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題名 美國法上聯邦先占原則(Preemption)之探討:以法律解釋方法論為基礎的法理重塑
Preemption Doctrine in the United States : A Perspective of Statutory Interpretation Theory and Reconstruction
作者 艾鶴軒
Ai, Ho-Hsuan
貢獻者 廖元豪
Liao, Yuan-Hao
艾鶴軒
Ai, Ho-Hsuan
關鍵詞 聯邦先占原則
法律解釋方法論
文本主義
聯邦主義
最高條款
Preemption
Statutory interpretation
Textualism
Federalism
Supremacy clause
日期 2017
上傳時間 13-Sep-2017 14:55:24 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文以美國聯邦最高法院Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing為文引,在詳細解析與評論該案判決並呈現出聯邦先佔原則的本質爭論後,指出必須要以法律解釋方法論為論述核心,才能解決美國法上聯邦先占原則所面對的困境,並試圖提供聯邦先占原則一個更一致的法學思維與分析視角。
     
     本文的分析可以拆分成四大區塊。第一部分,我會先介紹並評析Hughes,指出本案並非毫無疑義,並對於各方可能的反論予以辯駁,並總結得出本案各方對於聯邦先占原則的理解以及判決結果差異,關鍵就在於對法律解釋方法論的認識。第二部分,我會梳理聯邦先占原則在美國法上的發展,包括其歷史沿革與各時期較重要學說與法院見解,試圖完整開展聯邦先占原則的發展歷程,並同時回顧曾經被提及的主要批評與可能解決方法;第三部分則會轉入法律解釋方法論,將重點放在當代最主要的文本主義與目地主義,分別進行介紹與梳理,尤其是在聯邦先占原則場域中的具體適用、發展與評析;最後,在聯邦先占原則、文本主義與目的主義都妥善總結後,我會綜合分析並整體適用,希冀能闡述我的想法,重塑聯邦先占原則的法理架構,並提出較為合適的判斷基準,以期能反思聯邦先占原則的具體適用結果,提供一個具有邏輯一貫性的理論基礎。
This thesis takes Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing of the Supreme Court of the United States as a leading case, and, after closely examine the case and the opinions, which can present the inherent confrontations within the Preemption doctrine, claims that only by centering arguments and rationales around theories of statutory interpretation can a more jurisprudentially and analytically coherent solution, which I attempt to provide in this thesis, of the problems and difficulties Preemption currently facing be delivered.
     
     This thesis consists of four major blocks. In the first part, I will introduce and comment the case Hughes, and suggest by countering the possible arguments of the Parties and the Court that this case is somewhat problematic, so as to conclude that the understandings of Preemption and the differences of the opinions of this case ought to be contributed mostly to the perceptions of statutory interpretation. Second, I will review the development of Preemption in the U.S., including its historical roots and major theories of the scholars and opinions of the courts, with an eye to fully presenting the track of Preemption, important criticisms, and possible solutions mentioned in the past. Third, I will turn to statutory interpretation focusing on the two most significant theories, namely Textualism and Purposivism, and introduce respectively while emphasizing the application, evolvement, and comments in the field of Preemption. Lastly, after properly inferring the Preemption doctrine, Textualism, and Purposivism, I will summarize and further specify my opinion with application, in order to address my proposed solution, that is to reconstruct the legal framework of the Preemption doctrine with more appropriate standards and tests, all for the purpose of reflecting the preemption and its application and establish a logically coherent theoretical foundation.
"第壹章 序論 8
     一、 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 8
     二、 Hughes判決基礎:聯邦先占原則 10
     三、 聯邦先占原則與法律解釋方法論 14
     四、 問題所在:聯邦先占原則的判斷準據與方法 17
     五、 研究方法與步驟 20
     
     第貳章 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 22
     一、 Hughes及其背景 22
     二、 判決論述的起點:法律解釋 23
     三、 系爭聯邦措施:PJM 24
     四、 系爭州政府措施:補貼 26
     五、 本案爭議:補貼不公 27
     六、 多數意見與評析 28
     七、 協同意見與評析 32
     (一) Sotomayor的協同意見與評析 32
     (二) Thomas的協同意見與評析 35
     (三) 本文評析 37
     1. 多數意見將實際上排除所有可能有效的州政府措施 37
     2. 系爭州政府措施並非直接設定跨州批發價格 38
     3. 滑坡效應抗辯並不合理 39
     4. 假設系爭州政府措施可以不涉及價格並無意義 43
     5. 經濟學供需法則並非法律原則 45
     八、 歸根究柢:法律解釋方法論與聯邦先占原則的路線爭議 46
     
     第參章 聯邦先占原則 48
     一、 概論與法理缺失 50
     二、 明示聯邦先占原則 53
     三、 領域聯邦先占原則 55
     (一) 以1930年代為分水嶺的聯邦先占原則 56
     (二) 當代領域聯邦先占原則 57
     四、 衝突聯邦先占原則 60
     (一) 起源與領域聯邦先占原則的區別 61
     (二) 「確實不能」(Actual Impossibility) 64
     (三) 「細緻平衡」(Delicate Balance) 69
     (四) 最低標準 71
     (五) 障礙聯邦先占原則與文本主義的衝突 76
     五、 聯邦先占原則的否定推定 77
     六、 聯邦主義與最高條款 80
     (一) 權力分配觀點下的聯邦先占原則功能 80
     1. 多元嘗試 82
     2. 因地制宜 83
     (二) 最高條款與聯邦先占原則:權源或誤解? 85
     七、 何去何從?聯邦先占原則的指導原則 91
     (一) 法律解釋方法論應爲聯邦先占原則的適用基礎 91
     (二) 聯邦主義與最高條款應為聯邦先占原則的理論基礎 93
     (三) 聯邦先占原則既有分類有其助益:標準意涵與判斷順序 96
     (四) 國會意圖仍然是聯邦先占原則的適用依據 98
     (五) 肯定推定與否定推定應為聯邦先占原則的輔助判準 100
     
     第肆章 法律解釋方法論 103
     一、 前身:目的主義 106
     二、 今世:文本主義 109
     (一) 文本主義的基本主張 111
     (二) 所謂「文本」 114
     1. 語言的直觀意義 114
     2. 語言的社會意義 116
     3. 文本主義的判斷標準 119
     (三) 除了文本,還能考量什麼? 120
     1. 立法意圖?意圖懷疑論的主張 120
     2. 立法目的? 127
     三、 聯邦先占原則下文本主義的主要爭論與評析 133
     (一) 默示聯邦先占原則在本質上牴觸與文本主義? 133
     (二) 法院應該在聯邦先占原則案件中更為積極,因而必須適用目的主義? 140
     (三) 文本主義符合美國憲法對於權力分立的精神與要求 144
     
     第伍章 本文意見:以法律解釋方法論重新理解聯邦先占原則 149
     一、 新文本主義與新目的主義之爭:司法權定位 150
     二、 權限分配觀點下的法律解釋方法論 153
     三、 二元聯邦先占原則:領域與衝突 156
     四、 Hughes的應有結論 158
     (一) 判決建議 158
     (二) 建議理由 160
     
     第陸章 結論 163
     
     第柒章 參考文獻 165
     一、 Cases and Decisions 165
     二、 Books and Periodicals 166
     三、 Internet Resources 169
參考文獻 一、 Cases and Decisions
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     29. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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     二、 Books and Periodicals
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     7. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343 (2002).
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     10. Donald P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” with Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of Preemption, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 829 (1984).
     11. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991).
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     13. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983).
     14. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 209 (2015).
     15. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1995).
     16. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (2016).
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     18. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387 (2003).
     19. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113 (2011).
     20. Joshua Hawkesa and Mark Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemption, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 63 (2014).
     21. Lawrence M. Solan, Is It Time For A Restatement Of Statutory Interpretation?, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 733 (2014).
     22. Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 467 (2014).
     23. Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1185 (2011).
     24. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002).
     25. Michael E. Bowlus, Runaway Preemption: The Reckless Doctrine of Pliva and Mutual Pharmaceutical, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913 (2015).
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     28. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 69 (1988).
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     33. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1982).
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     35. S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 829 (1992).
     36. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994).
     37. Stephen Gardbaum, The Breadth Vs. The Depth Of Congress’s Commerce Power: The Curious History Of Preemption During The Lochner Era, In Federal Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests 48 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
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     39. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
     40. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085 (2000).
     41. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems In The Making And Application Of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994).
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     三、 Internet Resources
     1. Nina Totenberg, Justice Gorsuch Finds His `Easier` Solution Has Few Takers On 1st Day, NPR News (April 17, 20174:30 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/17/524393113/justice-gorsuch-jumps-right-into-questioning-in-supreme-court-debut.
     2. FERC官方網站,https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp (last visited March 30, 2017).
     3. PJM官方網站,http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/value-proposition.aspx, (last visited March 30, 2017).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
102651042
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102651042
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 廖元豪zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Liao, Yuan-Haoen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 艾鶴軒zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Ai, Ho-Hsuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 艾鶴軒zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Ai, Ho-Hsuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 13-Sep-2017 14:55:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 13-Sep-2017 14:55:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 13-Sep-2017 14:55:24 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0102651042en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112694-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 法律學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 102651042zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以美國聯邦最高法院Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing為文引,在詳細解析與評論該案判決並呈現出聯邦先佔原則的本質爭論後,指出必須要以法律解釋方法論為論述核心,才能解決美國法上聯邦先占原則所面對的困境,並試圖提供聯邦先占原則一個更一致的法學思維與分析視角。
     
     本文的分析可以拆分成四大區塊。第一部分,我會先介紹並評析Hughes,指出本案並非毫無疑義,並對於各方可能的反論予以辯駁,並總結得出本案各方對於聯邦先占原則的理解以及判決結果差異,關鍵就在於對法律解釋方法論的認識。第二部分,我會梳理聯邦先占原則在美國法上的發展,包括其歷史沿革與各時期較重要學說與法院見解,試圖完整開展聯邦先占原則的發展歷程,並同時回顧曾經被提及的主要批評與可能解決方法;第三部分則會轉入法律解釋方法論,將重點放在當代最主要的文本主義與目地主義,分別進行介紹與梳理,尤其是在聯邦先占原則場域中的具體適用、發展與評析;最後,在聯邦先占原則、文本主義與目的主義都妥善總結後,我會綜合分析並整體適用,希冀能闡述我的想法,重塑聯邦先占原則的法理架構,並提出較為合適的判斷基準,以期能反思聯邦先占原則的具體適用結果,提供一個具有邏輯一貫性的理論基礎。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis takes Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing of the Supreme Court of the United States as a leading case, and, after closely examine the case and the opinions, which can present the inherent confrontations within the Preemption doctrine, claims that only by centering arguments and rationales around theories of statutory interpretation can a more jurisprudentially and analytically coherent solution, which I attempt to provide in this thesis, of the problems and difficulties Preemption currently facing be delivered.
     
     This thesis consists of four major blocks. In the first part, I will introduce and comment the case Hughes, and suggest by countering the possible arguments of the Parties and the Court that this case is somewhat problematic, so as to conclude that the understandings of Preemption and the differences of the opinions of this case ought to be contributed mostly to the perceptions of statutory interpretation. Second, I will review the development of Preemption in the U.S., including its historical roots and major theories of the scholars and opinions of the courts, with an eye to fully presenting the track of Preemption, important criticisms, and possible solutions mentioned in the past. Third, I will turn to statutory interpretation focusing on the two most significant theories, namely Textualism and Purposivism, and introduce respectively while emphasizing the application, evolvement, and comments in the field of Preemption. Lastly, after properly inferring the Preemption doctrine, Textualism, and Purposivism, I will summarize and further specify my opinion with application, in order to address my proposed solution, that is to reconstruct the legal framework of the Preemption doctrine with more appropriate standards and tests, all for the purpose of reflecting the preemption and its application and establish a logically coherent theoretical foundation.
en_US
dc.description.abstract (摘要) "第壹章 序論 8
     一、 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 8
     二、 Hughes判決基礎:聯邦先占原則 10
     三、 聯邦先占原則與法律解釋方法論 14
     四、 問題所在:聯邦先占原則的判斷準據與方法 17
     五、 研究方法與步驟 20
     
     第貳章 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 22
     一、 Hughes及其背景 22
     二、 判決論述的起點:法律解釋 23
     三、 系爭聯邦措施:PJM 24
     四、 系爭州政府措施:補貼 26
     五、 本案爭議:補貼不公 27
     六、 多數意見與評析 28
     七、 協同意見與評析 32
     (一) Sotomayor的協同意見與評析 32
     (二) Thomas的協同意見與評析 35
     (三) 本文評析 37
     1. 多數意見將實際上排除所有可能有效的州政府措施 37
     2. 系爭州政府措施並非直接設定跨州批發價格 38
     3. 滑坡效應抗辯並不合理 39
     4. 假設系爭州政府措施可以不涉及價格並無意義 43
     5. 經濟學供需法則並非法律原則 45
     八、 歸根究柢:法律解釋方法論與聯邦先占原則的路線爭議 46
     
     第參章 聯邦先占原則 48
     一、 概論與法理缺失 50
     二、 明示聯邦先占原則 53
     三、 領域聯邦先占原則 55
     (一) 以1930年代為分水嶺的聯邦先占原則 56
     (二) 當代領域聯邦先占原則 57
     四、 衝突聯邦先占原則 60
     (一) 起源與領域聯邦先占原則的區別 61
     (二) 「確實不能」(Actual Impossibility) 64
     (三) 「細緻平衡」(Delicate Balance) 69
     (四) 最低標準 71
     (五) 障礙聯邦先占原則與文本主義的衝突 76
     五、 聯邦先占原則的否定推定 77
     六、 聯邦主義與最高條款 80
     (一) 權力分配觀點下的聯邦先占原則功能 80
     1. 多元嘗試 82
     2. 因地制宜 83
     (二) 最高條款與聯邦先占原則:權源或誤解? 85
     七、 何去何從?聯邦先占原則的指導原則 91
     (一) 法律解釋方法論應爲聯邦先占原則的適用基礎 91
     (二) 聯邦主義與最高條款應為聯邦先占原則的理論基礎 93
     (三) 聯邦先占原則既有分類有其助益:標準意涵與判斷順序 96
     (四) 國會意圖仍然是聯邦先占原則的適用依據 98
     (五) 肯定推定與否定推定應為聯邦先占原則的輔助判準 100
     
     第肆章 法律解釋方法論 103
     一、 前身:目的主義 106
     二、 今世:文本主義 109
     (一) 文本主義的基本主張 111
     (二) 所謂「文本」 114
     1. 語言的直觀意義 114
     2. 語言的社會意義 116
     3. 文本主義的判斷標準 119
     (三) 除了文本,還能考量什麼? 120
     1. 立法意圖?意圖懷疑論的主張 120
     2. 立法目的? 127
     三、 聯邦先占原則下文本主義的主要爭論與評析 133
     (一) 默示聯邦先占原則在本質上牴觸與文本主義? 133
     (二) 法院應該在聯邦先占原則案件中更為積極,因而必須適用目的主義? 140
     (三) 文本主義符合美國憲法對於權力分立的精神與要求 144
     
     第伍章 本文意見:以法律解釋方法論重新理解聯邦先占原則 149
     一、 新文本主義與新目的主義之爭:司法權定位 150
     二、 權限分配觀點下的法律解釋方法論 153
     三、 二元聯邦先占原則:領域與衝突 156
     四、 Hughes的應有結論 158
     (一) 判決建議 158
     (二) 建議理由 160
     
     第陸章 結論 163
     
     第柒章 參考文獻 165
     一、 Cases and Decisions 165
     二、 Books and Periodicals 166
     三、 Internet Resources 169
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dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 序論 8
     一、 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 8
     二、 Hughes判決基礎:聯邦先占原則 10
     三、 聯邦先占原則與法律解釋方法論 14
     四、 問題所在:聯邦先占原則的判斷準據與方法 17
     五、 研究方法與步驟 20
     
     第貳章 文引:Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing 22
     一、 Hughes及其背景 22
     二、 判決論述的起點:法律解釋 23
     三、 系爭聯邦措施:PJM 24
     四、 系爭州政府措施:補貼 26
     五、 本案爭議:補貼不公 27
     六、 多數意見與評析 28
     七、 協同意見與評析 32
     (一) Sotomayor的協同意見與評析 32
     (二) Thomas的協同意見與評析 35
     (三) 本文評析 37
     1. 多數意見將實際上排除所有可能有效的州政府措施 37
     2. 系爭州政府措施並非直接設定跨州批發價格 38
     3. 滑坡效應抗辯並不合理 39
     4. 假設系爭州政府措施可以不涉及價格並無意義 43
     5. 經濟學供需法則並非法律原則 45
     八、 歸根究柢:法律解釋方法論與聯邦先占原則的路線爭議 46
     
     第參章 聯邦先占原則 48
     一、 概論與法理缺失 50
     二、 明示聯邦先占原則 53
     三、 領域聯邦先占原則 55
     (一) 以1930年代為分水嶺的聯邦先占原則 56
     (二) 當代領域聯邦先占原則 57
     四、 衝突聯邦先占原則 60
     (一) 起源與領域聯邦先占原則的區別 61
     (二) 「確實不能」(Actual Impossibility) 64
     (三) 「細緻平衡」(Delicate Balance) 69
     (四) 最低標準 71
     (五) 障礙聯邦先占原則與文本主義的衝突 76
     五、 聯邦先占原則的否定推定 77
     六、 聯邦主義與最高條款 80
     (一) 權力分配觀點下的聯邦先占原則功能 80
     1. 多元嘗試 82
     2. 因地制宜 83
     (二) 最高條款與聯邦先占原則:權源或誤解? 85
     七、 何去何從?聯邦先占原則的指導原則 91
     (一) 法律解釋方法論應爲聯邦先占原則的適用基礎 91
     (二) 聯邦主義與最高條款應為聯邦先占原則的理論基礎 93
     (三) 聯邦先占原則既有分類有其助益:標準意涵與判斷順序 96
     (四) 國會意圖仍然是聯邦先占原則的適用依據 98
     (五) 肯定推定與否定推定應為聯邦先占原則的輔助判準 100
     
     第肆章 法律解釋方法論 103
     一、 前身:目的主義 106
     二、 今世:文本主義 109
     (一) 文本主義的基本主張 111
     (二) 所謂「文本」 114
     1. 語言的直觀意義 114
     2. 語言的社會意義 116
     3. 文本主義的判斷標準 119
     (三) 除了文本,還能考量什麼? 120
     1. 立法意圖?意圖懷疑論的主張 120
     2. 立法目的? 127
     三、 聯邦先占原則下文本主義的主要爭論與評析 133
     (一) 默示聯邦先占原則在本質上牴觸與文本主義? 133
     (二) 法院應該在聯邦先占原則案件中更為積極,因而必須適用目的主義? 140
     (三) 文本主義符合美國憲法對於權力分立的精神與要求 144
     
     第伍章 本文意見:以法律解釋方法論重新理解聯邦先占原則 149
     一、 新文本主義與新目的主義之爭:司法權定位 150
     二、 權限分配觀點下的法律解釋方法論 153
     三、 二元聯邦先占原則:領域與衝突 156
     四、 Hughes的應有結論 158
     (一) 判決建議 158
     (二) 建議理由 160
     
     第陸章 結論 163
     
     第柒章 參考文獻 165
     一、 Cases and Decisions 165
     二、 Books and Periodicals 166
     三、 Internet Resources 169
zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102651042en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯邦先占原則zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 法律解釋方法論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 文本主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯邦主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最高條款zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Preemptionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Statutory interpretationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Textualismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Federalismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Supremacy clauseen_US
dc.title (題名) 美國法上聯邦先占原則(Preemption)之探討:以法律解釋方法論為基礎的法理重塑zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Preemption Doctrine in the United States : A Perspective of Statutory Interpretation Theory and Reconstructionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、 Cases and Decisions
     1. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
     2. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928).
     3. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
     4. California Fed. S & L v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
     5. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
     6. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
     7. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
     8. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
     9. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981). Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
     10. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
     11. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
     12. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
     13. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
     14. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
     15. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
     16. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
     17. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass`n, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 760 (2016).
     18. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
     19. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995)
     20. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
     21. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
     22. Hayfield No. R. Co. v. C&N Transp. Co.,467 U.S. 622 (1984).
     23. Hillsborough County v. Auto. Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
     24. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, 578 U. S. _, 136 S.Ct. 1288 (2016).
     25. Int`l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
     26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
     27. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
     28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
     29. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
     30. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
     31. Midwest Power Sys., Inc., 78 FERC ¶61,067, 61,248 (1997).
     32. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
     33. New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
     34. New York Dept. of Soc. Svcs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
     35. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1591 (2015).
     36. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm`n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
     37. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
     38. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep`t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
     39. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
     40. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
     41. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
     42. Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912)
     43. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867).
     44. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 32 (1941).
     45. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
     46. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
     47. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
     48. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
     
     二、 Books and Periodicals
     1. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation-Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L. J. 1764 (2010).
     2. Amy L. Stein, Pitfalls Along the Brave New Energy Federalism Path, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 114 (2017).
     3. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511 (1989).
     4. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 559 (1997).
     5. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2000).
     6. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner`s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987).
     7. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343 (2002).
     8. David E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51 (1973).
     9. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921(1992).
     10. Donald P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” with Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of Preemption, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 829 (1984).
     11. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991).
     12. Ernest A. Young, ‘‘The Ordinary Diet of the Law’’: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253 (2012).
     13. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983).
     14. Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 209 (2015).
     15. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1995).
     16. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (2016).
     17. John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 369 (2013).
     18. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387 (2003).
     19. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113 (2011).
     20. Joshua Hawkesa and Mark Seidenfeld, A Positive Defense of Administrative Preemption, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 63 (2014).
     21. Lawrence M. Solan, Is It Time For A Restatement Of Statutory Interpretation?, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 733 (2014).
     22. Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 467 (2014).
     23. Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1185 (2011).
     24. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002).
     25. Michael E. Bowlus, Runaway Preemption: The Reckless Doctrine of Pliva and Mutual Pharmaceutical, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913 (2015).
     26. Michael S. Greve, Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question, 26 Const. Comment. 679 (2010).
     27. Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1056 (2013).
     28. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 69 (1988).
     29. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692 (2001).
     30. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663 (2001).
     31. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1982).
     32. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 519 (2012).
     33. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1982).
     34. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685 (1991).
     35. S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 829 (1992).
     36. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994).
     37. Stephen Gardbaum, The Breadth Vs. The Depth Of Congress’s Commerce Power: The Curious History Of Preemption During The Lochner Era, In Federal Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests 48 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
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     三、 Internet Resources
     1. Nina Totenberg, Justice Gorsuch Finds His `Easier` Solution Has Few Takers On 1st Day, NPR News (April 17, 20174:30 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/17/524393113/justice-gorsuch-jumps-right-into-questioning-in-supreme-court-debut.
     2. FERC官方網站,https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp (last visited March 30, 2017).
     3. PJM官方網站,http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/value-proposition.aspx, (last visited March 30, 2017).
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