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題名 具銀行相關經驗之董事對借款條件之影響：以聯貸市場為例
The effect of board of directors’ banking experience on debt contracting: evidence from the syndicated loan market
作者 簡鈺庭
Jian, Yu Ting
貢獻者 詹凌菁
簡鈺庭
Jian, Yu Ting
關鍵詞 聯合貸款
董事經驗
銀行產業
資訊不對稱
Syndicated loans
Director experience
Banking industry
Information asymmetry
日期 2017
上傳時間 10-Aug-2017 09:40:17 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究係探討董事具銀行相關經驗對聯合貸款特性之影響。董事具銀行相關經驗應能降低借款企業與銀行間的資訊不對稱，而使得借款企業取得較低的聯貸利差並影響主辦銀行之放貸比率。此外，本研究預期資訊不對稱較高之企業，具銀行相關背景董事較能有效降低聯貸利差並對主辦銀行之放貸比率有影響；於低資訊不對稱之企業則對聯貸利差及主辦銀行之放貸比率之影響較小。本研究以2001至2014年（不含2008及2009年）之樣本進行實證研究。研究結果顯示具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，與主辦銀行之放貸比率無關聯性。而將樣本區分為高資訊不對稱及低資訊不對稱後，研究結果顯示於高資訊不對稱之企業，具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，並與主辦銀行之放貸比率呈正相關；而於低資訊不對稱之企業，則未發現具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差及主辦銀行之放貸比率具關聯性。
This study investigates the effect of board of directors with experience in the banking sector on syndicated loan features. I predict that having banking experience directors on board may alleviate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and thereby reduce yield spreads and affect the portion of loan retained by lead arrangers. I further predict that for high information asymmetry firms, their directors with banking experience could assist them to receive lower cost of debts and influence lead arrangers’ share. For low information asymmetry firms, there is no effect on both cost of debts and lead arranger’s share. I use 7,738 firm-year observations during 2001 to 2014 (exclude the year 2008 and 2009) to test my predictions. The empirical results suggest that firms with more banking experience directors enjoy lower syndicated loan spread and that banking experience directors do not influence the share of loan retained by lead arrangers. I further separate the sample into two high and low information asymmetry groups. The evidence suggests that banking experience directors are negatively associated with loan spreads and positively associated with lead arrangers’ proportion of loan facility among the firms with high information asymmetry, while there is no such evidence among the firms with low information asymmetry.
參考文獻 Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 2001. Do some outside directors play a political role? Journal of Law and Economics 44 (1): 179-198.
Armstrong, C. S., J. E. Core, D. J. Taylor, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2011. When does information asymmetry affect the cost of capital? Journal of Accounting Research 49 (1): 1-40.
Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2): 13-35.
Baiman, S., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1996. The relation among capital markets, financial disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (1): 1-22.
Ball, R., R. M. Bushman, and F. P. Vasvari. 2008. The debt-contracting value of accounting information and loan syndicate structure. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (2): 247-287.
Bharath, S. T., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders, and A. Srinivasan. 2011. Lending relationships and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies 24 (4): 1141-1203.
Bolton, P., and D. S. Scharfstein. 1996. Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1): 1-25.
Booth, J. R., and D. N. Deli. 1999. On executives of financial institutions as outside directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (3): 227-250.
Byrd, D. T., and M. S. Mizruchi. 2005. Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (1): 129-173.
Carpenter, M. A., and j. D. Westphal. 2001. The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal 44 (4): 639-660.
Champagne, C., and F. Coggins. 2012. Common information asymmetry factors in syndicated loan structures. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (5): 1437-1451.
Chan, A. L.-C., Y.-T. Hsieh, E. Lee, and M.-L. Yueh. 2015. Does financial statement information affect cross-border lending by foreign banks in the syndicated loan market? Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 34 (5): 520-547.
Cohen, J. R., U. Hoitash, G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2014. The effect of audit committee industry expertise on monitoring the financial reporting process. The Accounting Review 89 (1): 243-273.
Dass, N., O. Kini, V. Nanda, B. Onal, and J. Wang. 2014. Board expertise: Do directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of Financial Studies 27 (5): 1533-1592.
Davidson, W. N., B. Xie, and W. Xu. 2004. Market reaction to voluntary announcements of audit committee appointments: The effect of financial expertise. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (4): 279-293.
DeFond, M. L., R. N. Hann, and X. Hu. 2005. Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? Journal of Accounting Research 43 (2): 153-193.
Dennis, S. A., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2000. Syndicated loans. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9 (4): 404-426.
Dhaliwal, D. A. N., V. I. C. Naiker, and F. Navissi. 2010. The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 787-827.
Esty, B. C. 2001. Structuring loan syndicates: A case study of the Hong Kong Disneyland project loan. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14 (3): 80-95.
Esty, B. C., and W. L. Megginson. 2003. Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt ownership structure: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 (1): 37-59.
Fields, L. P., D. R. Fraser, and A. Subrahmanyam. 2012. Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (5): 1536-1547.
Güner, A. B., U. Malmendier, and G. Tate. 2008. Financial expertise of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 323-354.
Gertner, R., and D. S. Scharfstein. 1991. A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1189-1222.
Graham, J., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics 89 (1): 44-61.
Gray, S., and J. Nowland. 2013. Is prior director experience valuable? Accounting & Finance 53 (3): 643-666.
Hillman, A. J., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.
Ivashina, V. 2009. Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. Journal of Financial Economics 92 (2): 300-319.
Jones, J. D., W. W. Lang, and P. J. Nigro. 2005. Agent bank behavior in bank loan syndications. Journal of Financial Research 28 (3): 385-402.
Kim, J.-B., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011a. Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting: Evidence from SOX section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1157-1188.
Kim, J.-B., J. S. L. Tsui, and C. H. Yi. 2011b. The voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards and loan contracting around the world. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (4): 779-811.
Kor, Y. Y., and C. Sundaramurthy. 2009. Experience-based human capital and social capital of outside directors. Journal of management 35 (4): 981-1006.
Kothari, S. P., S. Shu, and P. D. Wysocki. 2009. Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 241-276.
Krishnan, J., Y. Wen, and W. Zhao. 2011. Legal expertise on corporate audit committees and financial reporting quality. The Accounting Review 86 (6): 2099-2130.
Kroll, M., B. A. Walters, and P. Wright. 2008. Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal 29 (4): 363-382.
Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 2001. Bankers on board: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (3): 415-452.
Lambert, R., C. Leuz, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (2): 385-420.
Lee, S. W., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2004. Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates. Financial Management 33 (3): 107-130.
McDonald, M. L., J. D. Westphal, and M. E. Graebner. 2008. What do they know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal 29 (11): 1155-1177.
Panayagometh, K., and G. S. Roberts. 2002. Private information, agency problems and determinants of loan syndications: Evidence from 1987-1999. Working paper, York University.
Panayagometh, K., and G. S. Roberts. 2010. Do lead banks exploit syndicate participants? Evidence from ex post risk. Financial Management 39 (1): 273-299.
Rajan, R., and A. Winton. 1995. Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The Journal of Finance 50 (4): 1113-1146.
Simon, K. 1993. Why do banks syndicate loans? New England Economic Review (Jan): 45-52.
Strahan, P. E. 1999. Borrower risk and the price and non-price terms of bank loans. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Sufi, A. 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans. The Journal of Finance 62 (2): 629-668.
Westphal, J. D., and J. W. Fredrickson. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic Management Journal 22 (12): 1113-1137.
Westphal, J. D., and L. P. Milton. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the influence of demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly 45 (2): 366-398.
Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9 (3): 295-316.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
104353009
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353009
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 詹凌菁zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 簡鈺庭zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Jian, Yu Tingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 簡鈺庭zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Jian, Yu Tingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 10-Aug-2017 09:40:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 10-Aug-2017 09:40:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-Aug-2017 09:40:17 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0104353009en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111714-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 104353009zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究係探討董事具銀行相關經驗對聯合貸款特性之影響。董事具銀行相關經驗應能降低借款企業與銀行間的資訊不對稱，而使得借款企業取得較低的聯貸利差並影響主辦銀行之放貸比率。此外，本研究預期資訊不對稱較高之企業，具銀行相關背景董事較能有效降低聯貸利差並對主辦銀行之放貸比率有影響；於低資訊不對稱之企業則對聯貸利差及主辦銀行之放貸比率之影響較小。本研究以2001至2014年（不含2008及2009年）之樣本進行實證研究。研究結果顯示具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，與主辦銀行之放貸比率無關聯性。而將樣本區分為高資訊不對稱及低資訊不對稱後，研究結果顯示於高資訊不對稱之企業，具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，並與主辦銀行之放貸比率呈正相關；而於低資訊不對稱之企業，則未發現具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差及主辦銀行之放貸比率具關聯性。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates the effect of board of directors with experience in the banking sector on syndicated loan features. I predict that having banking experience directors on board may alleviate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and thereby reduce yield spreads and affect the portion of loan retained by lead arrangers. I further predict that for high information asymmetry firms, their directors with banking experience could assist them to receive lower cost of debts and influence lead arrangers’ share. For low information asymmetry firms, there is no effect on both cost of debts and lead arranger’s share. I use 7,738 firm-year observations during 2001 to 2014 (exclude the year 2008 and 2009) to test my predictions. The empirical results suggest that firms with more banking experience directors enjoy lower syndicated loan spread and that banking experience directors do not influence the share of loan retained by lead arrangers. I further separate the sample into two high and low information asymmetry groups. The evidence suggests that banking experience directors are negatively associated with loan spreads and positively associated with lead arrangers’ proportion of loan facility among the firms with high information asymmetry, while there is no such evidence among the firms with low information asymmetry.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 5
2.1. Board of Directors and Experiences 5
2.2. Loan Syndication 10
3. Hypotheses Development 14
4. Data and Research Design 17
4.1. Sample Selection 17
4.2. Empirical Model 18
5. Empirical Results 22
5.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Analysis 22
5.2. Test of Hypothesis H1 28
5.3. Test of Hypothesis H2 30
5.4. Test of Hypothesis H3a 32
5.5. Test of Hypothesis H3b 34
6. Additional Analysis 36
7. Conclusion 39
References 41		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353009en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合貸款zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事經驗zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銀行產業zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Syndicated loansen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Director experienceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Banking industryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information asymmetryen_US
dc.title (題名) 具銀行相關經驗之董事對借款條件之影響：以聯貸市場為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The effect of board of directors’ banking experience on debt contracting: evidence from the syndicated loan marketen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Agrawal, A., and C. R. Knoeber. 2001. Do some outside directors play a political role? Journal of Law and Economics 44 (1): 179-198.
Armstrong, C. S., J. E. Core, D. J. Taylor, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2011. When does information asymmetry affect the cost of capital? Journal of Accounting Research 49 (1): 1-40.
Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 23 (2): 13-35.
Baiman, S., and R. E. Verrecchia. 1996. The relation among capital markets, financial disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (1): 1-22.
Ball, R., R. M. Bushman, and F. P. Vasvari. 2008. The debt-contracting value of accounting information and loan syndicate structure. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (2): 247-287.
Bharath, S. T., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders, and A. Srinivasan. 2011. Lending relationships and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies 24 (4): 1141-1203.
Bolton, P., and D. S. Scharfstein. 1996. Optimal debt structure and the number of creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104 (1): 1-25.
Booth, J. R., and D. N. Deli. 1999. On executives of financial institutions as outside directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (3): 227-250.
Byrd, D. T., and M. S. Mizruchi. 2005. Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (1): 129-173.
Carpenter, M. A., and j. D. Westphal. 2001. The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal 44 (4): 639-660.
Champagne, C., and F. Coggins. 2012. Common information asymmetry factors in syndicated loan structures. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (5): 1437-1451.
Chan, A. L.-C., Y.-T. Hsieh, E. Lee, and M.-L. Yueh. 2015. Does financial statement information affect cross-border lending by foreign banks in the syndicated loan market? Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 34 (5): 520-547.
Cohen, J. R., U. Hoitash, G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2014. The effect of audit committee industry expertise on monitoring the financial reporting process. The Accounting Review 89 (1): 243-273.
Dass, N., O. Kini, V. Nanda, B. Onal, and J. Wang. 2014. Board expertise: Do directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of Financial Studies 27 (5): 1533-1592.
Davidson, W. N., B. Xie, and W. Xu. 2004. Market reaction to voluntary announcements of audit committee appointments: The effect of financial expertise. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (4): 279-293.
DeFond, M. L., R. N. Hann, and X. Hu. 2005. Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors? Journal of Accounting Research 43 (2): 153-193.
Dennis, S. A., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2000. Syndicated loans. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9 (4): 404-426.
Dhaliwal, D. A. N., V. I. C. Naiker, and F. Navissi. 2010. The association between accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 787-827.
Esty, B. C. 2001. Structuring loan syndicates: A case study of the Hong Kong Disneyland project loan. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14 (3): 80-95.
Esty, B. C., and W. L. Megginson. 2003. Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt ownership structure: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 (1): 37-59.
Fields, L. P., D. R. Fraser, and A. Subrahmanyam. 2012. Board quality and the cost of debt capital: The case of bank loans. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (5): 1536-1547.
Güner, A. B., U. Malmendier, and G. Tate. 2008. Financial expertise of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (2): 323-354.
Gertner, R., and D. S. Scharfstein. 1991. A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1189-1222.
Graham, J., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics 89 (1): 44-61.
Gray, S., and J. Nowland. 2013. Is prior director experience valuable? Accounting & Finance 53 (3): 643-666.
Hillman, A. J., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 28 (3): 383-396.
Ivashina, V. 2009. Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads. Journal of Financial Economics 92 (2): 300-319.
Jones, J. D., W. W. Lang, and P. J. Nigro. 2005. Agent bank behavior in bank loan syndications. Journal of Financial Research 28 (3): 385-402.
Kim, J.-B., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011a. Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting: Evidence from SOX section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1157-1188.
Kim, J.-B., J. S. L. Tsui, and C. H. Yi. 2011b. The voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards and loan contracting around the world. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (4): 779-811.
Kor, Y. Y., and C. Sundaramurthy. 2009. Experience-based human capital and social capital of outside directors. Journal of management 35 (4): 981-1006.
Kothari, S. P., S. Shu, and P. D. Wysocki. 2009. Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 241-276.
Krishnan, J., Y. Wen, and W. Zhao. 2011. Legal expertise on corporate audit committees and financial reporting quality. The Accounting Review 86 (6): 2099-2130.
Kroll, M., B. A. Walters, and P. Wright. 2008. Board vigilance, director experience, and corporate outcomes. Strategic Management Journal 29 (4): 363-382.
Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 2001. Bankers on board: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (3): 415-452.
Lambert, R., C. Leuz, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (2): 385-420.
Lee, S. W., and D. J. Mullineaux. 2004. Monitoring, financial distress, and the structure of commercial lending syndicates. Financial Management 33 (3): 107-130.
McDonald, M. L., J. D. Westphal, and M. E. Graebner. 2008. What do they know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal 29 (11): 1155-1177.
Panayagometh, K., and G. S. Roberts. 2002. Private information, agency problems and determinants of loan syndications: Evidence from 1987-1999. Working paper, York University.
Panayagometh, K., and G. S. Roberts. 2010. Do lead banks exploit syndicate participants? Evidence from ex post risk. Financial Management 39 (1): 273-299.
Rajan, R., and A. Winton. 1995. Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The Journal of Finance 50 (4): 1113-1146.
Simon, K. 1993. Why do banks syndicate loans? New England Economic Review (Jan): 45-52.
Strahan, P. E. 1999. Borrower risk and the price and non-price terms of bank loans. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Sufi, A. 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans. The Journal of Finance 62 (2): 629-668.
Westphal, J. D., and J. W. Fredrickson. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic Management Journal 22 (12): 1113-1137.
Westphal, J. D., and L. P. Milton. 2000. How experience and network ties affect the influence of demographic minorities on corporate boards. Administrative Science Quarterly 45 (2): 366-398.
Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9 (3): 295-316.		zh_TW