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題名 搜尋公司違反聯貸限制條款的事件：以美國證券交易委員會 EDGAR 系統資料為例
Identifying Covenant Violations of Syndicated Loan Contracts - Searching From SEC EDGAR Database
作者 由文萱
貢獻者 張元晨
由文萱
關鍵詞 聯合貸款
限制性條款
違約
syndicated loan
Covenant
violation
日期 2015
上傳時間 4-Jan-2017 11:55:14 (UTC+8)
摘要 本篇論文的研究動機。由於許多文獻提到債權人在公司治理上從過去的被動位置轉變為主動利用聯合貸款合約中的限制性條款(covenant) 來規範公司營業活動。小至限制公司資本支出、股利發放，大則影響董事會決定公司 CEO 的去留。限制性條款扮演越來越重要的角色。本文探討從 SEC EDGAR filings 中搜尋公司是否面臨限制性條款的違約(in violation of covenants)。本篇論文能降低未來研究在資料建立上需要人工處理的時間，藉由降低錯誤標記的筆數來達成。
Covenant violations in syndicated loan agreements are a key factor which demonstrates a shift in control rights to debt holders before a company enters into events of default. This paper focuses on the methodology of identifying incidents of covenant violations using both programming codes and manual searches. We dedicate to minimize the time in hand-collecting while pursue high hitting rates of true covenant violations in SEC EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) database. Our findings provide a way to access the U.S. firms’ public financial statements reported to SEC and extends the list of companies provided by Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012).
參考文獻 (1) Billett, M. T., Esmer, B., & Yu, M. (2014). Creditor Control and Product-Market Competition. Available at SSRN 2307031.
(2) Chava, S., & Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. The Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2085-2121.

(3) Denis, D. J., & Wang, J. (2014). Debt covenant renegotiations and creditor control rights. Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 348-367.
(4) Freudenberg, F., Imbierowicz, B., Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2013, October). Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting. In AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper.
(5) Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review,76(2).
(6) Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
(7) Murfin, J. (2012). The Supply ‐ Side Determinants of Loan Contract

Strictness.The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1565-1601.

(8) Nini, G., Smith, D. C., & Sufi, A. (2012). Creditor control rights, corporate governance, and firm value. Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1713-1761.
(9) Roberts, M. R., & Sufi, A. (2009). Control rights and capital structure: An empirical investigation. The Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1657-1695.
(10) Tan, L. (2013). Creditor control rights, state of nature verification, and financial reporting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(1), 1-22.

(11) Vashishtha, R. (2014). The role of bank monitoring in borrowers׳ discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57(2), 176-195.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
102357023
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102357023
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張元晨zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 由文萱zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 由文萱zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2015en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Jan-2017 11:55:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Jan-2017 11:55:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Jan-2017 11:55:14 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102357023en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/105588-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102357023zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本篇論文的研究動機。由於許多文獻提到債權人在公司治理上從過去的被動位置轉變為主動利用聯合貸款合約中的限制性條款(covenant) 來規範公司營業活動。小至限制公司資本支出、股利發放，大則影響董事會決定公司 CEO 的去留。限制性條款扮演越來越重要的角色。本文探討從 SEC EDGAR filings 中搜尋公司是否面臨限制性條款的違約(in violation of covenants)。本篇論文能降低未來研究在資料建立上需要人工處理的時間，藉由降低錯誤標記的筆數來達成。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Covenant violations in syndicated loan agreements are a key factor which demonstrates a shift in control rights to debt holders before a company enters into events of default. This paper focuses on the methodology of identifying incidents of covenant violations using both programming codes and manual searches. We dedicate to minimize the time in hand-collecting while pursue high hitting rates of true covenant violations in SEC EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) database. Our findings provide a way to access the U.S. firms’ public financial statements reported to SEC and extends the list of companies provided by Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012).en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents List of Tables-------------------------------------iii
Abstract-------------------------------------------iv
1. Introduction---------------------------------1
1.1 Motivation-----------------------------------1
1.2 Objective------------------------------------2
1.3 Outline ----------------------------------3
2. Literature Review----------------------------4
2.1 The Mechanism of Corporate Governance--------4
2.2 Covenant Violation Searching Methodology-----5
3. Data and Methodology-------------------------8
3.1 Data Construction----------------------------8
3.2 Issues with Search Methodology---------------12
3.3 Issues with Appendix in Nini, et al. (2012)--13
4. Conclusion-----------------------------------16
5. References-----------------------------------17		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 757048 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102357023en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合貸款zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 限制性條款zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 違約zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) syndicated loanen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Covenanten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) violationen_US
dc.title (題名) 搜尋公司違反聯貸限制條款的事件：以美國證券交易委員會 EDGAR 系統資料為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Identifying Covenant Violations of Syndicated Loan Contracts - Searching From SEC EDGAR Databaseen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (1) Billett, M. T., Esmer, B., & Yu, M. (2014). Creditor Control and Product-Market Competition. Available at SSRN 2307031.
(2) Chava, S., & Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. The Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2085-2121.

(3) Denis, D. J., & Wang, J. (2014). Debt covenant renegotiations and creditor control rights. Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 348-367.
(4) Freudenberg, F., Imbierowicz, B., Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2013, October). Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting. In AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper.
(5) Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review,76(2).
(6) Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
(7) Murfin, J. (2012). The Supply ‐ Side Determinants of Loan Contract

Strictness.The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1565-1601.

(8) Nini, G., Smith, D. C., & Sufi, A. (2012). Creditor control rights, corporate governance, and firm value. Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1713-1761.
(9) Roberts, M. R., & Sufi, A. (2009). Control rights and capital structure: An empirical investigation. The Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1657-1695.
(10) Tan, L. (2013). Creditor control rights, state of nature verification, and financial reporting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(1), 1-22.

(11) Vashishtha, R. (2014). The role of bank monitoring in borrowers׳ discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 57(2), 176-195.		zh_TW