| dc.contributor | 國際經營與貿易學系 | zh_Tw |
| dc.creator (作者) | 胡聯國 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Yu-Hsiu | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hu, Len-Kuo | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2015-11 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Aug-2017 17:17:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Aug-2017 17:17:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Aug-2017 17:17:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111681 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This article utilizes a representative agent model to address how the regulation policies for banks should respond to the general economic condition. With the consideration of a self-fulfilling deposit insurance facility with sufficient bank reserve to meet the expected need of liquidity shock, our model suggests a counter-cyclical capital adequacy requirement in a competitive loan market. The exception might occur when the moral hazard problem becomes very unwieldy and the representative individual is rather risk averse. With regard to the closure policy, we find that it is closely related to the individual’s degree of risk aversion. A counter-cyclical closure policy is recommended when the individual is highly risk averse. Otherwise, a pro-cyclical closure policy is preferred. © 2015 Taylor & Francis. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 213 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Applied Economics, 47(53), 5791-5804 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | banking; capital; economic conditions; financial market; financial policy; insurance system; regulatory framework | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The cyclicality of bank regulation in a general economic framework | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1080/00036846.2015.1058908 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2015.1058908 | |
