| dc.contributor | 財政系 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張勝文 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang, Sheng Wen | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Coulson, N. Edward | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wang, Ping | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2016-10 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 31-Aug-2017 13:48:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 31-Aug-2017 13:48:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 31-Aug-2017 13:48:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112442 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The control of drug activity currently favors supply-side policies: drug suppliers in the United States face a higher arrest rate and longer sentences than demanders. We construct a simple model of drug activity with search and entry frictions in labor and drug markets. Our calibration analysis suggests a strong “dealer replacement effect.” As a result, given a variety of community objectives, it is beneficial to lower supplier arrests and raise the demand arrest rate from current values. A 10% shift from supply-side to demand-side arrests can reduce the population of potential drug dealers by 22–25,000 and raise aggregate local income by $380–$400 million, at 2002 prices. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 340893 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18(5), 726-751 | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Optimal Drug Policy in Low-Income Neighborhoods | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/jpet.12147 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12147 | |
