| dc.coverage.temporal | 計畫年度：91 起迄日期：20020801～20030731 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 俞洪昭;邱士宗;戚務君 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:31 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 8-Sep-2008 15:53:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:31 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 8-Sep-2008 15:53:38 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:31 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | 912416H004023.pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://tair.lib.ntu.edu.tw:8000/123456789/3895 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/3895 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 核定金額：682900元 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study analytically and experimentally examines how different combinations of legal regimes (strict vs. negligence) and damage apportionment rules (joint-and-several vs. proportionate) may affect auditor？H？Hs effort and independence decisions and firm？H？Hs investment level. I adopt the laboratory experiments to test a series of economic and behavioral hypotheses derived from a one-period game theoretic model in which (a) the manager provides quasi-rents and side payment to induce the auditor to compromise his independence, and (b) the auditor may commit either a technical audit failure (due to imperfect audit technology and audit effort) or an independence audit failure (due to the impairment of independence). I distinguish these two types of audit failure because they are subject to different damage apportionment rules stipulated in the 1995 Reform Act. The experimental results reveal several important findings. First, no single legal system (i.e., combination of legal regime and damage apportionment rule) can induce higher audit quality, improve auditor independence, and encourage firm？H？Hs investments simultaneously. Therefore, the policy makers have to carefully consider what regulatory goals they want to achieve in determining the appropriate legal system imposing on the auditors. If improving auditor independence and encouraging more investments are the main purposes, the experimental evidence suggests that a legal system that consists of a strict legal regime with a proportionate damage rule can induce the highest level of auditor independence and firm？H？Hs investments. Second, the auditors？H？H independence is impaired less often than the model prediction because they recognize the compromise of independence to be unethical. In addition, the auditors exert more high effort under the proportionate rule than under the joint-and-several rule because they perceive the former to be relatively fair in the occurrence of a technical audit failure. These results suggest the importance of considering human？H？Hs psychological factors such as ethics and fairness in examining auditor？H？Hs legal liability, audit quality, and independence. Finally, from a regulation？H？Hs perspective, an emphasis on damage apportionment rule is by itself not enough to improve auditor independence and motivate firm？H？Hs investment. A switch of legal regime seems to be more useful than a switch of damage apportionment rule. This result not only partially explains why Arthur Andersen impairs its independence with Enron after the enactment of the 1995 Reform Act (whose focus is on the switching of damage apportionment rules), but also provides support for recent trends of moving auditor？H？Hs legal liability toward a strict regime after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. | - |
| dc.format | applicaiton/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 438347 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 438347 bytes | - |
| dc.format.extent | 24434 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | - |
| dc.language | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.publisher (Publisher) | 臺北市：國立政治大學會計學系 | en_US |
| dc.rights (Rights) | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Audit failure;Auditor independence;Damage apportionment rule;Legal liability;Legal regime Data Availability: The experimental data are available from the author upon request | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 法律制度與損害賠償機制對會計師獨立性的影響─理論與實驗證據 | zh_TW |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
