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題名 從「我是什麼？」論同一性判準
On the criteria of self-identity from the viewpoint of "What am I ?"作者 趙茂林
Chao, Mao-lin貢獻者 戴華
趙茂林
Chao, Mao-lin關鍵詞 同一性
人格人
人類生物
同一性判準
為己關懷
心理研究進路
生命（物）研究進路
產前基因干預
預立醫囑
先前的自主
最佳權益
Identity
Person
Human animal(organism)
Criterion of identity
Egoistic concern
The psychological approach
The biological approach
Prenatal genetic intervention
Advance directive
Precedent autonomy
Best interests日期 2014 上傳時間 3-Jul-2017 14:40:20 (UTC+8) 摘要 關切並意圖解決如妳我對象相關的生命議題是撰寫本論文的出發點，從理解當代研究進路並進而建構出融貫的生命整體解釋架構則是目的。在這樣的研究過程中包含了二個主要問題需要作出進一步的釐清，一是「如妳我的個體屬於存有學範疇中的哪一種類？」（即「我是什麼？」的問題），另一則是「如妳我的個體又是如何跨越時間而持續存在的？」釐清了自我的形上學本質，攸關於自我對過去與未來的生命歷程該如何作出為己關懷的理解。因而，採取什麼樣的同一性判準而將過去與未來的對象當作是「同一個人」是貫串本論文的核心討論。學界對此議題的相關探討大致可分為二種進路：心理研究進路與生命（物）研究進路。如何能夠合理地將「我」建立成為一個有意義的「生命整體」，進而因應我們所面對的生命倫理議題，筆者執此標準作為測試的依據，並試圖從對二種進路的析論中得出能對於生命做出最合理的說明架構。實際的生命倫理議題便是驗證說明架構的試金石。故本論文後半部分別以「產前基因干預」與「預立醫囑」為例，作出介紹與討論。針對反對者依據道德理由、先前自主而提出的同一性論證，驗證說明架構是否能明確地做出解釋與回應，並積極為產前基因干預的道德性、預立醫囑效力與建立病患的最佳權益提供合理的依據。
Concern and with intent to solve life issues related to individuals like you and me is the start of this dissertation. Research into modern approaches and construct an explaining structure is its aim. There are two main questions included in the process of research. One is the question “individuals like you and me belong to which kind of entity” (question “what am I ?”), the other is “how and what is involved in an individual continued existence over time”. Clarification of the metaphysical nature of self is connected to understanding of one’s egoistic concern. Therefore, which identity criterion can connect a past one and a future one as a ‘same individual’ is the core through this dissertation. There have two approaches focus on this discussion: the Psychological Approach and the Biological Approach. How to construct a self as a meaningful life as a whole, then rationally respond to life issues are taken as the test basis. A reasonable explaining structure that makes life as a whole is derived from research to two approaches.Actual life issues are verified touchstone of explaining structure. Take “prenatal genetic intervention (PGI)” and “advance directive (AD)” as examples and discuss them constitute the second half of this dissertation. Whether identity arguments based on moral reasons or precedent autonomy can be responded and reasonable explained, whether it also provide basis for interpretation of morality of PGI, authority of AD, and patient’s best interests are taken as verified standards of rationality of explaining structure.參考文獻 書籍Baker, L. R. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.Baker, L. R. (2007). The metaphysics of everyday life: An essay in practical realism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W. (1989). Deciding for others: The ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.Buchanan, A. E. (2000). From chance to choice: Genetics and justice. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (1996). Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (2005). Human identity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (2012). Creation ethics: Reproduction, genetics, and quality of life. Oxford : Oxford University Press.Dworkin, R. (1993). Life`s dominion: An argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom. New York: Knopf.Dworkin, R., & Burley, J. (2004). Dworkin and his critics: With replies by Dworkin. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.Furberg, Elisabeth. (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity. Stockholm University.Holland, S. (2003). Bioethics: A philosophical introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.MacBride, F. (2006). Identity and modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.McMahan, J. (2002). The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life. New York: Oxford University Press.Noonan, H. W. (1989). Personal identity. London: Routledge.Olson, E. T. (2004). The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Olson, E. T. (2007). What are we?: A study in personal ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Perry, J. (1975). Personal identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press.Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the self: Philosophical papers 1956-1972. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.Wilkes, K. V. (1988). Real people: Personal identity without thought experiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press.波伊曼編著，魏德驥等譯，1997，《解構死亡：死亡、自殺、安樂死與死刑的剖析》台北：桂冠圖書。Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W.等著，蕭郁雯譯，2004，《從機會到選擇：遺傳學與正義》，台北：巨流圖書。約翰‧哈里斯著，蔡甫昌等譯，2006，《複製、基因與不朽：基因革命的反思》，台北：桂冠圖書。朗諾‧德沃金著，郭貞伶、陳雅汝譯，2002，《生命的自主權》，台北：商周出版。維吉尼亞‧貝爾、大衛‧儲克索著，蔡佳芬譯，2012，《你忘了我，但我永遠記得你：以友善尊嚴方式照顧失智症親友》，台北：心靈工坊文化。 期刊文章Berghmans, R. L. (January 01, 1998). Advance directives for non-therapeutic dementia research: some ethical and policy considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24, 1, 32-7.Berghmans, Ron (January 25, 2006). Advance Directives and Dementia. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 913, 1, 105-110.Buchanan, A. (October 01, 1988). Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 17, 4, 277-302.Chappell, T. (January 01, 1995). Personal Identity, "R-Relatedness` and the Empty Question Argument. The Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 178, 88-92.Dresser, R., & Whitehouse, P. J. (July 01, 1994). The Incompetent Patient on the Slippery Slope. The Hastings Center Report, 24, 4, 6-12.Dresser, R. (November 01, 1995). Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy. Hastings Center Report, 25, 6, 32-38.Elliot, R. (January 01, 1991). Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement. The Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 162, 55-75.Elliot, Robert (January 01, 1993). Identity and the Gene Therapy. Bioethics, 7, 1, 27-40.Garrett, B. (1998). Personal identity and self-consciousness. London: Routledge.Gendler, T. S. (January 01, 2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 206, 34-54.Hawkins, J. (April, 2014). Well-Being, Time, and Dementia. Ethics, Vol. 124, No. 3, 507-542.Jaworska, Agnieszka (April 01, 1999). Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer`s Patients and the Capacity to Value. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 28, 2, 105-138.Jones, D. Gareth, & Telfer, Barbara (January 01, 1995). Before I was An Embryo, I was A Pre-Embryo: or was I?. Bioethics, 9, 1, 32-49.Korsgaard, C. M. (April 01, 1989). Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 18, 2, 101-132.Kuczewski, Mark G. (January 01, 1994). Whose Will Is It, Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics. Bioethics, 8, 1, 27-48.Ott, A. (January 01, 2009). Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives. The Pluralist, 4, 2, 38-54.Persson, I. (January 01, 1997). Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity -- a reply to Robert Elliot. Bioethics, 11, 2, 161-9.Sider, T. (October 01, 2001). Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis. Nous, 35, 189-209.Taliaferro, C. (January 01, 1986). Pollock`s Body-Switching. The Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 142, 57-61.Woodward, J. (July 01, 1986). The Non-Identity Problem. Ethics, 96, 4, 804-831.Zohar, Noam. J. (October 01, 1991). Prospects for “Genetic Therapy”- Can A Person Benefit from Being Altered?. Bioethics, 5, 4, 275-288. 描述 博士
國立政治大學
哲學系
93154503資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154503 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 戴華 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 趙茂林 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chao, Mao-lin en_US dc.creator (作者) 趙茂林 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chao, Mao-lin en_US dc.date (日期) 2014 en_US dc.date.accessioned 3-Jul-2017 14:40:20 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 3-Jul-2017 14:40:20 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Jul-2017 14:40:20 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0093154503 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110690 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 哲學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 93154503 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 關切並意圖解決如妳我對象相關的生命議題是撰寫本論文的出發點，從理解當代研究進路並進而建構出融貫的生命整體解釋架構則是目的。在這樣的研究過程中包含了二個主要問題需要作出進一步的釐清，一是「如妳我的個體屬於存有學範疇中的哪一種類？」（即「我是什麼？」的問題），另一則是「如妳我的個體又是如何跨越時間而持續存在的？」釐清了自我的形上學本質，攸關於自我對過去與未來的生命歷程該如何作出為己關懷的理解。因而，採取什麼樣的同一性判準而將過去與未來的對象當作是「同一個人」是貫串本論文的核心討論。學界對此議題的相關探討大致可分為二種進路：心理研究進路與生命（物）研究進路。如何能夠合理地將「我」建立成為一個有意義的「生命整體」，進而因應我們所面對的生命倫理議題，筆者執此標準作為測試的依據，並試圖從對二種進路的析論中得出能對於生命做出最合理的說明架構。實際的生命倫理議題便是驗證說明架構的試金石。故本論文後半部分別以「產前基因干預」與「預立醫囑」為例，作出介紹與討論。針對反對者依據道德理由、先前自主而提出的同一性論證，驗證說明架構是否能明確地做出解釋與回應，並積極為產前基因干預的道德性、預立醫囑效力與建立病患的最佳權益提供合理的依據。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Concern and with intent to solve life issues related to individuals like you and me is the start of this dissertation. Research into modern approaches and construct an explaining structure is its aim. There are two main questions included in the process of research. One is the question “individuals like you and me belong to which kind of entity” (question “what am I ?”), the other is “how and what is involved in an individual continued existence over time”. Clarification of the metaphysical nature of self is connected to understanding of one’s egoistic concern. Therefore, which identity criterion can connect a past one and a future one as a ‘same individual’ is the core through this dissertation. There have two approaches focus on this discussion: the Psychological Approach and the Biological Approach. How to construct a self as a meaningful life as a whole, then rationally respond to life issues are taken as the test basis. A reasonable explaining structure that makes life as a whole is derived from research to two approaches.Actual life issues are verified touchstone of explaining structure. Take “prenatal genetic intervention (PGI)” and “advance directive (AD)” as examples and discuss them constitute the second half of this dissertation. Whether identity arguments based on moral reasons or precedent autonomy can be responded and reasonable explained, whether it also provide basis for interpretation of morality of PGI, authority of AD, and patient’s best interests are taken as verified standards of rationality of explaining structure. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 前 言 ………………………………………………………………………………1第一章 我是什麼？…………………………………………………51. 我是靈魂嗎？ …………………………………………………………71.1形質論（Hylomorphism）的靈魂說…………………91.2 Descartes的靈魂說 …………………………………………122. 我是人類生物（human organism）嗎？ ………162.1 腦移植反例 ……………………………………………………192.2 雙頭人（Dicephalus）的例子…………………………………223. 我是心理的存有物（psychological being）嗎？ ……………………273.1前人格人（Pre-persons）與後人格人（Post-persons）………283.2 構成觀點 ………………………………………………………303.2.1「強」與「弱」的第一人稱觀點 ………313.2.2構成與其難題……………………………………………333.3具現的心靈（Embodied Mind）……………39小結 ………………………………………………………………………43「我是人類生物」續探 ……………………………………45第二章 同一性判準 …………………………………461. 非化約論式的同一性判準…………………………512. 化約論式的同一性判準………………………………522.1身體判準（The Bodily Criterion）……522.1.1標準判準與修正判準……………………………………522.1.2身體論（Corporealism）…………………………………572.2腦判準（The Brain Criterion）……………………592.2.1死亡判準與死亡定義……………………………………602.2.2對上腦判準的批判………………………………………632.3再探腦判準 ……………………………………………………653. 心理判準（The Psychological Criterion）/ 心理研究進路 ………663.1記憶判準 ………………………………………………………673.2心理連續性判準 ………………………………………………693.2.1關於丐題謬誤的反駁 …………………………………694.生物判準（The Biological Criterion）…………………………………734.1明智關懷論證（Prudential Concern Argument）………………754.2道德責任論證與人際對待論證 ………………………………764.3維生功能 ………………………………………………………794.4生物連續性 ……………………………………………………804.5生物連續性再探 ………………………………………………815. 同一性判準的修正……………………………………………68第三章 產前基因干預 ……………………………………861. 相關背景介紹………………………………………………………861.1產前基因診斷（PGD）……………………………………871.2產前基因治療（PGT）……………………………………881.3產前基因強化（PGE）……………………………………882. 胎兒問題（The Fetus Problem）…………893. 我與單細胞受精卵的關係…………………………………934. 干預與產前同一性的關聯……………………………………974.1前個體化基因干預 …………………………………………1004.2後個體化基因干預 …………………………………………1025. 反對產前基因干預的同一性論證 …………………1056. 論證細節再探與論戰 ………………………………………1066.1基因治療是個誤稱：找不出涉及特定個人的理由…………1066.2「CT無傷於同一性」讓我們具有道德理由 …………………1106.3讓其存在便能使之受益或受到傷害…………………………118小結：對反「產前基因干預」（PGI）論證的回應…………121第四章 預立醫囑（AD）…………………………………1231. AD發展背景 …………………………………………………………1231.1指示醫囑 ………………………………………………………1251.2委任醫囑 ………………………………………………………1262.在AD中幾個不對稱之處 ……………………………………………1263.反對AD效力的同一性論證 …………………………………………1283.1 PVS病患版本的同一性論證 …………………………………1293.2失智病患版本的同一性論證 …………………………………1313.2.1 回應失智病患版本的同一性論證 ……………………1323.2.2 從社群觀點，否認N-SEP駁斥了數量同一性 ………1333.2.3 探討N-SEP本身的問題 ………………………………1354. 先前的自主 …………………………………………………………1375. 失智病患的最佳權益 ………………………………………1415.1 體驗權益與關鍵權益…………………………………………1415.2 與時間相關的權益……………………………………………1445.3 失智病患的最佳權益是不確定的…………………148小結 ……………………………………………………………………150再探AD效力 ……………………………………………………151結論 ……………………………………………………………………154參考文獻 …………………………………………………………156 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1475957 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154503 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 同一性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 人格人 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 人類生物 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 同一性判準 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 為己關懷 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 心理研究進路 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 生命（物）研究進路 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產前基因干預 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 預立醫囑 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 先前的自主 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最佳權益 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Identity en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Person en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Human animal(organism) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Criterion of identity en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Egoistic concern en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) The psychological approach en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) The biological approach en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Prenatal genetic intervention en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Advance directive en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Precedent autonomy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Best interests en_US dc.title (題名) 從「我是什麼？」論同一性判準 zh_TW dc.title (題名) On the criteria of self-identity from the viewpoint of "What am I ?" en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 書籍Baker, L. R. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.Baker, L. R. (2007). The metaphysics of everyday life: An essay in practical realism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W. (1989). Deciding for others: The ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.Buchanan, A. E. (2000). From chance to choice: Genetics and justice. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (1996). Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (2005). Human identity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DeGrazia, D. (2012). Creation ethics: Reproduction, genetics, and quality of life. Oxford : Oxford University Press.Dworkin, R. (1993). Life`s dominion: An argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom. New York: Knopf.Dworkin, R., & Burley, J. (2004). Dworkin and his critics: With replies by Dworkin. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.Furberg, Elisabeth. (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity. Stockholm University.Holland, S. (2003). Bioethics: A philosophical introduction. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.MacBride, F. (2006). Identity and modality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.McMahan, J. (2002). The ethics of killing: Problems at the margins of life. New York: Oxford University Press.Noonan, H. W. (1989). Personal identity. London: Routledge.Olson, E. T. (2004). The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Olson, E. T. (2007). What are we?: A study in personal ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Perry, J. (1975). Personal identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press.Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the self: Philosophical papers 1956-1972. Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press.Wilkes, K. V. (1988). Real people: Personal identity without thought experiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press.波伊曼編著，魏德驥等譯，1997，《解構死亡：死亡、自殺、安樂死與死刑的剖析》台北：桂冠圖書。Buchanan, A. E., & Brock, D. W.等著，蕭郁雯譯，2004，《從機會到選擇：遺傳學與正義》，台北：巨流圖書。約翰‧哈里斯著，蔡甫昌等譯，2006，《複製、基因與不朽：基因革命的反思》，台北：桂冠圖書。朗諾‧德沃金著，郭貞伶、陳雅汝譯，2002，《生命的自主權》，台北：商周出版。維吉尼亞‧貝爾、大衛‧儲克索著，蔡佳芬譯，2012，《你忘了我，但我永遠記得你：以友善尊嚴方式照顧失智症親友》，台北：心靈工坊文化。 期刊文章Berghmans, R. L. (January 01, 1998). Advance directives for non-therapeutic dementia research: some ethical and policy considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24, 1, 32-7.Berghmans, Ron (January 25, 2006). Advance Directives and Dementia. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 913, 1, 105-110.Buchanan, A. (October 01, 1988). Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 17, 4, 277-302.Chappell, T. (January 01, 1995). Personal Identity, "R-Relatedness` and the Empty Question Argument. The Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 178, 88-92.Dresser, R., & Whitehouse, P. J. (July 01, 1994). 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