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題名 代理模型中的策略性利他行為
Friendship building with boss: strategic prosocial behaviors in agency model
作者 蔡一豪
Tsai, Yi Hao
貢獻者 何靜嫺
蔡一豪
Tsai, Yi Hao
關鍵詞 社會網路
代理模型
公司治理
Social network
Principal-Agent model
Corporate governance
日期 2017
上傳時間 28-Aug-2017 14:25:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 Many recent researches examine the social networks between directors and CEO and show their negative impacts on corporate governance (see Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Gaspar and Massa, 2007). If, this negative relation between social connection and corporate governance is true, we would expect that family firms where the CEOs and directors are family members should have the worst governance and the worst performance. This certainly is not the case. So how exactly the social network between board members and CEO can influence corporate governance and the firm performance? Our paper provides the first theoretical discussion on this effect. In particular, our paper considers three scenarios: complete information where the prosocial inclinations are known for each other, incomplete information where the shareholders`.prosocial inclination (we denote as α ) is privately known for themselves, and incomplete information where the manager`s .prosocial inclination (we denote as β ) is privately known for himself.
參考文獻 Allen, F., and Babus, A. (2009). Networks in Finance1. The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World, 367.
Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007). Director networks and firm governance. Unpublished working paper, University of Texas--Austin.
Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007, April). Sympathetic boards: director networks and firm governance. In EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper, Austin.
Bartling, B., and von Siemens, F. A. (2010). The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents. Labour Economics, 17(3), 598-607.
Batson, D. (1998) "Altruism and Prosocial Behavior," chapter 23 in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske,and G. Lindzey eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. II,. McGraw Hill, 282---316.
Benabou, R., and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The review of economic studies, 70(3), 489-520.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior." American Economic Review 96 (5): 1652--78.
Bierbrauer, F., and Netzer, N. (2016). Mechanism design and intentions. Journal of Economic Theory, 163, 557-603.
Braggion, F. (2011). Managers and (secret) social networks: the influence of the Freemasonry on firm performance. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(6), 1053-1081.
Carmichael, L., and MacLeod, W. B. (2003). Caring about sunk costs: a behavioral solution to holdup problems with small stakes. Journal of law, economics, and organization, 19(1), 106-118.
Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.
Fang, H., and Moscarini, G. (2005). Morale hazard. Journal of monetary Economics, 52(4), 749-777.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868.
Freeman, R. B. (1997). Working for nothing: The supply of volunteer labor. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1, Part 2), S140-S166.
Frey, B. S. (1997). A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. The Economic Journal, 107(443), 1043-1053.
Frey, B. S., and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of economic surveys, 15(5), 589-611.
Gaspar, J. M., and M. Massa, (2007). Power Plays: Intra-Firm Corporate Connections and Firm Value, working paper, INSEAD.
Herold, F. (2010). Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 180-191.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell journal of economics, 74-91.
Itoh, H. (2004). Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences. The Japanese Economic Review, 55(1), 18-45.
Jewitt, I. (1988). Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1177-1190.
Kőszegi, B. (2014). Behavioral contract theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 52(4), 1075-1118.
Kramarz, F., and Thesmar, D. (2013). Social networks in the boardroom. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), 780-807.
Kuhnen, C. M. (2006). Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry.
Nguyen, B. D. (2012). Does the Rolodex matter? Corporate elite`s small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors. Management Science, 58(2), 236-252.
Pepper and Gore (2015) , Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations for Theorizing About Executive Compensation
Pistor, K. (2007). Network-finance: An institutional innovation for a global market place. Working paper, Columbia University.
Rey-Biel, P. (2008). Inequity aversion and team incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297-320.
Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. American Economic Review, 97(3), 999-1012.
Tracey, D., and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 990-1008.
von Siemens, F. A. (2010). Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts. Oxford Economic Papers, 63(3), 499-522.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
103258009
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258009
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何靜嫺zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔡一豪zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Tsai, Yi Haoen_US
dc.creator (作者) 蔡一豪zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tsai, Yi Haoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 28-Aug-2017 14:25:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 28-Aug-2017 14:25:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 28-Aug-2017 14:25:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0103258009en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112281-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103258009zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Many recent researches examine the social networks between directors and CEO and show their negative impacts on corporate governance (see Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Gaspar and Massa, 2007). If, this negative relation between social connection and corporate governance is true, we would expect that family firms where the CEOs and directors are family members should have the worst governance and the worst performance. This certainly is not the case. So how exactly the social network between board members and CEO can influence corporate governance and the firm performance? Our paper provides the first theoretical discussion on this effect. In particular, our paper considers three scenarios: complete information where the prosocial inclinations are known for each other, incomplete information where the shareholders`.prosocial inclination (we denote as α ) is privately known for themselves, and incomplete information where the manager`s .prosocial inclination (we denote as β ) is privately known for himself.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Related Literature 4
2 The Model 8
2.1 Employment Contract 9
2.2 E§ort and Compensation 11
3 The Principal Signals 15
3.1 Pooling Strategy 16
3.2 Separating Strategy 17
3.3 Partial Pooling Strategy 19
4 The Agent Signals 21
4.1 Pooling Strategy 24
4.2 Separating Strategy 27
4.3 Partial Pooling Strategy 31
5 Concluding Remarks 40
6 References 43		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 3165339 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258009en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 社會網路zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 代理模型zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social networken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Principal-Agent modelen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate governanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 代理模型中的策略性利他行為zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Friendship building with boss: strategic prosocial behaviors in agency modelen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Allen, F., and Babus, A. (2009). Networks in Finance1. The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World, 367.
Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007). Director networks and firm governance. Unpublished working paper, University of Texas--Austin.
Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007, April). Sympathetic boards: director networks and firm governance. In EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper, Austin.
Bartling, B., and von Siemens, F. A. (2010). The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents. Labour Economics, 17(3), 598-607.
Batson, D. (1998) "Altruism and Prosocial Behavior," chapter 23 in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske,and G. Lindzey eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. II,. McGraw Hill, 282---316.
Benabou, R., and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The review of economic studies, 70(3), 489-520.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior." American Economic Review 96 (5): 1652--78.
Bierbrauer, F., and Netzer, N. (2016). Mechanism design and intentions. Journal of Economic Theory, 163, 557-603.
Braggion, F. (2011). Managers and (secret) social networks: the influence of the Freemasonry on firm performance. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(6), 1053-1081.
Carmichael, L., and MacLeod, W. B. (2003). Caring about sunk costs: a behavioral solution to holdup problems with small stakes. Journal of law, economics, and organization, 19(1), 106-118.
Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.
Fang, H., and Moscarini, G. (2005). Morale hazard. Journal of monetary Economics, 52(4), 749-777.
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868.
Freeman, R. B. (1997). Working for nothing: The supply of volunteer labor. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1, Part 2), S140-S166.
Frey, B. S. (1997). A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. The Economic Journal, 107(443), 1043-1053.
Frey, B. S., and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of economic surveys, 15(5), 589-611.
Gaspar, J. M., and M. Massa, (2007). Power Plays: Intra-Firm Corporate Connections and Firm Value, working paper, INSEAD.
Herold, F. (2010). Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 180-191.
Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell journal of economics, 74-91.
Itoh, H. (2004). Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences. The Japanese Economic Review, 55(1), 18-45.
Jewitt, I. (1988). Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1177-1190.
Kőszegi, B. (2014). Behavioral contract theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 52(4), 1075-1118.
Kramarz, F., and Thesmar, D. (2013). Social networks in the boardroom. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), 780-807.
Kuhnen, C. M. (2006). Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry.
Nguyen, B. D. (2012). Does the Rolodex matter? Corporate elite`s small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors. Management Science, 58(2), 236-252.
Pepper and Gore (2015) , Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations for Theorizing About Executive Compensation
Pistor, K. (2007). Network-finance: An institutional innovation for a global market place. Working paper, Columbia University.
Rey-Biel, P. (2008). Inequity aversion and team incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297-320.
Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. American Economic Review, 97(3), 999-1012.
Tracey, D., and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 990-1008.
von Siemens, F. A. (2010). Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts. Oxford Economic Papers, 63(3), 499-522.		zh_TW