| dc.creator (作者) | 謝復生 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsieh, John Fuh-Sheng | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2006-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 25-Oct-2016 16:01:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 25-Oct-2016 16:01:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 25-Oct-2016 16:01:54 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/103293 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In designing democratic institutions, it is imperative that we take into consideration both the constitutional form of government and the electoral system. On paper Taiwan`s institutional arrangement, essentially parliamentary coupled with a semi-proportional electoral system, resembles that found in many Continental European countries. This is generally sound except that the electoral system (i.e., the single nontransferable vote), albeit with certain merits, contains some truly undesirable features that need to be corrected. Proportional representation with a relatively high threshold to eliminate minuscule parties is preferable. Nonetheless, the actual practice in Taiwan-presidentialism plus a relatively proportional electoral system-looks more like the institutional arrangement seen in Latin America, which is not a good choice. The easiest way of changing it and moving it back to the Continental European type of system is to close the loophole by reinstituting an investiture vote for the premier-designate by the Legislative Yuan. It is important that the constitutional practice should not deviate too much from the logic of the constitutional arrangement. | |
| dc.format.extent | 1006200 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Issues & Studies,42(1),81-102 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | presidentialism;parliamentarism;single-member district plurality system;proportional representation;single nontransferable vote | |
| dc.title (題名) | Institutional Design for a Mildly Divided Society: The Case of Taiwan | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
