1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of International Affairs
  4. Theses
  5. Item

學術產出-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

  • No doi shows Citation Infomation
題名 政治制度與內戰持續性的分析－ 以哥倫比亞「哥倫比亞革命軍」以及 秘魯「光明之路」為例
The analysis of political institutions and civil war duration: cases of Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and Peru’s Sendero Luminoso
作者 林庭瑋
Lin, Ting Wei
貢獻者 張文揚
林庭瑋
Lin,Ting Wei
關鍵詞 內戰
延續性
祕魯
哥倫比亞
政治制度
光明之路
哥倫比亞革命軍
Civil war
Duration
Peru
Colombia
Political institution
Sendero Luminoso
FARC
日期 2017
上傳時間 11-Jul-2017 12:09:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文旨在討論內戰持續性的差異是否可以以其政治轉型解釋？也就是說，作者欲探討為何有些內戰較短、有些內戰較長？是否有關鍵因素導致內戰持續性之差別。目前學術研究多著重於以非政治因素（經濟因素）解釋內戰延續性問題，但筆者認為政治制度相對於其他因素（經濟、社會制度）是最能解釋內戰持續性差異之自變數，並提出本文核心假設－「內戰隨著政體的民主深化而縮短。」，其主因有三：（一）生活於民主政權下的人民，政治壓迫感較小（二）民主促進社會的重新分配（Redistributive）消弭國內之不平等狀況；（三）民主政府能透過稅收進行公共財的施放或公共服務滿足人民。
本文之研究方法以質性分析法的個案研究法為主，以南美洲作為研究對象而不以內戰發生最頻繁的非洲為研究對象，乃因2016年11月13日哥倫比亞政府正式與左翼武裝「哥倫比亞革命軍」（FARC）簽署修正版和平協議，結束長達半世紀的敵對狀態，引發作者對南美洲內戰延續性之研究興趣。經過最大相似法篩選後，作者以哥倫比亞與哥倫比亞革命軍和秘魯與光明之路的內戰作為個案案例，透過個案研究法，本文研究發現符合筆者之核心假設。筆者認為本文之內戰研究發現提供受內戰影響之國際社會、國家有關政治制度面之政策方向－即民主深化對於一國內戰延續性之影響力。　
參考文獻 平思寧（2015)。自然資源與國內衝突：權力轉移理論的應用。人文及社會科學集刊，27(3)，471-506。
陳勁（2005）。 由哥倫比亞計畫論美國在中南美洲之反毒政策。全球政治評論，12，47-78。
袁東振（2009）。拉美社會主義思想和運動: 基本特徵與主要趨勢。拉丁美洲研究，31 (3)，5-11。
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality (Working Paper No. 19746). MA: NBER Working Papers and Publications.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Agamben, S. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic growth, 8(2), 155-194.
Amnesty International. (2016). Amnesty International Report 2016/17. United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd.
Amnesty International. (2012). Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law. United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd.
Amnesty International. (2015, July 17). Colombia: National Development Plan threatens to deny the right to land restitution to victims of the armed conflict and allow mining firms to operate on illegally acquired lands. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.amnesty.ca/news/public-statements/colombia-national-development-plan-threatens-to-deny-the-right-to-land
Bailey, K. D. (1994). Methods of social research. New York: The Free Press.
Balbi, C. R., & Palmer, D. S. (2001). " Reinventing" democracy in Peru. Current history, 100(643), 65.
Balcells, L., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2014). Does warfare matter? Severity, duration,and outcomes of civil wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(8), 1390-1418.
Bapat, N. A. (2005). Insurgency and the opening of peace processes. Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 699-717.
BBC News. (2011, June 7). Peru election winner Humala congratulated by rival. Retrieved March 20, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-13651468
BBC News. (2012, August 28). Colombia agrees to hold peace talks with Farc rebels. Retrieved March 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19393096
BBC News. (2016, June 10). Peru elections: Keiko Fujimori concedes to Kuczynski. Retrieved April 20, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36505027
BBC News. (2016, December 28). Colombia approves amnesty agreed in Farc peace deal. Retrieved May 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38455493
BBC News. (2017, March 1). Colombia: Farc rebels prepare to lay down arms. Retrieved March 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-39124119
BBVA Microfinance Foundation. (2015). Colombian National Development Plan: All for a New Country. Retrieved April 14, 2017, from http://progresomicrofinanzas.org/en/colombian-national-development-plan-all-for-a-new-country/
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy, 119(4), 766-819.
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic literature, 48(1), 3-57.
Bleaney, M., & Dimico, A. (2011). How different are the correlates of onset and continuation of civil wars?. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2), 145-155.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Koch, M. T., & Siverson, R. M. (2004). Testing competing institutional explanations of the democratic peace: The case of dispute duration. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21(4), 255-267.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2011). The dictator`s handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics. NY: PublicAffairs.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2017). Political Succession. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(4), 707-743.
Buhaug, H., & Lujala, P. (2005). Accounting for scale: Measuring geography in quantitative studies of civil war. Political Geography, 24(4), 399-418.
Burt, J. M. (1992). Peru Façade of Democracy Crumbles. Report on the Americas, 26(1), 3-6.
Buscaglia, E., & Ratliff, W, (2001). War and Lack of Governance in Colombia:
Narcos, Guerrillas and U.S. Policy. Palo Alto: Hoover Press.
Bushnell, D. (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Caparros, M. (2016, October 7). Colombia’s Proof That Democracy Doesn’t Work. The New York Times. Retrieved April 22, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/colombias-proof-that-democracy-doesnt-work.html?_r=1
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2017). CIA The World Factbook. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html
Chacón, M., Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R. (2011). When is democracy an 　　
　　equilibrium? theory and evidence from Colombia’s la Violencia. Journal of 　　
　　Conflict Resolution, 55(3), 366-396.
Charles, V. (2015) Doing Business Across the Continents: A Quick Heads-Up.
STRATEGIA, 37, 8-18.
Chen, K., & Gallón, N. (2016, October 5). Colombians narrowly reject peace deal with the FARC. CNN. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/02/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal-vote/
Clark, N. (2015, April 6). Education in Peru. World Education News & Reviews. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from http://wenr.wes.org/2015/04/education-in-peru
Clayton, G. (2013). Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation. Journal of Peace Research, 50(5), 609-622.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford economic papers, 50(4), 563-573.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford economic
papers, 56(4), 563-595.
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2004). On the duration of civil war. Journal　
　　of peace research, 41(3), 253-273.
Colombia Reports. (2016, September 25). Colombia’s 2012 – 2016 peace talks | Fact　
　　sheet. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from　
　　https://colombiareports.com/colombia-peace-talks-fact-sheet/
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis
　　for field settings. MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Cunningham, D. E. (2006). Veto players and civil war duration. American Journal of　
　　Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch. K. S., & Salehyan, I. (2009). It takes two: A dyadic 　
　　analysis of civil war duration and outcome. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(4), 　　
　　570-597.
Davenport, C. (1995). Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An
　　inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. American Journal of Political
　　Science, 39(3), 683-713.
DeNardo, J. (2014). Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion.
　　NY: Princeton University Press.
Dixon, W. J. (1996). Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and
　　promoting peaceful settlement. International Organization, 50, 653-81.
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and
　　quantitative analysis. American political science review, 94(4), 779-801.
Durand, F. (1992). The New Right and Political Change in Peru. The Right and
　　Democracy in Latin America. NY: Praeger Publishers, 239-257.
Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2002). How much war will we see? Explaining the
　　prevalence of civil war. Journal of conflict resolution, 46(3), 307-334.
Fitzgibbon, R. H., & Kelly, P. (1998). Assessing Democracy in Latin America: A
　　Tribute to Russell H. Fitzgibbon. CO: Westview Press.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international
　　disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577-592.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International organization,
　　49(03), 379-414.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science review, 97(1), 75-90.
Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 275-301.
Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of conflict Resolution, 49(4), 483-507.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2007, August). Civil war termination. Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Florea, A. (2012). Where Do We Go from Here? Conceptual, Theoretical, and Methodological Gaps in the Large‐N Civil War Research Program1. International studies review, 14(1), 78-98.
Flores, T. E. (2013, August 28). 200 years of landlessness? Land inequality and the search for peace in Colombia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2013/200-years-landlessness-land-inequality-and-search-peace-colombia
Flores, T. E. (2014). Vertical inequality, land reform, and insurgency in Colombia. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20(1), 5-31.
Figueroa, A., & Barrón, M. (2005). Inequality ethnicity and social disorder in Peru. (Working Paper No. 8). Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House. http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml.
Freedom House (2017). Freedom in the world 2017: Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
Garfinkel, M. R. (2012). Political institutions and war initiation: the democratic peace hypothesis revisited. In Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gaviria, A. (2000). Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia. Journal of development economics, 61(1), 1-25.
Gaventa, J. (2006). Triumph, deficit or contestation? deepening the `deepening democracy` debate. (Working Paper No. 264).UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Gent, S. E. (2011). Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflicts. International Interactions, 37(2), 215-228.
Gerring, J. (2001). Social science methodology: A criterial framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand , H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. Journal of peace research, 39(5), 615-637.
Gleditsch, N. P., Hegre, H., & Strand, H. (2009). Democracy and civil war. In Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension (pp.92-155). Ann Arbor:
　　University of Michigan Press.
Gleditsch, K. S., & Ruggeri, A. (2010) Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war. Journal of Peace Research 47(3), 299-310.
Goñi, E., López, J. H., & Servén, L. (2011). Fiscal redistribution and income
　　inequality in Latin America. World Development, 39(9), 1558-1569.
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. The American
　　Economic Review, 81(4), 912-921.
Gurr, T. R. (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic
　　civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992. The
　　American Political Science Review, 95(1), 33-48.
Hendrix, C. S. (2011). Head for the hills? Rough terrain, state capacity, and civil war
　　onset. Civil Wars, 13(4), 345-370.
Hoddie, M., & Hartzell, C. (2003). Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements. Journal of Peace Research, 40(3), 303-320
Holmes, J. S., Piñeres, S. A. G., & Curtin, K. M. (2006). Drugs, violence, and
　　development in Colombia: A department‐level analysis. Latin American Politics
　　and Society, 48(3), 157-184.
Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping and
　　civilian protection in civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4),
　　875-891.
Hultquist, P. (2013). Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war
　　settlement. Journal of Peace Research, 50(5), 623-634.
Humphreys, M. (2003, February). Economics and violent conflict. Paper presented at
　　the meeting for Conflict Prevention Initiative, Massachusetts.
Joumard, I., & Vélez, J. L. (2013). Income Inequality and Poverty in Colombia-Part
　　2. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers. OECD Economic
　　Department Working Papers (Working Paper No. 1037). Paris: OECD Publishing
Kalyvas, S. N. (2010). Civil Wars. In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.
　　Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karl, R., & Sobek, D. (2004). The dynamics of civil war duration and
　　outcome. Journal of Peace Research,41(3), 303-320.
Kay, B. H. (1996). Fujipopulism and the liberal state in Peru, 1990–1995. Journal of
　　Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(4), 55-98.
Kay, B. H. (1999). Violent opportunities: The rise and fall of “King Coca” and
　　Shining Path. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(3), 97-127.
Keen, D. (2012). Greed and grievance in civil war. International Affairs, 88(4), 757-777.
KPMG. (2017, January 15). Peru: Tax reform includes increased corporate income tax rate. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/01/tnf-peru-tax-reform.html
Lacina, B., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2005). Monitoring trends in global combat: A new
dataset of battle deaths. European Journal of Population/Revue Européenne de
Démographie, 21(2), 145-166.
Lake, D. A., & Baum, M. A. (2001). The invisible hand of democracy: political
control and the provision of public services. Comparative political studies, 34(6),
587-621.
Lee, C. S. (2005). Income inequality, democracy, and public sector size. American
Sociological Review, 70(1), 158-181.
Li, H., Squire, L., & Zou, H. F. (1998). Explaining international and intertemporal
variations in income inequality. The Economic Journal, 108(446), 26-43.
Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of 　
　　repression and dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), 266-297.
Lichbach, M. I. (1995). The rebel`s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Linz, J. J. (1994). The failure of presidential democracy (Vol. 1). Baltimore: JHU
Press.
Lipson, M. (2007). Peacekeeping: organized hypocrisy?. European Journal of International Relations, 13(1), 5-34.
Livingstone, G. (2003). Inside Colombia: drugs, democracy and war. NY: Rutgers University Press.
Lopez-Calix, J., & Melo, A. (2003). Restoring Fiscal Discipline for Poverty Reduction in Peru: A Public Expenditure Review. A World Bank Country Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Lopez, E., & Capelouto, S. (2016, November 13). Colombia signs peace deal with FARC. CNN. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/12/world/colombia-farc-peace/
Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. Political geography, 20(5), 561-584.
Leech, G. (2011) The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. New York: Fernwood Publishing.
Long, T. (2016, December 16) Peace in Colombia? Lessons from the failed 1999-2002 talks. Latin America Goes Global. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2015/12/peace-in-colombia-lessons-from-the-failed-1999-2002-talks/
Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P., & Gilmore, E. (2005). A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 538-562.
Luque, J., & Fernandez, R. (2002). Peru. International Tax Review, (10), 128-131. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/230205668?accountid=10067
Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
Marin, C. (2011, September 16). Big Win For Indigenous Rights In Peru. Amnesty International Blog. Retrieved May 1, 2017 from http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/big-win-for-indigenous-rights-in-peru/
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2010). Polity IV country report 2010: Colombia. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://www. systemicpeace. org/polity/Colombia2010. pdf.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2010). Polity IV country report 2010: Peru. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from http://www. systemicpeace. org/polity/Peru2010. pdf.
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2016). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2014. The polity IV dataset. Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of Black insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McClintock, C. (1984). Why peasants rebel: The case of Peru`s Sendero
　　Luminoso. World Politics, 37(01), 48-84.
McClintock, C. (1994). Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru. In The Shining Path of Peru (pp. 243-258). NY: Palgrave Macmillan US.
McClintock, C. (1998). Revolutionary movements in Latin America: El Salvador`s FMLN & Perú`s shining path. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
McKenzie, V. (2014, November 27). Colombia’s land restitution law defrauding victims: Amnesty International. Colombia Reports. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://colombiareports.com/colombias-land-restitution-law-defrauding-victims-amnesty-international/
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013a). Do illegal drug markets breed violence? Evidence for Colombia. Chile: Universidad de los Andes.
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). Bushes and bullets: Illegal cocaine markets and violence in Colombia. Chile: Universidad de los Andes.
Melander, E., Pettersson, T., & Themnér, L. (2016). Organized violence, 1989–2015. Journal of Peace Research, 53(5), 727-742.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of political Economy, 89(5), 914-927.
Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. (2004). Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social forces, 82(4), 1457-1492.
Mill, J. S. (1884). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. NY: Harper.
Miller, L. E., & Aucoin, L. (2010). Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making. DC: USIP Press
Miller, T., & Kim, A. B. (2016). 2016 Index of Economic Freedom: Promoting Economic Opportunity and Prosperity. DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Miroff, N. (2016, September 5) Colombia’s war has displaced 7 million. With peace, will they go home? The Washington Post. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_term=.69628cce5878
Molano, A. (2000). The Evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group’s long history. NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(2), 23-31.
Moller, L. C. (2012). Fiscal policy in Colombia: Tapping its potential for a more equitable society. NY: World Bank Publications.
Moloney, A. (2016, November 30) Latin America has most unequal land distribution, Colombia fares worst: charity. Reuters. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-landrights-idUSKBN13P2NX
Moore, W. H. (1998). Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and 　　
　　timing. American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 851-873.
Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence a rational action approach. Journal of conflict resolution, 34(4), 624-651.
Mukherjee, B. (2006). Why Political Power‐Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?. International studies quarterly, 50(2), 479-504.
OECD, et al. (2017). Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action (Vol. 124). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Otis, J. (2014). The FARC and Colombia’s illegal drug trade. Paper presented at the meeting of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—Latin America Program, Washington, DC.
Payne, G., & Payne, J. (2004). Key concepts in social research. London: Sage Publications.
Peceny, M., & Michael, D. (2006). The FARC`s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug 　　
　　Policies and the Deepening of Columbia`s Civil War in the 1990s. Latin
　　American Politics &Society, 48(2), 95-116.
Peeler, J. A. (1998). Building Democracy in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (2005). The economic effects of constitutions. Massachusetts: MIT press.
Persson, T., & Besley, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation and policy. The American Economic Review, 99(4), 1218-1244.
Przeworski, A. (1990). The state and the economy under capitalism. UK: Routledge.
Rabasa, A., & Chalk, P. (2001). Colombian labyrinth: The synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability. Washington, DC: Rand Corporation.
Radu, M. (2000). The perilous appeasement of guerrillas. Orbis, 44(3), 362-379.
Ramírez, M. C. (2010). Maintaining democracy in Colombia through political exclusion, states of exception, counterinsurgency and dirty war. In Violent democracies in Latin America (pp. 129-165). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Regan, P. M. (2000). Civil wars and foreign powers: Outside interventions and intrastate conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Regan, P. M. (2002). Third party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 55-73.
Regan, P. M., & Henderson, E. A. (2002). Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: are democracies internally less violent? Third World Quarterly, 23(1), 119-136.
Restrepo, J., Spagat, M., & Vargas, J. (2003). The dynamics of the Colombian civil conflict: a new dataset. Homo Oeconom. 21(2), 396–428
RodríguezRaga, J. C., & Seligson, M. A. (2012). The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia and the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity. Bogota: USAID.
Ron, J. (2001). Ideology in context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso`s tactical
　　escalation. Journal of Peace Research, 38(5), 569-592.
Rosato, S. (2003). The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. American Political Science Review, 97(04), 585-602.
Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of peace research, 41(3), 337-356.
Ross, M. L. (2015). Conflict and Natural Resources: Is the Latin American and
Caribbean Region Different from the Rest of the World? In Transparent Governance in an Age of Abundance: experiences from the extractive industries in Latin America and the Caribbean (pp.109-142). Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
RSF (2017). 2017 World Press Freedom Index. Paris: Reporters Without Borders.
Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2017
Rustad, S. C. A., Rød, J. K., Larsen, W., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2008). Foliage and
fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and
　　location of civil war. Political Geography, 27(7), 761-782.
Saab, B. Y., & Taylor, A. W.(2009). Criminality and armed groups: A 　　
　　comparative study of FARC and paramilitary groups in Colombia. Studies in
　　Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 455-475.
Safford, F., & Palacios, M. (2001). Colombia: Fragmented land, divided society
(Latin American histories). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Salazar, M. (2017, February 23). Colombia’s ex-president seeks referendum to alter peace deal. Colombia Report. Retrieved April 13, 2017 from https://colombiareports.com/colombias-ex-president-seeks-referendum-alter-peace-deal/
Salehyan, I. (2009). Rebels without borders. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sambanis, N.(2002). A review of recent advances and future directions in the
quantitative literature on civil war. Defence and Peace Economics, 13(3), 215-243.
Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. Journal of conflict resolution, 48(6), 814-858.
Sanín, F. G. (2008). Telling the difference: Guerrillas and 　　
　　paramilitaries in the Colombian war. Politics & Society, 36(1), 3-34.
Sarkees, M. R. (2000). The correlates of war data on war: An update to
1997. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18(1), 123-144.
Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: An introduction and some
hypotheses. In Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict (pp. 3-24). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Strand, H., Carlsen, J., Gleditsch, N. P., Hegre, H., Ormhaug, C., & Wilhelmsen, L. 　　
　　(2005). Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook: Version 3-2005. Oslo, Norway: 　　
　　International Peace Research Institute. (www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict)
Syria Regional Refugee Response. (2017). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
Taliercio, R. (2001). Unsustainably Autonomous?: Challenges to the Revenue Authority Model in Latin America Tax Agencies in Developing Countries. Washington DC: World Bank.
Teune, H., & Przeworski, A. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. Malabar, FL: Krieger.
The Economist. (2016, April 14). Unfunny Money. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21697008-government-may-never-get-its-hands-guerrillas-ill-gotten-gains-unfunny-money
Thies, C. G. (2010). Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and
primary commodities. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 321-332.
Thorp, R., Caumartin, C., & Gray‐Monila, G. (2006). Inequality, ethnicity, political mobilisation and political violence in Latin America: The cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25(4), 453-480.
Thoumi, F. E. (2002). Illegal drugs in Colombia: From illegal economic boom to social crisis. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 582(1), 102-116.
Transparency International. (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin, Germany: Transparency In¬ternational. (Accessed on November 25, 2016).
URL: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/
United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.) What is peacekeeping? Retrieved May 20, 2017, from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml
Van Belle, D. A. (1996). Leadership and collective action: the case of
revolution. International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 107-132.
Vanden, H. E., & Prevost, G. (2015). Politics of Latin America: the power game. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vélez, J. L. (2012). Income and Wealth at the Top in Colombia: An Exploration of Tax Records 1993-2010. (Public Policy and Development Master Dissertation). Paris School of Economics, Paris.
Vergara, A., & Encinas, D. (2016). Continuity by surprise: explaining institutional stability in contemporary Peru. Latin American Research Review, 51(1), 159-180.
Vreeland, J. R. (2008). The effect of political regime on civil war unpacking anocracy. Journal of conflict Resolution, 52(3), 401-425.
Vyas, K. (2016, October 20). Colombian Government Proposes Broad Tax Overhaul to Congress. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/colombian-government-proposes-structural-tax-reform-to-congress-1476927097
World Bank. (2012). Peru - Country partnership strategy for the period FY12-FY16. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/177751468294360196/Peru-Country-partnership-strategy-for-the-period-FY12-FY16
World Bank. (2015). World Development Indicators 2015. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
World Bank. (2017, May 2). The World Bank Group Presents its New Support Program for Peru. Retrieved 2017, May 10, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/05/02/grupo-banco-mundial-presenta-su-nuevo-programa-de-apoyo-peru
World Health Organization (WHO) (2009). Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use. (Last accessed: 12 March 2017) Available: http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/interpersonal_violence_and_illicit_drug_use.pdf.
World Economic Forum. (2016). Global Competitiveness Index. Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum.
World Trade Organization (2016): World Trade Statistical Review 2016. Retrieved March 22 , 2017, from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts16_toc_e.htm.
Zanger, S. C. (2000). A global analysis of the effect of political regime changes on life integrity violations, 1977-93. Journal of Peace Research, 37(2), 213-233.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
外交學系
104253007
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104253007
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 張文揚zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林庭瑋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin,Ting Weien_US
dc.creator (作者) 林庭瑋zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Ting Weien_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jul-2017 12:09:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jul-2017 12:09:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jul-2017 12:09:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0104253007en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/110861-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 外交學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 104253007zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文旨在討論內戰持續性的差異是否可以以其政治轉型解釋？也就是說，作者欲探討為何有些內戰較短、有些內戰較長？是否有關鍵因素導致內戰持續性之差別。目前學術研究多著重於以非政治因素（經濟因素）解釋內戰延續性問題，但筆者認為政治制度相對於其他因素（經濟、社會制度）是最能解釋內戰持續性差異之自變數，並提出本文核心假設－「內戰隨著政體的民主深化而縮短。」，其主因有三：（一）生活於民主政權下的人民，政治壓迫感較小（二）民主促進社會的重新分配（Redistributive）消弭國內之不平等狀況；（三）民主政府能透過稅收進行公共財的施放或公共服務滿足人民。
本文之研究方法以質性分析法的個案研究法為主，以南美洲作為研究對象而不以內戰發生最頻繁的非洲為研究對象，乃因2016年11月13日哥倫比亞政府正式與左翼武裝「哥倫比亞革命軍」（FARC）簽署修正版和平協議，結束長達半世紀的敵對狀態，引發作者對南美洲內戰延續性之研究興趣。經過最大相似法篩選後，作者以哥倫比亞與哥倫比亞革命軍和秘魯與光明之路的內戰作為個案案例，透過個案研究法，本文研究發現符合筆者之核心假設。筆者認為本文之內戰研究發現提供受內戰影響之國際社會、國家有關政治制度面之政策方向－即民主深化對於一國內戰延續性之影響力。　		zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與目的 1
第二節、研究途徑與方法 3
第三節、研究範圍與限制 4
第四節、論文章節架構 5
第二章、文獻探析 7
第一節、政治制度面與內戰延續性的關聯 7
第二節、非政治制度面與內戰延續性之關聯 11
第三節、民主與內戰延續性之關聯 16
第三章、個案選擇說明 21
第一節、國家篩選標準 21
第二節、交戰團體篩選標準 24
第三節、小結 25
第四章、個案研究－哥倫比亞革命軍 27
第一節、哥倫比亞國情介紹 27
第二節、哥倫比亞革命軍之介紹 31
第三節、以哥倫比亞政治制度探析哥倫比亞革命軍興衰 34
第四節、小結 41
第五章、個案研究－光明之路 45
第一節、秘魯國情介紹 45
第二節、光明之路之背景 47
第三節、以秘魯政治制度探析光明之路興衰 48
第四節、小結 54
第六章、結論 57
第一節、假設的驗證 57
第二節、未來研究發展 61
第三節、政策建議 62
參考文獻 63		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 6436376 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104253007en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內戰zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 延續性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 祕魯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 哥倫比亞zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治制度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 光明之路zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 哥倫比亞革命軍zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Civil waren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Durationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Peruen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Colombiaen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political institutionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sendero Luminosoen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) FARCen_US
dc.title (題名) 政治制度與內戰持續性的分析－ 以哥倫比亞「哥倫比亞革命軍」以及 秘魯「光明之路」為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The analysis of political institutions and civil war duration: cases of Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and Peru’s Sendero Luminosoen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 平思寧（2015)。自然資源與國內衝突：權力轉移理論的應用。人文及社會科學集刊，27(3)，471-506。
陳勁（2005）。 由哥倫比亞計畫論美國在中南美洲之反毒政策。全球政治評論，12，47-78。
袁東振（2009）。拉美社會主義思想和運動: 基本特徵與主要趨勢。拉丁美洲研究，31 (3)，5-11。
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2013). Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality (Working Paper No. 19746). MA: NBER Working Papers and Publications.
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Agamben, S. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic growth, 8(2), 155-194.
Amnesty International. (2016). Amnesty International Report 2016/17. United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd.
Amnesty International. (2012). Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law. United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd.
Amnesty International. (2015, July 17). Colombia: National Development Plan threatens to deny the right to land restitution to victims of the armed conflict and allow mining firms to operate on illegally acquired lands. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.amnesty.ca/news/public-statements/colombia-national-development-plan-threatens-to-deny-the-right-to-land
Bailey, K. D. (1994). Methods of social research. New York: The Free Press.
Balbi, C. R., & Palmer, D. S. (2001). " Reinventing" democracy in Peru. Current history, 100(643), 65.
Balcells, L., & Kalyvas, S. N. (2014). Does warfare matter? Severity, duration,and outcomes of civil wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(8), 1390-1418.
Bapat, N. A. (2005). Insurgency and the opening of peace processes. Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 699-717.
BBC News. (2011, June 7). Peru election winner Humala congratulated by rival. Retrieved March 20, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-13651468
BBC News. (2012, August 28). Colombia agrees to hold peace talks with Farc rebels. Retrieved March 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19393096
BBC News. (2016, June 10). Peru elections: Keiko Fujimori concedes to Kuczynski. Retrieved April 20, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36505027
BBC News. (2016, December 28). Colombia approves amnesty agreed in Farc peace deal. Retrieved May 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38455493
BBC News. (2017, March 1). Colombia: Farc rebels prepare to lay down arms. Retrieved March 14, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-39124119
BBVA Microfinance Foundation. (2015). Colombian National Development Plan: All for a New Country. Retrieved April 14, 2017, from http://progresomicrofinanzas.org/en/colombian-national-development-plan-all-for-a-new-country/
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011). Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy, 119(4), 766-819.
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic literature, 48(1), 3-57.
Bleaney, M., & Dimico, A. (2011). How different are the correlates of onset and continuation of civil wars?. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2), 145-155.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Koch, M. T., & Siverson, R. M. (2004). Testing competing institutional explanations of the democratic peace: The case of dispute duration. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21(4), 255-267.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2011). The dictator`s handbook: why bad behavior is almost always good politics. NY: PublicAffairs.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2017). Political Succession. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(4), 707-743.
Buhaug, H., & Lujala, P. (2005). Accounting for scale: Measuring geography in quantitative studies of civil war. Political Geography, 24(4), 399-418.
Burt, J. M. (1992). Peru Façade of Democracy Crumbles. Report on the Americas, 26(1), 3-6.
Buscaglia, E., & Ratliff, W, (2001). War and Lack of Governance in Colombia:
Narcos, Guerrillas and U.S. Policy. Palo Alto: Hoover Press.
Bushnell, D. (1993). The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Caparros, M. (2016, October 7). Colombia’s Proof That Democracy Doesn’t Work. The New York Times. Retrieved April 22, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/colombias-proof-that-democracy-doesnt-work.html?_r=1
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2017). CIA The World Factbook. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html
Chacón, M., Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R. (2011). When is democracy an 　　
　　equilibrium? theory and evidence from Colombia’s la Violencia. Journal of 　　
　　Conflict Resolution, 55(3), 366-396.
Charles, V. (2015) Doing Business Across the Continents: A Quick Heads-Up.
STRATEGIA, 37, 8-18.
Chen, K., & Gallón, N. (2016, October 5). Colombians narrowly reject peace deal with the FARC. CNN. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/02/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal-vote/
Clark, N. (2015, April 6). Education in Peru. World Education News & Reviews. Retrieved May 20, 2017, from http://wenr.wes.org/2015/04/education-in-peru
Clayton, G. (2013). Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation. Journal of Peace Research, 50(5), 609-622.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford economic papers, 50(4), 563-573.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford economic
papers, 56(4), 563-595.
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2004). On the duration of civil war. Journal　
　　of peace research, 41(3), 253-273.
Colombia Reports. (2016, September 25). Colombia’s 2012 – 2016 peace talks | Fact　
　　sheet. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from　
　　https://colombiareports.com/colombia-peace-talks-fact-sheet/
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis
　　for field settings. MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Cunningham, D. E. (2006). Veto players and civil war duration. American Journal of　
　　Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch. K. S., & Salehyan, I. (2009). It takes two: A dyadic 　
　　analysis of civil war duration and outcome. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(4), 　　
　　570-597.
Davenport, C. (1995). Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An
　　inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. American Journal of Political
　　Science, 39(3), 683-713.
DeNardo, J. (2014). Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion.
　　NY: Princeton University Press.
Dixon, W. J. (1996). Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and
　　promoting peaceful settlement. International Organization, 50, 653-81.
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and
　　quantitative analysis. American political science review, 94(4), 779-801.
Durand, F. (1992). The New Right and Political Change in Peru. The Right and
　　Democracy in Latin America. NY: Praeger Publishers, 239-257.
Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2002). How much war will we see? Explaining the
　　prevalence of civil war. Journal of conflict resolution, 46(3), 307-334.
Fitzgibbon, R. H., & Kelly, P. (1998). Assessing Democracy in Latin America: A
　　Tribute to Russell H. Fitzgibbon. CO: Westview Press.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international
　　disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577-592.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International organization,
　　49(03), 379-414.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science review, 97(1), 75-90.
Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 275-301.
Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of conflict Resolution, 49(4), 483-507.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2007, August). Civil war termination. Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Florea, A. (2012). Where Do We Go from Here? Conceptual, Theoretical, and Methodological Gaps in the Large‐N Civil War Research Program1. International studies review, 14(1), 78-98.
Flores, T. E. (2013, August 28). 200 years of landlessness? Land inequality and the search for peace in Colombia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2013/200-years-landlessness-land-inequality-and-search-peace-colombia
Flores, T. E. (2014). Vertical inequality, land reform, and insurgency in Colombia. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 20(1), 5-31.
Figueroa, A., & Barrón, M. (2005). Inequality ethnicity and social disorder in Peru. (Working Paper No. 8). Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House. http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml.
Freedom House (2017). Freedom in the world 2017: Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy. Washington, DC: Freedom House.
Garfinkel, M. R. (2012). Political institutions and war initiation: the democratic peace hypothesis revisited. In Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gaviria, A. (2000). Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia. Journal of development economics, 61(1), 1-25.
Gaventa, J. (2006). Triumph, deficit or contestation? deepening the `deepening democracy` debate. (Working Paper No. 264).UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Gent, S. E. (2011). Relative rebel strength and power sharing in intrastate conflicts. International Interactions, 37(2), 215-228.
Gerring, J. (2001). Social science methodology: A criterial framework. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand , H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. Journal of peace research, 39(5), 615-637.
Gleditsch, N. P., Hegre, H., & Strand, H. (2009). Democracy and civil war. In Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension (pp.92-155). Ann Arbor:
　　University of Michigan Press.
Gleditsch, K. S., & Ruggeri, A. (2010) Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war. Journal of Peace Research 47(3), 299-310.
Goñi, E., López, J. H., & Servén, L. (2011). Fiscal redistribution and income
　　inequality in Latin America. World Development, 39(9), 1558-1569.
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. The American
　　Economic Review, 81(4), 912-921.
Gurr, T. R. (1970) Why Men Rebel Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a Democratic
　　civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992. The
　　American Political Science Review, 95(1), 33-48.
Hendrix, C. S. (2011). Head for the hills? Rough terrain, state capacity, and civil war
　　onset. Civil Wars, 13(4), 345-370.
Hoddie, M., & Hartzell, C. (2003). Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements. Journal of Peace Research, 40(3), 303-320
Holmes, J. S., Piñeres, S. A. G., & Curtin, K. M. (2006). Drugs, violence, and
　　development in Colombia: A department‐level analysis. Latin American Politics
　　and Society, 48(3), 157-184.
Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping and
　　civilian protection in civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4),
　　875-891.
Hultquist, P. (2013). Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war
　　settlement. Journal of Peace Research, 50(5), 623-634.
Humphreys, M. (2003, February). Economics and violent conflict. Paper presented at
　　the meeting for Conflict Prevention Initiative, Massachusetts.
Joumard, I., & Vélez, J. L. (2013). Income Inequality and Poverty in Colombia-Part
　　2. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers. OECD Economic
　　Department Working Papers (Working Paper No. 1037). Paris: OECD Publishing
Kalyvas, S. N. (2010). Civil Wars. In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.
　　Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karl, R., & Sobek, D. (2004). The dynamics of civil war duration and
　　outcome. Journal of Peace Research,41(3), 303-320.
Kay, B. H. (1996). Fujipopulism and the liberal state in Peru, 1990–1995. Journal of
　　Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(4), 55-98.
Kay, B. H. (1999). Violent opportunities: The rise and fall of “King Coca” and
　　Shining Path. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 41(3), 97-127.
Keen, D. (2012). Greed and grievance in civil war. International Affairs, 88(4), 757-777.
KPMG. (2017, January 15). Peru: Tax reform includes increased corporate income tax rate. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/01/tnf-peru-tax-reform.html
Lacina, B., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2005). Monitoring trends in global combat: A new
dataset of battle deaths. European Journal of Population/Revue Européenne de
Démographie, 21(2), 145-166.
Lake, D. A., & Baum, M. A. (2001). The invisible hand of democracy: political
control and the provision of public services. Comparative political studies, 34(6),
587-621.
Lee, C. S. (2005). Income inequality, democracy, and public sector size. American
Sociological Review, 70(1), 158-181.
Li, H., Squire, L., & Zou, H. F. (1998). Explaining international and intertemporal
variations in income inequality. The Economic Journal, 108(446), 26-43.
Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of 　
　　repression and dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(2), 266-297.
Lichbach, M. I. (1995). The rebel`s dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Linz, J. J. (1994). The failure of presidential democracy (Vol. 1). Baltimore: JHU
Press.
Lipson, M. (2007). Peacekeeping: organized hypocrisy?. European Journal of International Relations, 13(1), 5-34.
Livingstone, G. (2003). Inside Colombia: drugs, democracy and war. NY: Rutgers University Press.
Lopez-Calix, J., & Melo, A. (2003). Restoring Fiscal Discipline for Poverty Reduction in Peru: A Public Expenditure Review. A World Bank Country Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Lopez, E., & Capelouto, S. (2016, November 13). Colombia signs peace deal with FARC. CNN. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/12/world/colombia-farc-peace/
Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. Political geography, 20(5), 561-584.
Leech, G. (2011) The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. New York: Fernwood Publishing.
Long, T. (2016, December 16) Peace in Colombia? Lessons from the failed 1999-2002 talks. Latin America Goes Global. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2015/12/peace-in-colombia-lessons-from-the-failed-1999-2002-talks/
Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P., & Gilmore, E. (2005). A diamond curse? Civil war and a lootable resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 538-562.
Luque, J., & Fernandez, R. (2002). Peru. International Tax Review, (10), 128-131. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/230205668?accountid=10067
Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.
Marin, C. (2011, September 16). Big Win For Indigenous Rights In Peru. Amnesty International Blog. Retrieved May 1, 2017 from http://blog.amnestyusa.org/americas/big-win-for-indigenous-rights-in-peru/
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2010). Polity IV country report 2010: Colombia. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://www. systemicpeace. org/polity/Colombia2010. pdf.
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2010). Polity IV country report 2010: Peru. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from http://www. systemicpeace. org/polity/Peru2010. pdf.
Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2016). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2014. The polity IV dataset. Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of Black insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McClintock, C. (1984). Why peasants rebel: The case of Peru`s Sendero
　　Luminoso. World Politics, 37(01), 48-84.
McClintock, C. (1994). Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru. In The Shining Path of Peru (pp. 243-258). NY: Palgrave Macmillan US.
McClintock, C. (1998). Revolutionary movements in Latin America: El Salvador`s FMLN & Perú`s shining path. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
McKenzie, V. (2014, November 27). Colombia’s land restitution law defrauding victims: Amnesty International. Colombia Reports. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://colombiareports.com/colombias-land-restitution-law-defrauding-victims-amnesty-international/
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013a). Do illegal drug markets breed violence? Evidence for Colombia. Chile: Universidad de los Andes.
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). Bushes and bullets: Illegal cocaine markets and violence in Colombia. Chile: Universidad de los Andes.
Melander, E., Pettersson, T., & Themnér, L. (2016). Organized violence, 1989–2015. Journal of Peace Research, 53(5), 727-742.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of political Economy, 89(5), 914-927.
Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. (2004). Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social forces, 82(4), 1457-1492.
Mill, J. S. (1884). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. NY: Harper.
Miller, L. E., & Aucoin, L. (2010). Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making. DC: USIP Press
Miller, T., & Kim, A. B. (2016). 2016 Index of Economic Freedom: Promoting Economic Opportunity and Prosperity. DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Miroff, N. (2016, September 5) Colombia’s war has displaced 7 million. With peace, will they go home? The Washington Post. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombias-war-has-displaced-7-million-with-peace-will-they-go-home/2016/09/05/538df3c6-6eb8-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_story.html?utm_term=.69628cce5878
Molano, A. (2000). The Evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group’s long history. NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(2), 23-31.
Moller, L. C. (2012). Fiscal policy in Colombia: Tapping its potential for a more equitable society. NY: World Bank Publications.
Moloney, A. (2016, November 30) Latin America has most unequal land distribution, Colombia fares worst: charity. Reuters. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-landrights-idUSKBN13P2NX
Moore, W. H. (1998). Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and 　　
　　timing. American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 851-873.
Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence a rational action approach. Journal of conflict resolution, 34(4), 624-651.
Mukherjee, B. (2006). Why Political Power‐Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?. International studies quarterly, 50(2), 479-504.
OECD, et al. (2017). Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action (Vol. 124). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Otis, J. (2014). The FARC and Colombia’s illegal drug trade. Paper presented at the meeting of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—Latin America Program, Washington, DC.
Payne, G., & Payne, J. (2004). Key concepts in social research. London: Sage Publications.
Peceny, M., & Michael, D. (2006). The FARC`s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug 　　
　　Policies and the Deepening of Columbia`s Civil War in the 1990s. Latin
　　American Politics &Society, 48(2), 95-116.
Peeler, J. A. (1998). Building Democracy in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (2005). The economic effects of constitutions. Massachusetts: MIT press.
Persson, T., & Besley, T. (2009). The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation and policy. The American Economic Review, 99(4), 1218-1244.
Przeworski, A. (1990). The state and the economy under capitalism. UK: Routledge.
Rabasa, A., & Chalk, P. (2001). Colombian labyrinth: The synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability. Washington, DC: Rand Corporation.
Radu, M. (2000). The perilous appeasement of guerrillas. Orbis, 44(3), 362-379.
Ramírez, M. C. (2010). Maintaining democracy in Colombia through political exclusion, states of exception, counterinsurgency and dirty war. In Violent democracies in Latin America (pp. 129-165). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Regan, P. M. (2000). Civil wars and foreign powers: Outside interventions and intrastate conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Regan, P. M. (2002). Third party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 55-73.
Regan, P. M., & Henderson, E. A. (2002). Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: are democracies internally less violent? Third World Quarterly, 23(1), 119-136.
Restrepo, J., Spagat, M., & Vargas, J. (2003). The dynamics of the Colombian civil conflict: a new dataset. Homo Oeconom. 21(2), 396–428
RodríguezRaga, J. C., & Seligson, M. A. (2012). The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia and the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity. Bogota: USAID.
Ron, J. (2001). Ideology in context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso`s tactical
　　escalation. Journal of Peace Research, 38(5), 569-592.
Rosato, S. (2003). The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. American Political Science Review, 97(04), 585-602.
Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war? Journal of peace research, 41(3), 337-356.
Ross, M. L. (2015). Conflict and Natural Resources: Is the Latin American and
Caribbean Region Different from the Rest of the World? In Transparent Governance in an Age of Abundance: experiences from the extractive industries in Latin America and the Caribbean (pp.109-142). Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
RSF (2017). 2017 World Press Freedom Index. Paris: Reporters Without Borders.
Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2017
Rustad, S. C. A., Rød, J. K., Larsen, W., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2008). Foliage and
fighting: Forest resources and the onset, duration, and
　　location of civil war. Political Geography, 27(7), 761-782.
Saab, B. Y., & Taylor, A. W.(2009). Criminality and armed groups: A 　　
　　comparative study of FARC and paramilitary groups in Colombia. Studies in
　　Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 455-475.
Safford, F., & Palacios, M. (2001). Colombia: Fragmented land, divided society
(Latin American histories). Oxford: Oxford University Press
Salazar, M. (2017, February 23). Colombia’s ex-president seeks referendum to alter peace deal. Colombia Report. Retrieved April 13, 2017 from https://colombiareports.com/colombias-ex-president-seeks-referendum-alter-peace-deal/
Salehyan, I. (2009). Rebels without borders. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sambanis, N.(2002). A review of recent advances and future directions in the
quantitative literature on civil war. Defence and Peace Economics, 13(3), 215-243.
Sambanis, N. (2004). What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. Journal of conflict resolution, 48(6), 814-858.
Sanín, F. G. (2008). Telling the difference: Guerrillas and 　　
　　paramilitaries in the Colombian war. Politics & Society, 36(1), 3-34.
Sarkees, M. R. (2000). The correlates of war data on war: An update to
1997. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18(1), 123-144.
Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: An introduction and some
hypotheses. In Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict (pp. 3-24). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Strand, H., Carlsen, J., Gleditsch, N. P., Hegre, H., Ormhaug, C., & Wilhelmsen, L. 　　
　　(2005). Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook: Version 3-2005. Oslo, Norway: 　　
　　International Peace Research Institute. (www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict)
Syria Regional Refugee Response. (2017). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
Taliercio, R. (2001). Unsustainably Autonomous?: Challenges to the Revenue Authority Model in Latin America Tax Agencies in Developing Countries. Washington DC: World Bank.
Teune, H., & Przeworski, A. (1970). The logic of comparative social inquiry. Malabar, FL: Krieger.
The Economist. (2016, April 14). Unfunny Money. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21697008-government-may-never-get-its-hands-guerrillas-ill-gotten-gains-unfunny-money
Thies, C. G. (2010). Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and
primary commodities. Journal of Peace Research, 47(3), 321-332.
Thorp, R., Caumartin, C., & Gray‐Monila, G. (2006). Inequality, ethnicity, political mobilisation and political violence in Latin America: The cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25(4), 453-480.
Thoumi, F. E. (2002). Illegal drugs in Colombia: From illegal economic boom to social crisis. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 582(1), 102-116.
Transparency International. (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin, Germany: Transparency In¬ternational. (Accessed on November 25, 2016).
URL: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/
United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.) What is peacekeeping? Retrieved May 20, 2017, from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml
Van Belle, D. A. (1996). Leadership and collective action: the case of
revolution. International Studies Quarterly, 40(1), 107-132.
Vanden, H. E., & Prevost, G. (2015). Politics of Latin America: the power game. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vélez, J. L. (2012). Income and Wealth at the Top in Colombia: An Exploration of Tax Records 1993-2010. (Public Policy and Development Master Dissertation). Paris School of Economics, Paris.
Vergara, A., & Encinas, D. (2016). Continuity by surprise: explaining institutional stability in contemporary Peru. Latin American Research Review, 51(1), 159-180.
Vreeland, J. R. (2008). The effect of political regime on civil war unpacking anocracy. Journal of conflict Resolution, 52(3), 401-425.
Vyas, K. (2016, October 20). Colombian Government Proposes Broad Tax Overhaul to Congress. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved May 1, 2017, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/colombian-government-proposes-structural-tax-reform-to-congress-1476927097
World Bank. (2012). Peru - Country partnership strategy for the period FY12-FY16. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/177751468294360196/Peru-Country-partnership-strategy-for-the-period-FY12-FY16
World Bank. (2015). World Development Indicators 2015. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
World Bank. (2017, May 2). The World Bank Group Presents its New Support Program for Peru. Retrieved 2017, May 10, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/05/02/grupo-banco-mundial-presenta-su-nuevo-programa-de-apoyo-peru
World Health Organization (WHO) (2009). Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use. (Last accessed: 12 March 2017) Available: http://www.who.int/violenceprevention/interpersonal_violence_and_illicit_drug_use.pdf.
World Economic Forum. (2016). Global Competitiveness Index. Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum.
World Trade Organization (2016): World Trade Statistical Review 2016. Retrieved March 22 , 2017, from https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts16_toc_e.htm.
Zanger, S. C. (2000). A global analysis of the effect of political regime changes on life integrity violations, 1977-93. Journal of Peace Research, 37(2), 213-233.		zh_TW