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題名 薪酬委員會品質是否會抑制公司進行租稅規避行為?
Whether compensation committee quality will reduce tax avoidance in Taiwan?
作者 呂瑋釬
Lyu, Wei Han
貢獻者 何怡澄
Ho, Yi Cheng
呂瑋釬
Lyu, Wei Han
關鍵詞 薪酬委員會品質
租稅規避
Compensation committee quality
Tax avoidance
日期 2016
上傳時間 8-Feb-2017 16:32:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文主要目的為探討經理人現金薪酬受到薪酬委員會品質影響時，是否會影響公司進行租稅規避行為。本文以當期有效稅率、現金有效稅率、總財稅差異以及永久性財稅差異衡量公司之租稅規避，而薪酬委員會品質衡量則依據Sun and Cahan (2009)所提出之方式衡量，並計算出各公司的薪酬委員會品質分數。研究期間為2012年至2014年之上市櫃公司，但不含產業性質特殊之金融業公司。其實證結果發現經理人現金薪酬與公司進行租稅規避行為呈顯著正相關，但加入薪酬委員會品質時，發現受到薪酬委員會品質影響之經理人現金薪酬與公司租稅規避行為呈顯著負相關，其結果顯示，當薪酬委員會品質越佳時，公司越不會進行租稅規避行為。
參考文獻 (期刊)
吳幸蓁、謝佳純和梁書瑋，2014，薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第10卷第2期：135-188。
楊朝旭與吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期：55-87 頁。
蔡柳卿、楊朝旭和許慧雯，2012，高階管理團隊薪酬對資產減損敏感度之實證研究， 中華會計學刊，第8卷第2期：165-216。
(專書)
王建煊，2009，租稅法，臺北：華泰文化事業股份有限公司。
（Journal paper）
Anderson, R. C., and J. M. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the ceo and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking & Finance 27: 1323-1348.
Antle, R., and A. Smith. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 24: 1-39.
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, and D. F. Larcker. 2012. The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53: 391-411.
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2015. Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 60: 1-17.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analys is of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71: 443-465.
Berger, P. G. 1993. Explicit and implicit tax effects of the r & d tax credit. Journal of Accounting Research 31: 131-171.
Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95, 41–61.
Chhaochharia, V., and Y. Grinstein. 2009. Ceo compensation and board structure. The Journal of Finance 64: 231-261.
Comprix, J., and K. A. Muller. 2006. Asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in ceo cash compensation calculations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 385-416.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics 51: 371-406.
Daily, C. M., J. L. Johnson, A. E. Ellstrand, and D. R. Dalton. 1998. Compensation committee composition as a determinant of ceo compensation. Academy of Management Journal 4: 209-220.
Dechow, P. M., M. R. Huson, and R. G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on executives` cash compensation. Accounting Review 69: 138-156.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 145-179.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2009. Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 537-546.
Desai, M. A., I. Dyck, and L. Zingales. 2007. Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 84: 591-623.
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 83: 61-82.
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2010. The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 85: 1163-1189.
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren, and M. T. Wells. 1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of financial economics 48: 35-54.
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R. M. Stulz. 2010. Why do firms appoint ceos as outside directors?. Journal of Financial Economics 97: 12-32.
Faleye, O. 2011. Ceo directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives. Journal of Financial Research 34: 241-277.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58: 1087-1111.
Fich, E.M., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors?. The Journal of finance 61: 689-724.
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: a synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9: 543-558.
Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch, and S. O. Rego. 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting. The Accounting Review 84: 467-496.
Gaertner, F. B. 2014. Ceo after‐tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. Contemporary Accounting Research 31: 1077-1102.
Gibbons, R., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(3): 30-51.
Gupta, S., and K. Newberry. 1997. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16: 1-34.
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 127-178.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics 3: 305-360.
Kerr, J. L., and L. Kren. 1992. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 35: 370-397.
Khurana, I. K., and W. J. Moser. 2013. Institutional shareholders` investment horizons and tax avoidance. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 35: 111-134..
Mangel, R., and H. Singh. 1993. Ownership structure, board relationships and ceo compensation in large us corporations. Accounting and Business Research 23: 339-350.
Murphy, K. J. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 11-42.
Newman, H. A. 1989. Selection of short-term accounting-based bonus plans. Accounting Review 64: 758-772.
Newman, H. A., and H. A. Mozes. 1999. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence ceo compensation practices?. Financial management 28: 41-53.
O`Reilly, C. A., B. G. Main, and G. S. Crystal. 1988. Ceo compensation as tournament and social comparison: a tale of two theories. Administrative Science Quarterly 33: 257-274.
Phillips, J. D. 2003. Corporate tax-planning effectiveness: the role of compensation-based incentives. The Accounting Review 78: 847-874.
Rego, S. O. 2003. Tax‐avoidance activities of us multinational corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research 20: 805-833.
Shelley, M. K., T. C. Omer, and T. J. Atwood. 1998. Capital restructuring and accounting compliance costs: the case of publicly traded partnerships. Journal of Accounting Research 36: 365-378.
Slemrod, J. 2004. The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness. National Tax Journal 57: 877-899.
Sloan, R. G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 55-100.
Sun, J., and S. Cahan. 2009. The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between ceo cash compensation and accounting performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17: 193-207.
Vafeas, N. 2003. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 30: 1043-1064.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics 40: 185-211.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353112
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353112
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何怡澄zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Ho, Yi Chengen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 呂瑋釬zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lyu, Wei Hanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 呂瑋釬zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lyu, Wei Hanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned 8-Feb-2017 16:32:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 8-Feb-2017 16:32:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 8-Feb-2017 16:32:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103353112en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/106388-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103353112zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文主要目的為探討經理人現金薪酬受到薪酬委員會品質影響時，是否會影響公司進行租稅規避行為。本文以當期有效稅率、現金有效稅率、總財稅差異以及永久性財稅差異衡量公司之租稅規避，而薪酬委員會品質衡量則依據Sun and Cahan (2009)所提出之方式衡量，並計算出各公司的薪酬委員會品質分數。研究期間為2012年至2014年之上市櫃公司，但不含產業性質特殊之金融業公司。其實證結果發現經理人現金薪酬與公司進行租稅規避行為呈顯著正相關，但加入薪酬委員會品質時，發現受到薪酬委員會品質影響之經理人現金薪酬與公司租稅規避行為呈顯著負相關，其結果顯示，當薪酬委員會品質越佳時，公司越不會進行租稅規避行為。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構與流程 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 台灣薪酬委員會制度介紹 7
第二節 薪酬委員會品質與總經理薪酬相關文獻 8
第三節 租稅規避 9
第四節 租稅避稅與總經理薪酬相關文獻 11
第五節 公司治理與租稅規避文獻 11
第六節 研究假說 12
第參章 研究方法 13
第一節 研究模型 13
第二節 變數定義說明 14
第三節 資料來源與樣本篩選 23
第肆章 實證結果 25
第一節 樣本敘述統計 25
第二節 模型檢定 28
第三節 普通最小平方法實證結果 32
第伍章 結論與建議 35
第一節 結論與建議 35
第二節 研究限制 36
參考文獻 37
附錄 41
表目錄
表1 研究樣本篩選過程 24
表2 薪酬委員會品質指標敘述統計 26
表3 敘述統計 27
表4 Pearson相關係數表 29
表5 VIF檢定 30
表6 VIF檢定(不含公司規模) 31
表7 最小平方法實證結果－薪酬績效敏感度及薪酬委員會品質 32
表8 最小平方法實證結果－租稅規避與薪酬委員會品質 34
附表1 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ1)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 41
附表2 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ2)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 42
附表3 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ3)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 43
附表4 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ4)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 44
附表5 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ5)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 45
附表6 迴歸結果－薪酬委員會品質指標(CCQ6)對薪酬績效敏感度之影響 46
圖目錄
圖1 研究流程圖 5
圖2 研究架構圖 6		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 981983 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353112en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬委員會品質zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Compensation committee qualityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax avoidanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 薪酬委員會品質是否會抑制公司進行租稅規避行為?zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Whether compensation committee quality will reduce tax avoidance in Taiwan?en_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) (期刊)
吳幸蓁、謝佳純和梁書瑋，2014，薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第10卷第2期：135-188。
楊朝旭與吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，會計評論，第36期：55-87 頁。
蔡柳卿、楊朝旭和許慧雯，2012，高階管理團隊薪酬對資產減損敏感度之實證研究， 中華會計學刊，第8卷第2期：165-216。
(專書)
王建煊，2009，租稅法，臺北：華泰文化事業股份有限公司。
（Journal paper）
Anderson, R. C., and J. M. Bizjak. 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the ceo and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking & Finance 27: 1323-1348.
Antle, R., and A. Smith. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 24: 1-39.
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, and D. F. Larcker. 2012. The incentives for tax planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53: 391-411.
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, A. D. Jagolinzer, and D. F. Larcker. 2015. Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 60: 1-17.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analys is of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71: 443-465.
Berger, P. G. 1993. Explicit and implicit tax effects of the r & d tax credit. Journal of Accounting Research 31: 131-171.
Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95, 41–61.
Chhaochharia, V., and Y. Grinstein. 2009. Ceo compensation and board structure. The Journal of Finance 64: 231-261.
Comprix, J., and K. A. Muller. 2006. Asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in ceo cash compensation calculations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 385-416.
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics 51: 371-406.
Daily, C. M., J. L. Johnson, A. E. Ellstrand, and D. R. Dalton. 1998. Compensation committee composition as a determinant of ceo compensation. Academy of Management Journal 4: 209-220.
Dechow, P. M., M. R. Huson, and R. G. Sloan. 1994. The effect of restructuring charges on executives` cash compensation. Accounting Review 69: 138-156.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 145-179.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2009. Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 537-546.
Desai, M. A., I. Dyck, and L. Zingales. 2007. Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 84: 591-623.
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 83: 61-82.
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2010. The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 85: 1163-1189.
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren, and M. T. Wells. 1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of financial economics 48: 35-54.
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R. M. Stulz. 2010. Why do firms appoint ceos as outside directors?. Journal of Financial Economics 97: 12-32.
Faleye, O. 2011. Ceo directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives. Journal of Financial Research 34: 241-277.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. Too busy to mind the business? monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance 58: 1087-1111.
Fich, E.M., and A. Shivdasani. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors?. The Journal of finance 61: 689-724.
Finkelstein, S., and D. C. Hambrick. 1988. Chief executive compensation: a synthesis and reconciliation. Strategic Management Journal 9: 543-558.
Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch, and S. O. Rego. 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its relation to aggressive financial reporting. The Accounting Review 84: 467-496.
Gaertner, F. B. 2014. Ceo after‐tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance. Contemporary Accounting Research 31: 1077-1102.
Gibbons, R., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(3): 30-51.
Gupta, S., and K. Newberry. 1997. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16: 1-34.
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50: 127-178.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics 3: 305-360.
Kerr, J. L., and L. Kren. 1992. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal 35: 370-397.
Khurana, I. K., and W. J. Moser. 2013. Institutional shareholders` investment horizons and tax avoidance. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 35: 111-134..
Mangel, R., and H. Singh. 1993. Ownership structure, board relationships and ceo compensation in large us corporations. Accounting and Business Research 23: 339-350.
Murphy, K. J. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7: 11-42.
Newman, H. A. 1989. Selection of short-term accounting-based bonus plans. Accounting Review 64: 758-772.
Newman, H. A., and H. A. Mozes. 1999. Does the composition of the compensation committee influence ceo compensation practices?. Financial management 28: 41-53.
O`Reilly, C. A., B. G. Main, and G. S. Crystal. 1988. Ceo compensation as tournament and social comparison: a tale of two theories. Administrative Science Quarterly 33: 257-274.
Phillips, J. D. 2003. Corporate tax-planning effectiveness: the role of compensation-based incentives. The Accounting Review 78: 847-874.
Rego, S. O. 2003. Tax‐avoidance activities of us multinational corporations. Contemporary Accounting Research 20: 805-833.
Shelley, M. K., T. C. Omer, and T. J. Atwood. 1998. Capital restructuring and accounting compliance costs: the case of publicly traded partnerships. Journal of Accounting Research 36: 365-378.
Slemrod, J. 2004. The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness. National Tax Journal 57: 877-899.
Sloan, R. G. 1993. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 55-100.
Sun, J., and S. Cahan. 2009. The effect of compensation committee quality on the association between ceo cash compensation and accounting performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review 17: 193-207.
Vafeas, N. 2003. Length of board tenure and outside director independence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 30: 1043-1064.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of financial economics 40: 185-211.		zh_TW