| dc.coverage.temporal | 計畫年度：89 起迄日期：20000801～20010731 | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張清福;歐進士;李佳玲 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2000 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:46 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 8-Sep-2008 15:55:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:46 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 8-Sep-2008 15:55:55 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 18-Apr-2007 16:37:46 (UTC+8) | en_US |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | 892416H004100.pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://tair.lib.ntu.edu.tw:8000/123456789/3928 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/3928 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 核定金額：350000元 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 高階主管（CEO）獎酬的決定因素有很多，包括經濟性及非經濟性決定因素，諸如經營績效、公司規模、公司成長、企業風險、董監持股、以及股權結構等。本研究採用Partial Least Squares（PLS）方法來探討高階主管獎酬的經濟性決定因素，以克服傳統迴歸方法在本文所面臨的限制：1.同時存在兩個以上的因變數；2.自變數間有複共線性；3.模型含方程組而非單一方程式4.變數為抽象性的隱變數（latentvariable ） 而非顯變數（ observablevariable）；5. 資料分佈不符合迴歸殘差項的假設要求；6. 樣本小變數多。“高階主管”一詞在國外文獻中大都指負責決策的執行長（CEO），然而在台灣企業中並無執行長一職，而總經理也未必握有實際決策之權。唯一可以確認的是企業必然有“董事長”與“總經理”兩種職稱，而兩者之一應負有決策之權。本文據此進行研究，在控制公司成長、公司規模、企業風險、董監持股、股權結構及產業競爭因素之後，發現同時有“董事長”及“常董兼總經理”兩種職位的公司與同時有“董事長”及“總經理”兩種職位的公司，高階主管的獎酬並不受企業經營績效的影響；然而，同時有“董事長”及“常董兼總經理”兩種職位的公司，高階主管的獎酬則顯著地受到企業經營績效的影響。美國企業高階主管的獎酬亦充分反應了企業經營的績效。這項發現與過去的文獻有很大不同，但卻強烈支持代理理論的論點。 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study investigates the economic determinants of executive compensation with the control of other factors including firm size, growth, business risk, board ownership, and ownership structure. The partial least squares (PLS) approach, as an alternative method specified in the proposal, is applied to address the issue, which overcomes the problems in this study faced by the traditional regression approach: (1) two dependent variables (2) multicollinearity (3) a set of equations in the model (4) latent variables (5) small sample and large number of variables and (6) free of distribution assumption. The issue of executive compensation concerns with the CEO as a focus but it couldn`t be easily identified in Taiwan’s enterprises. By applying PLS approach this study found that the executive compensation of firms with both titles of president and managing director and firms with titles of president and manager is not linked to firm president and managing director is significantly associated with firm performance. As for US firms, the executive compensation is significantly correlated with firm performance though all other control variables are insignificant. This finding provides strong evidence supporting the argument of agency theory. The PLS approach applied in this study is quite unique in executive compensation research. It would contribute to the field as an application illustration. | - |
| dc.format | applicaiton/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 98659 bytes | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 98659 bytes | - |
| dc.format.extent | 20504 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | - |
| dc.language | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | en_US |
| dc.publisher (Publisher) | 臺北市：國立政治大學會計學系 | en_US |
| dc.rights (Rights) | 行政院國家科學委員會 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 高階主管;薪酬制度;決定因素;公司績效;公司規模;董監事持股;股權結構 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Top management;Compensation system;Determinant;Corporate performance;Firm size;Insider holdings;Ownership structure | - |
| dc.title (題名) | 高階主管酬勞的經濟性決定因素：台灣與美國的實證分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title.alternative (其他題名) | Economic Determinants of Executive Compensation---Evidence from Taiwan and USA | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | en |
