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題名 禮讓參選的賽局分析
A game-theoretic analysis of making a concession decision of election
作者 嚴馥妤
Yan, Fu Yu
貢獻者 王智賢
Wang, Jue Shyan
嚴馥妤
Yan, Fu Yu
關鍵詞 禮讓參選
政黨整合
序列均衡
Concession election
Party integration
Sequential equilibrium
日期 2017
上傳時間 11-Jul-2017 11:26:45 (UTC+8)
摘要 臺灣的政黨候選人在選舉競選過程中時常發生政治禮讓參選的狀況，相關新聞報導政黨整合同黨內或是政治理念較接近的不同政黨，可凝聚較多力量來提升選舉的勝選機率。本文引進參選人可以在他方參選人參選時，選擇是否採取禮讓決策的賽局模型來分析禮讓參選決策的合理性，而在參選人一方不知道他方參選人實力的強弱情況下，我們發現強者型態的他方參選人比例較大、他方參選人給予較多的禮讓好處時，使參選人較容易啟動禮讓機制。
In Taiwan, there is a common phenomenon that the candidates of the party give in to other candidates in the election campaigns. The relevant news reports a political party can integrate with the same party or different political parties with closer political ideas. By integrating, a political party can gather more political power to enhance the winning probability of election. This paper establishes a model of game theory which candidates can choose whether to make a concession decision of election when other party candidates are running for the election. This model is used to analyze the rationality of making a concession decision of election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidate, the candidates are easier to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of strong type of other candidates is larger and the other party candidates give more concessional benefits.
參考文獻 王宏恩 ( 2015 )，「政黨標籤的規模效應－以2014年村里長選舉為例」，選舉研究， 22：1，109-141。
王智賢 ( 2007 )，「勸退參選的賽局分析」，經濟研究，43：2，149-180。
王智賢、曾姵華 ( 2008 )，「勸退參選的賽局分析-政黨利益模型」，經社法治論叢，42，193-227。
王鼎銘 ( 2011 )，「參選人競選支出效果及其外部性:單記非讓渡投票制下之黨內競爭性分析」，人文及社會科學集刊，23：3，341-370。
田弘華、劉義周 ( 2005 )，「 政黨合作與杜瓦傑法則：連宋配、國親合的賽局分析 」，臺灣政治學刊，9：1，3 -37。
林水波 ( 2010 )，「 政治弔詭及其管理--以發展第三勢力為例」，政策研究學報，10，1-18。
林長志 ( 2009 )，「立委選制變遷對選民投票行為之影響---投票穩定與變遷的分析」，國立政治大學政治學系博士論文。
崔曉倩、吳重禮 ( 2007 )，「政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析」，選舉研究，14：1，119-143。
黃紀，劉義周與蕭怡靖 ( 2009 )，「單一選區兩票制下台灣選民的投票行為，2008年立法委員選舉的多層分析」，國立政治大學政治學系博士論文。
羅月英 ( 2005 )，「 政黨聯盟的經驗—兼論國民黨、親民黨之政黨整合 」，私立中國文化大學政治學系研究所碩士論文。
Aldrich, J. H. 2011. Why Parties? : A Second Look, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Aylott, N. and N. Bolin (2017), “Managed Intra-Party Democracy: Precursory Delegation and Party Leader Selection.” Party Politics, 23:1, 55-65.
Balliet, D., J. M. Tybur, J. Wu, C. Antonellis and P. A. M. Van Lange (2016), “Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation: In-Group Favoritism among Republicans and Democrats during a US National Election.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.
Best, R. E. and S. B. Lem (2010), “Electoral Volatility, Competition and Third-Party Candidacies in US Gubernatorial Elections.” Party Politics, 17:5, 611-628.
Cassino, D., C. S. Taber and M. Lodge (2007), “Information Processing and Public Opinion.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48:2, 205-220.
Jensen, C. and J. P. F. Thomsen (2011), “Can Party Competition Amplify Mass Ideological Polarization over Public Policy? The Case of Ethnic Exclusionism in Denmark and Sweden.” Party Politics, 19:5, 821-840.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium.” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.
Riker, W. H. (1982), “The Two-Party System and Duverger`s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” The American Political Science Review,76:4, 753-766.
Somer-Topcu, Z. (2017), “Agree or Disagree: How do Party Leader Changes Affect the Distribution of Voters’ Perceptions.” Party Politics, 23:1, 66-75.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
103255008
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255008
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 王智賢zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wang, Jue Shyanen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 嚴馥妤zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yan, Fu Yuen_US
dc.creator (作者) 嚴馥妤zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yan, Fu Yuen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2017 11:26:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jul-2017 11:26:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2017 11:26:45 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103255008en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110787-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103255008zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 臺灣的政黨候選人在選舉競選過程中時常發生政治禮讓參選的狀況，相關新聞報導政黨整合同黨內或是政治理念較接近的不同政黨，可凝聚較多力量來提升選舉的勝選機率。本文引進參選人可以在他方參選人參選時，選擇是否採取禮讓決策的賽局模型來分析禮讓參選決策的合理性，而在參選人一方不知道他方參選人實力的強弱情況下，我們發現強者型態的他方參選人比例較大、他方參選人給予較多的禮讓好處時，使參選人較容易啟動禮讓機制。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In Taiwan, there is a common phenomenon that the candidates of the party give in to other candidates in the election campaigns. The relevant news reports a political party can integrate with the same party or different political parties with closer political ideas. By integrating, a political party can gather more political power to enhance the winning probability of election. This paper establishes a model of game theory which candidates can choose whether to make a concession decision of election when other party candidates are running for the election. This model is used to analyze the rationality of making a concession decision of election. In the case of candidates who do not know the capability of other party candidate, the candidates are easier to start the concession mechanism when the proportion of strong type of other candidates is larger and the other party candidates give more concessional benefits.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 前言 1
第二章 基本模型 6
第三章 參選人 2 可以採取禮讓決策下之模型 10
第一節 參選人 2 不禮讓參選人 1 參選下之決策 12
第二節 參選人 2 採取禮讓參選人 1 下之決策 13
第三節 參選人 1是否參選之決策 14
第四節 均衡分析 15
第四章 基本模型及允許禮讓參選模型的分析結果 17
第五章 結論 24
參考文獻 26		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 904799 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255008en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 禮讓參選zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政黨整合zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 序列均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Concession electionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Party integrationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sequential equilibriumen_US
dc.title (題名) 禮讓參選的賽局分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) A game-theoretic analysis of making a concession decision of electionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王宏恩 ( 2015 )，「政黨標籤的規模效應－以2014年村里長選舉為例」，選舉研究， 22：1，109-141。
王智賢 ( 2007 )，「勸退參選的賽局分析」，經濟研究，43：2，149-180。
王智賢、曾姵華 ( 2008 )，「勸退參選的賽局分析-政黨利益模型」，經社法治論叢，42，193-227。
王鼎銘 ( 2011 )，「參選人競選支出效果及其外部性:單記非讓渡投票制下之黨內競爭性分析」，人文及社會科學集刊，23：3，341-370。
田弘華、劉義周 ( 2005 )，「 政黨合作與杜瓦傑法則：連宋配、國親合的賽局分析 」，臺灣政治學刊，9：1，3 -37。
林水波 ( 2010 )，「 政治弔詭及其管理--以發展第三勢力為例」，政策研究學報，10，1-18。
林長志 ( 2009 )，「立委選制變遷對選民投票行為之影響---投票穩定與變遷的分析」，國立政治大學政治學系博士論文。
崔曉倩、吳重禮 ( 2007 )，「政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析」，選舉研究，14：1，119-143。
黃紀，劉義周與蕭怡靖 ( 2009 )，「單一選區兩票制下台灣選民的投票行為，2008年立法委員選舉的多層分析」，國立政治大學政治學系博士論文。
羅月英 ( 2005 )，「 政黨聯盟的經驗—兼論國民黨、親民黨之政黨整合 」，私立中國文化大學政治學系研究所碩士論文。
Aldrich, J. H. 2011. Why Parties? : A Second Look, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Aylott, N. and N. Bolin (2017), “Managed Intra-Party Democracy: Precursory Delegation and Party Leader Selection.” Party Politics, 23:1, 55-65.
Balliet, D., J. M. Tybur, J. Wu, C. Antonellis and P. A. M. Van Lange (2016), “Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation: In-Group Favoritism among Republicans and Democrats during a US National Election.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.
Best, R. E. and S. B. Lem (2010), “Electoral Volatility, Competition and Third-Party Candidacies in US Gubernatorial Elections.” Party Politics, 17:5, 611-628.
Cassino, D., C. S. Taber and M. Lodge (2007), “Information Processing and Public Opinion.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48:2, 205-220.
Jensen, C. and J. P. F. Thomsen (2011), “Can Party Competition Amplify Mass Ideological Polarization over Public Policy? The Case of Ethnic Exclusionism in Denmark and Sweden.” Party Politics, 19:5, 821-840.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium.” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.
Riker, W. H. (1982), “The Two-Party System and Duverger`s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” The American Political Science Review,76:4, 753-766.
Somer-Topcu, Z. (2017), “Agree or Disagree: How do Party Leader Changes Affect the Distribution of Voters’ Perceptions.” Party Politics, 23:1, 66-75.		zh_TW