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題名 現金持有與企業董事會外部董事的產業背景
Cash holdings and industrial background of outside directors
作者 王思蘋
Wang, Szu Ping
貢獻者 潘健民
Pan, Chien Min
王思蘋
Wang, Szu Ping
關鍵詞 現金持有
外部董事
產業背景
Cash holdings
Outside directors
Industrial background
日期 2017
上傳時間 11-Jul-2017 11:24:38 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究欲探討日本企業之現金持有是否會因董事會中之外部董事曾經或現有銀行、主要往來銀行、證券、保險業之背景或經驗，而有所影響。日本企業主要透過間接金融之方式籌措資金，其主要監督者並非資本市場，而為該企業之主要債權人-銀行。日本銀行在對其客戶執行高風險之策略或投資時會施予適當之關注，甚至視情況派員進入其董事會進行干預。因此，企業董事會中之外部董事如有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景者，可推測銀行對於該企業之控制力較大，因而使該企業現金持有較多。本研究實證結果發現企業董事會之外部董事有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景或經驗者，其現金持有會高於無該等外部董事之企業，且主要往來銀行之影響更甚於非主要往來銀行。
In this study, I investigate the relation between corporate cash holdings and the industrial background of the outside directors in Japan. Indirect finance has been dominating in Japan for decades. The banking system, not the capital market, has played the role disciplining firms. Banks in Japan also have the practice of appointing directors to the board of their client firms. We therefore conjecture that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliations will have more cash holdings. The results show that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliation tend to have higher cash holding level. The results are stronger when such bank affiliation is a main bank affiliation.
參考文獻 王志誠，1998，美國公司經營機關之改造與啟發－兼論我國引進外部董事制度之基本課題，證券暨期貨管理，第16卷第11期：1-21。
李徳冠、陳禹竹、陳計良與張慧珊，2015，董事會職能與獨立董事角色：從企業競爭策略和獨立董事背景來探討，證券市場發展季刊，第27卷第4期：43-79。
周鰵，2010，獨立董事背景與治理效果-基於中國上市公司的實證研究，北京市：經濟科學出版社。
陳美華與蔡俊佑，2010，公司治理對於企業持有現金價值之影響，台灣銀行季刊，第六十一卷第四期：227-243。
楊敏華，2003，從公司治理探討美國公司監督制度之運作，台灣人文生態研究，第5卷第1期，73-97。
瑪麗安．簡寧斯，2000，董事會的功能與技巧:管理者與董事會良性互動的25個溝通方式，洪裕翔譯，臺北市：新自然主義股份有限公司。
蔡麗雯，2015，企業超額現金持有與租稅規避，國立政治大學會計學系博士論文。
羅傑．巴克，2013，有效能的董事會:邁向董事與董事會成功之路，中華公司治理協會譯，臺北市：中華公司治理協會。
Basu, S., L. S. Hwang, T. Mitsudome, and J. Weintrop. 2007. Corporate governance, top executive compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15 (1): 56-79.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.
Chatterjee, A., and D. Hambrick. 2007. It’s all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (3): 351-386.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Cotter, J. F., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. 1997. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics 43 (2): 195-218.
Dittmar, A., J. Mahrt-Smith, and H. Servaes. 2003. International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis 38 (1): 111-133.
Hiraki, T., H. Inoue, A. Ito, F. Kuroki, and H. Masuda. 2003. Corporate governance and firm value in Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 11 (3): 239-265.
Hitt, M. A., and B. B. Tyler. 1991. Strategic decision models: Integrating different perspectives. Strategic Management Journal 12 (5): 327-351.
Jensen, M, C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Keynes, J. M. 1934. The general theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375-400.
Linck, J. S., J. M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2):308-328.
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance 60 (6): 2661-2700.
Morck, R., and M. Nakamura. 1999. Banks and corporate control in Japan. Journal of Finance 54 (1): 319-339.
Nakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Coporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1): 3-46.
Palazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104 (1): 162-185.
Perry, T., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring. Journal of Business 78 (4): 1403-1431.
Pinkowitz, L., and R. Williason. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. Review of Financial Studies 14 (4): 1059-1082.
Raheja, C. G. 2005. Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (2): 283–306.
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about the capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1421-1460.
Sanders, WM. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055-1078.
Wiersema, M. F., and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in Japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996-1025.
Wiersema, M. F., and K. A. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91-121.
Zahra, S. A., and J. A. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15 (2): 291-334.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
104353022
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353022
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Pan, Chien Minen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 王思蘋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wang, Szu Pingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 王思蘋zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wang, Szu Pingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2017 11:24:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jul-2017 11:24:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2017 11:24:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0104353022en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110775-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 104353022zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究欲探討日本企業之現金持有是否會因董事會中之外部董事曾經或現有銀行、主要往來銀行、證券、保險業之背景或經驗，而有所影響。日本企業主要透過間接金融之方式籌措資金，其主要監督者並非資本市場，而為該企業之主要債權人-銀行。日本銀行在對其客戶執行高風險之策略或投資時會施予適當之關注，甚至視情況派員進入其董事會進行干預。因此，企業董事會中之外部董事如有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景者，可推測銀行對於該企業之控制力較大，因而使該企業現金持有較多。本研究實證結果發現企業董事會之外部董事有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景或經驗者，其現金持有會高於無該等外部董事之企業，且主要往來銀行之影響更甚於非主要往來銀行。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In this study, I investigate the relation between corporate cash holdings and the industrial background of the outside directors in Japan. Indirect finance has been dominating in Japan for decades. The banking system, not the capital market, has played the role disciplining firms. Banks in Japan also have the practice of appointing directors to the board of their client firms. We therefore conjecture that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliations will have more cash holdings. The results show that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliation tend to have higher cash holding level. The results are stronger when such bank affiliation is a main bank affiliation.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機和目的 1
第二節 研究架構 5
貳、 文獻探討與研究假說 6
第一節 董事會對營運之影響 6
第二節 現金持有 10
第三節 小結 17
參、 研究方法 19
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 19
第二節 變數定義與衡量 23
第三節 資料分析方法 31
肆、 實證結果與分析 32
第一節 敘述性統計 32
第二節 樣本相關檢定 34
第三節 現金持有與企業董事會外部董事的產業背景之實證結果 37
伍、 追加測試 41
第一節 有金融背景之外部董事人數 41
第二節 與產業平均數差異之測試 45
第三節 第一四分位數之測試 47
第四節 第三四分位數之測試 49
第五節 小結 51
陸、 結論 52
柒、 參考文獻 55		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353022en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 現金持有zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外部董事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產業背景zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cash holdingsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Outside directorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Industrial backgrounden_US
dc.title (題名) 現金持有與企業董事會外部董事的產業背景zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Cash holdings and industrial background of outside directorsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王志誠，1998，美國公司經營機關之改造與啟發－兼論我國引進外部董事制度之基本課題，證券暨期貨管理，第16卷第11期：1-21。
李徳冠、陳禹竹、陳計良與張慧珊，2015，董事會職能與獨立董事角色：從企業競爭策略和獨立董事背景來探討，證券市場發展季刊，第27卷第4期：43-79。
周鰵，2010，獨立董事背景與治理效果-基於中國上市公司的實證研究，北京市：經濟科學出版社。
陳美華與蔡俊佑，2010，公司治理對於企業持有現金價值之影響，台灣銀行季刊，第六十一卷第四期：227-243。
楊敏華，2003，從公司治理探討美國公司監督制度之運作，台灣人文生態研究，第5卷第1期，73-97。
瑪麗安．簡寧斯，2000，董事會的功能與技巧:管理者與董事會良性互動的25個溝通方式，洪裕翔譯，臺北市：新自然主義股份有限公司。
蔡麗雯，2015，企業超額現金持有與租稅規避，國立政治大學會計學系博士論文。
羅傑．巴克，2013，有效能的董事會:邁向董事與董事會成功之路，中華公司治理協會譯，臺北市：中華公司治理協會。
Basu, S., L. S. Hwang, T. Mitsudome, and J. Weintrop. 2007. Corporate governance, top executive compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15 (1): 56-79.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.
Chatterjee, A., and D. Hambrick. 2007. It’s all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (3): 351-386.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Cotter, J. F., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner. 1997. Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics 43 (2): 195-218.
Dittmar, A., J. Mahrt-Smith, and H. Servaes. 2003. International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis 38 (1): 111-133.
Hiraki, T., H. Inoue, A. Ito, F. Kuroki, and H. Masuda. 2003. Corporate governance and firm value in Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 11 (3): 239-265.
Hitt, M. A., and B. B. Tyler. 1991. Strategic decision models: Integrating different perspectives. Strategic Management Journal 12 (5): 327-351.
Jensen, M, C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Keynes, J. M. 1934. The general theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan.
Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 375-400.
Linck, J. S., J. M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2):308-328.
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance 60 (6): 2661-2700.
Morck, R., and M. Nakamura. 1999. Banks and corporate control in Japan. Journal of Finance 54 (1): 319-339.
Nakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Coporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1): 3-46.
Palazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104 (1): 162-185.
Perry, T., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring. Journal of Business 78 (4): 1403-1431.
Pinkowitz, L., and R. Williason. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. Review of Financial Studies 14 (4): 1059-1082.
Raheja, C. G. 2005. Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40 (2): 283–306.
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about the capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1421-1460.
Sanders, WM. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055-1078.
Wiersema, M. F., and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in Japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996-1025.
Wiersema, M. F., and K. A. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91-121.
Zahra, S. A., and J. A. Pearce. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management 15 (2): 291-334.		zh_TW