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題名 雙權偏離與租稅規避之關聯性
Relationship between the separation of control and cash flow rights and tax avoidance
作者 翁敏
貢獻者 何怡澄
翁敏
關鍵詞 控制權
現金流量權
租稅規避
日期 2016
上傳時間 1-Mar-2017 17:03:16 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究從股份控制權及席次控制權與現金流量權偏離的程度，研究與租稅規避之前的關聯性。是否當控制權以大於盈餘分配權的方式越偏離時，因負的侵占效果使得租稅規避程度越高；又當控制權小於應於分配權而產生偏離時，因正的誘因效果使得租稅規避程度越低。
參考文獻 Badertscher, B. A., Katz, S. P., & Rego, S. O. (2013). The separation of ownership and control and corporate tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2), 228-250. \nBebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318): University of Chicago Press.\nBerle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporate and private property. McMillian, New York, NY. \nChen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61. \nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. \nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 58(1), 81-112. \nDesai, M. A. (2003). The divergence between book income and tax income Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17 (pp. 169-208): MIT press.\nDesai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 145-179. \nDyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 61-82. \nDyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010). The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1163-1189. \nFrank, M., Lynch, L., & Rego, S. (2006). Does aggressive financial reporting accompany aggressive tax reporting (and vice versa). University of Virginia. Mimeo. \nGompers, P. A., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2010). Extreme governance: An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1051-1088. \nGraham, J. R., & Tucker, A. L. (2006). Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 563-594. \nGupta, S., & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1-34. \nHanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2), 127-178. \nJensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. \nKhurana, I. K., & Moser, W. (2010). Institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness.\nKraft, A. (2014). What Really Affects German Firms` Effective Tax Rate? International Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 1-19. \nLa Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of finance, 1147-1170. \nLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33. \nLisowsky, P. (2010). Seeking shelter: Empirically modeling tax shelters using financial statement information. The Accounting Review, 85(5), 1693-1720. \nManzon Jr, G. B., & Plesko, G. A. (2001). Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, The. Tax L. Rev., 55, 175. \nMcGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J. (2014). Dual class ownership and tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 89(4), 1487-1516. \nMills, L. F. (1998). Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research, 36(2), 343-356. \nOmer, T. C., Molloy, K. H., & Ziebart, D. A. (1993). An investigation of the firm size—effective tax rate relation in the 1980s. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 8(2), 167-182. \nPorcano, T. (1986). Corporate tax rates: Progressive, proportional, or regressive. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 7(2), 17-31. \nPorta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. \nRego, S. O. (2003). Tax‐Avoidance Activities of US Multinational Corporations*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805-833. \nRego, S. O., & Wilson, R. (2012). Equity risk incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 775-810. \nRichardson, G., & Lanis, R. (2007). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates and tax reform: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(6), 689-704. \nRobinson, J. R., Sikes, S. A., & Weaver, C. D. (2010). Performance measurement of corporate tax departments. The Accounting Review, 85(3), 1035-1064. \nShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783. \nSiegfried, J. J. (1972). The relationship between economic structure and the effect of political influence: Empirical evidence from the federal corporation income tax program (Vol. 2): University of Wisconsin--Madison.\nStickney, C. P., & McGee, V. E. (1983). Effective corporate tax rates the effect of size, capital intensity, leverage, and other factors. Journal of accounting and public policy, 1(2), 125-152. \nWilson, R. J. (2009). An examination of corporate tax shelter participants. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 969-999. \nYeh, Y. h., Lee, T. s., & Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of finance, 2(1‐2), 21-48. \nZimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of accounting and economics, 5, 119-149. \nZingales, L. (1994). The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan stock exchange experience. Review of financial Studies, 7(1), 125-148. \n翁淑育. (2000). 台灣上市公司股權結構, 核心代理問題及公司價值之研究, 輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文. Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment.” American Economic Review, 48, 261-297. \n葉銀華, 李存修, & 柯承恩. (2002). 公司治理與評等系統: Sunbright Publishing Co.\n許崇源, 李怡宗, 林宛瑩 與 鄭桂蕙 (2003). 控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上). 貨幣觀測與信用評等(42), 15-31.\n許崇源, 李怡宗, 林宛瑩 與 鄭桂蕙 (2003). 控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下). 貨幣觀測與信用評等(42), 15-31.\n王建煊. (2005). 租稅法, 文笙書局. \n林宛瑩, 許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 28(1), 269-312.\n劉健右(2008)，租稅規避之研究，政治大學法律系碩士論文\n施惠喻（2015），資訊揭露、投票權與現金流量權偏離程度與避稅行為之關係，國立臺北商業大學會計財稅研究所碩士論文\n蔡佳芬（2015），公司治理與避稅行為之關聯性，國立東華大學會計與財務碩士論文
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
101353055
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353055
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何怡澄zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 翁敏zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 翁敏zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2016en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Mar-2017 17:03:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Mar-2017 17:03:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Mar-2017 17:03:16 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0101353055en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=123077-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 101353055zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究從股份控制權及席次控制權與現金流量權偏離的程度，研究與租稅規避之前的關聯性。是否當控制權以大於盈餘分配權的方式越偏離時，因負的侵占效果使得租稅規避程度越高；又當控制權小於應於分配權而產生偏離時，因正的誘因效果使得租稅規避程度越低。zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 1\n第一節 研究背景與動機 1\n第二節 研究目的及問題 3\n第三節 研究流程 4\n第四節 研究架構 6\n第貳章 文獻回顧 7\n第一節 股權結構與代理問題 7\n第二節 雙權偏離 9\n第三節 租稅規避與雙權偏離 21\n一、租稅規避 21\n第參章 研究設計 25\n第一節 研究模型 25\n第二節 變數定義說明 26\n第三節 資料來源與樣本篩選過程 33\n第肆章 實證結果 35\n第一節 敘述統計 35\n第二節 迴歸結果 41\n第伍章 結論與建議 48\n第一節 研究結論 48\n第二節 研究限制 51\n參考文獻 52zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353055en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 控制權zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 現金流量權zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避zh_TW
dc.title (題名) 雙權偏離與租稅規避之關聯性zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Relationship between the separation of control and cash flow rights and tax avoidanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Badertscher, B. A., Katz, S. P., & Rego, S. O. (2013). The separation of ownership and control and corporate tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2), 228-250. \nBebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318): University of Chicago Press.\nBerle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporate and private property. McMillian, New York, NY. \nChen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61. \nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. \nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 58(1), 81-112. \nDesai, M. A. (2003). The divergence between book income and tax income Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17 (pp. 169-208): MIT press.\nDesai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 145-179. \nDyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 83(1), 61-82. \nDyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010). The effects of executives on corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1163-1189. \nFrank, M., Lynch, L., & Rego, S. (2006). Does aggressive financial reporting accompany aggressive tax reporting (and vice versa). University of Virginia. Mimeo. \nGompers, P. A., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2010). Extreme governance: An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1051-1088. \nGraham, J. R., & Tucker, A. L. (2006). Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(3), 563-594. \nGupta, S., & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1-34. \nHanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2), 127-178. \nJensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. \nKhurana, I. K., & Moser, W. (2010). Institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness.\nKraft, A. (2014). What Really Affects German Firms` Effective Tax Rate? International Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 1-19. \nLa Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of finance, 1147-1170. \nLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2000). Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33. \nLisowsky, P. (2010). Seeking shelter: Empirically modeling tax shelters using financial statement information. The Accounting Review, 85(5), 1693-1720. \nManzon Jr, G. B., & Plesko, G. A. (2001). Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income, The. Tax L. Rev., 55, 175. \nMcGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J. (2014). Dual class ownership and tax avoidance. The Accounting Review, 89(4), 1487-1516. \nMills, L. F. (1998). Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research, 36(2), 343-356. \nOmer, T. C., Molloy, K. H., & Ziebart, D. A. (1993). An investigation of the firm size—effective tax rate relation in the 1980s. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 8(2), 167-182. \nPorcano, T. (1986). Corporate tax rates: Progressive, proportional, or regressive. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 7(2), 17-31. \nPorta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517. \nRego, S. O. (2003). Tax‐Avoidance Activities of US Multinational Corporations*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805-833. \nRego, S. O., & Wilson, R. (2012). Equity risk incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(3), 775-810. \nRichardson, G., & Lanis, R. (2007). Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates and tax reform: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(6), 689-704. \nRobinson, J. R., Sikes, S. A., & Weaver, C. D. (2010). Performance measurement of corporate tax departments. The Accounting Review, 85(3), 1035-1064. \nShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783. \nSiegfried, J. J. (1972). The relationship between economic structure and the effect of political influence: Empirical evidence from the federal corporation income tax program (Vol. 2): University of Wisconsin--Madison.\nStickney, C. P., & McGee, V. E. (1983). Effective corporate tax rates the effect of size, capital intensity, leverage, and other factors. Journal of accounting and public policy, 1(2), 125-152. \nWilson, R. J. (2009). An examination of corporate tax shelter participants. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 969-999. \nYeh, Y. h., Lee, T. s., & Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of finance, 2(1‐2), 21-48. \nZimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of accounting and economics, 5, 119-149. \nZingales, L. (1994). The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan stock exchange experience. Review of financial Studies, 7(1), 125-148. \n翁淑育. (2000). 台灣上市公司股權結構, 核心代理問題及公司價值之研究, 輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文. Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment.” American Economic Review, 48, 261-297. \n葉銀華, 李存修, & 柯承恩. (2002). 公司治理與評等系統: Sunbright Publishing Co.\n許崇源, 李怡宗, 林宛瑩 與 鄭桂蕙 (2003). 控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上). 貨幣觀測與信用評等(42), 15-31.\n許崇源, 李怡宗, 林宛瑩 與 鄭桂蕙 (2003). 控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下). 貨幣觀測與信用評等(42), 15-31.\n王建煊. (2005). 租稅法, 文笙書局. \n林宛瑩, 許崇源. (2008). 台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議. 交大管理學報, 28(1), 269-312.\n劉健右(2008)，租稅規避之研究，政治大學法律系碩士論文\n施惠喻（2015），資訊揭露、投票權與現金流量權偏離程度與避稅行為之關係，國立臺北商業大學會計財稅研究所碩士論文\n蔡佳芬（2015），公司治理與避稅行為之關聯性，國立東華大學會計與財務碩士論文zh_TW