| dc.contributor | 會計學系 | zh_Tw |
| dc.creator (作者) | Guo, Ruey-Ji;Chen, Ming-Chin | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳明進 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2015-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-Aug-2017 17:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-Aug-2017 17:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-Aug-2017 17:43:07 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111653 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | While audit action is a prominent measure for reducing agency cost, it remains inconclusive how the previous audit experience has an effect upon current audit decision. Guo et al. (2005) conclude that it is unnecessary for the principal to use conditional audit in two-period audit policy, suggesting that the optimal audit policy in current period is tomaintain the same audit probability as that in previous period. However, their analyses are based on punitive conditional audit. Thispaper modifies their model by introducing an incentive conditional audit regime. We find that, provided both audit cost and underdeclaring benefit are moderate, the incentive conditional audit policy will dominate the punitive conditional audit policy and the conditional audit mechanism will be a desirable solution. © 2015 College of Management, National Cheng Kung University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Taiwan LLC. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 436923 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Asia Pacific Management Review, 20(4), 234-240 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Asymmetric information; Agency problem; Conditional audit | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Incentive vs. punitive conditional audit policy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.apmrv.2015.02.002 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apmrv.2015.02.002 | |
