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題名 主管酬勞、內部持股與公司價值:以聯立模型分析台灣與美國的資料
其他題名 Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Executive Compensation, Insider Ownership, and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan and the USA
作者 張清福
關鍵詞 主管酬勞;內部持股;公司價值;聯立模型
Executive Compensation;Insider Ownership;Corporate Value;Simultaneous Equations
日期 2001
上傳時間 18-Apr-2007 16:37:34 (UTC+8)
Publisher 臺北市:國立政治大學會計學系
摘要 本文同時利用台灣以及美國1997-1999 的資料,探討比較高階主管酬勞、內部持股與公司價值三者間的內生性關係。美國資料顯示,無論是最小平方法或者三階段最小平方法(three-stage least squares),主管酬勞與內部持股,皆互為負向的函數關係。台灣資料則顯示,在最小平方法下,雖然不顯著,但兩者仍互為負向函數關係;在三階段最小平方法下則兩者互為顯著的負向函數關係。綜合而言,在三階段最小平方法下,無論台灣或美國的資料均顯示,主管酬勞與內部持股,顯著地互為負向的函數關係。在內部持股與公司價值的關係方面,台灣資料顯示,在最小平方法下,內部持股與公司價值互不具有內生的關係;只有在三階段最小平方法下,內部持股顯著地為公司價值的正向函數。美國的資料則顯示,無論用最小平方法或三階段最小平方法,內部持股與公司價值兩者顯著地互為正向的內生關係。至於主管酬勞與公司價值間是否互相具有內生性,台灣與美國的實證結果迥異。台灣資料顯示,最小平方法下,兩者間無顯著的關係;但在三階段最小平方法下,兩者則顯著地互為內生關係。主管酬勞是公司價值的正向函數,而公司價值則為前一期主管酬勞的正向函數,但為當期主管酬勞的負向函數。美國資料則顯示兩者間並無顯著之關係。
This study examines if executive compensation, insider ownership, and corporate value are endogenously determined. Simultaneous system can cure the inconsistent estimation problem induced by ordinary least squares in the case that the variables are endogenously determined. This study compares the empirical results of Taiwan and the USA for the endogenicity among executive compensation, insider ownership, and corporate value. The USA evidence shows that under both OLS and three-stage least squares (3SLS), executive compensation is a negative function of insider ownership, and vice versa. Taiwan evidence under OLS shows that the executive compensation is a negative but insignificant function of insider ownership, and vice versa. However, under 3SLS, Taiwan evidence shows the same results as those of the USA evidence. Putting together, under 3SLS, Taiwan and the USA evidences show the same results that executive compensation is a negative function of insider ownership and vice Taiwan evidence shows that under OLS the insider ownership and corporate value are not significantly correlated. But under 3SLS, insider ownership is a positive function of corporate value. However, the USA evidence shows that under both methods of OLS and 3SLS, insider ownership and corporate value are positively As for the relation between executive compensation and corporate value, Taiwan evidence is dramatically different from that of the USA. Taiwan evidence shows that they are not significantly related under OLS method. However, under 3SLS method, they are endogenously determined. On the other hand, corporate value is a positive function of 1-period lagged executive compensation but a negative function of current executive compensation. However, the USA evidence shows no relation between executive compensation and corporate value under both methods.
描述 核定金額:341200元
資料類型 report
dc.coverage.temporal 計畫年度:90 起迄日期:20010801~20020731en_US
dc.creator (作者) 張清福zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2001en_US
dc.date.accessioned 18-Apr-2007 16:37:34 (UTC+8)en_US
dc.date.accessioned 8-Sep-2008 15:54:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 18-Apr-2007 16:37:34 (UTC+8)en_US
dc.date.available 8-Sep-2008 15:54:09 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 18-Apr-2007 16:37:34 (UTC+8)en_US
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) 902416H004021.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://tair.lib.ntu.edu.tw:8000/123456789/3902en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/3902-
dc.description (描述) 核定金額:341200元en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文同時利用台灣以及美國1997-1999 的資料,探討比較高階主管酬勞、內部持股與公司價值三者間的內生性關係。美國資料顯示,無論是最小平方法或者三階段最小平方法(three-stage least squares),主管酬勞與內部持股,皆互為負向的函數關係。台灣資料則顯示,在最小平方法下,雖然不顯著,但兩者仍互為負向函數關係;在三階段最小平方法下則兩者互為顯著的負向函數關係。綜合而言,在三階段最小平方法下,無論台灣或美國的資料均顯示,主管酬勞與內部持股,顯著地互為負向的函數關係。在內部持股與公司價值的關係方面,台灣資料顯示,在最小平方法下,內部持股與公司價值互不具有內生的關係;只有在三階段最小平方法下,內部持股顯著地為公司價值的正向函數。美國的資料則顯示,無論用最小平方法或三階段最小平方法,內部持股與公司價值兩者顯著地互為正向的內生關係。至於主管酬勞與公司價值間是否互相具有內生性,台灣與美國的實證結果迥異。台灣資料顯示,最小平方法下,兩者間無顯著的關係;但在三階段最小平方法下,兩者則顯著地互為內生關係。主管酬勞是公司價值的正向函數,而公司價值則為前一期主管酬勞的正向函數,但為當期主管酬勞的負向函數。美國資料則顯示兩者間並無顯著之關係。-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines if executive compensation, insider ownership, and corporate value are endogenously determined. Simultaneous system can cure the inconsistent estimation problem induced by ordinary least squares in the case that the variables are endogenously determined. This study compares the empirical results of Taiwan and the USA for the endogenicity among executive compensation, insider ownership, and corporate value. The USA evidence shows that under both OLS and three-stage least squares (3SLS), executive compensation is a negative function of insider ownership, and vice versa. Taiwan evidence under OLS shows that the executive compensation is a negative but insignificant function of insider ownership, and vice versa. However, under 3SLS, Taiwan evidence shows the same results as those of the USA evidence. Putting together, under 3SLS, Taiwan and the USA evidences show the same results that executive compensation is a negative function of insider ownership and vice Taiwan evidence shows that under OLS the insider ownership and corporate value are not significantly correlated. But under 3SLS, insider ownership is a positive function of corporate value. However, the USA evidence shows that under both methods of OLS and 3SLS, insider ownership and corporate value are positively As for the relation between executive compensation and corporate value, Taiwan evidence is dramatically different from that of the USA. Taiwan evidence shows that they are not significantly related under OLS method. However, under 3SLS method, they are endogenously determined. On the other hand, corporate value is a positive function of 1-period lagged executive compensation but a negative function of current executive compensation. However, the USA evidence shows no relation between executive compensation and corporate value under both methods.-
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dc.format.extent 305340 bytesen_US
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dc.format.extent 16263 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdfen_US
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dc.language zh-TWen_US
dc.language.iso zh-TWen_US
dc.publisher (Publisher) 臺北市:國立政治大學會計學系en_US
dc.rights (Rights) 行政院國家科學委員會en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 主管酬勞;內部持股;公司價值;聯立模型-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive Compensation;Insider Ownership;Corporate Value;Simultaneous Equations-
dc.title (題名) 主管酬勞、內部持股與公司價值:以聯立模型分析台灣與美國的資料zh_TW
dc.title.alternative (其他題名) Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Executive Compensation, Insider Ownership, and Firm Value: Evidence from Taiwan and the USA-
dc.type (資料類型) reporten