | |
| dc.format.extent | 153 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Issues & Studies,36(6),1-26 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | two-level games;Robert D. Putnam;cross-Strait relations;linkage politics;democratic peace | |
| dc.title (題名) | Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
