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題名 關係人交易對公司租稅規避之影響: 以台灣上市電子業為例
The Effect of Related Party Transaction to Tax Avoidance: the Case of Taiwan Public Electronic Company作者 游竣淵 貢獻者 何怡澄
游竣淵關鍵詞 租稅規避
關係人交易
關係人類型
Tax avoidance
Related party transactions
Related party types日期 2016 上傳時間 13-Sep-2017 16:53:26 (UTC+8) 摘要 近來反避稅浪潮興起,促使各界再度檢視公司租稅規避的行為。關係人交易不透明且複雜的特性,常被公司用以進行不當的利益安排,達到減輕稅負的目的。本研究採用台灣上市電子業公司2013-2014年的關係人交易資料,探討關係人交易與租稅規避的關聯性。本研究將關係人交易類型分成簡單與複雜兩種類型。並將關係人分為關係個人、關係個體,更進一步將關係個體分為其他關係個體及集團企業型態。實證結果顯示公司與其他關係個體進行簡單交易時,稅規避程度較高。可以推論公司與不同關係人進行不同交易類型的避稅效果不同。
Due to the emerging of anti-tax avoidance, the act of companies arranging tax avoidance is being examined. Related party transaction is complicated and nontransparent, therefore companies often use it to undergo inappropriate interest arrangement to ease tax burden. This research examines the related party transactions of Taiwan public electronic companies from 2013 to 2014 to study the relationship between related party transaction and tax avoidance. This research divides transactions into two types, simple and complicated. Related parties are divided into individual and enterprise, and enterprise are further divided into other related enterprise and conglomerate. Research shows higher tax avoidance when companies adopt simple transaction with other related enterprise. In solution this research infers tax avoidance effects will differ when types of transactions and related parties are different.參考文獻 中文參考文獻:王建煊與吳家勳 (2012),租稅法,台北:華泰文化。馬嘉應與賴榮舟 (2013),關係公司間財務安排移轉訂價議題之探討,財稅研究,台北:財稅研究雜誌社。(27 p.23-33)陳明進,2002,營利事業有效稅率決定因素之實證研究,會計評論,(34):57-75。———,2003,我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響,管理評論,22(1):127-151。陳明進與蔡麗雯 (2006),稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究,管理學報,23(6):739-763。曾柏維 (2015),集團企業交易與租稅規避之關聯性研究,國立政治大學財政學研究所,未發表之碩士論文。黃美祝與楊佩璇 (2011),集團企業與非避稅程度之比較,會計學報,4(1):1-22 。葛克昌 (1977),租稅規避之研究,國立臺灣大學法論叢,6(2):167-187 。英文參考文獻:Austin, C. R., and R. J. Wilson. 2013. Are reputational costs a determinant of tax avoidance? Paper presented at 2013 American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting: Tax Avoidance in an International Setting.Bae, K. H., J. K. Kang, and J. M. Kim. 2002. Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. The Journal of Finance 57 (6): 2695-2740.Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95 (1): 41-61.Cheung, Y.-L., Y. Qi, P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. 2009. Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (5): 914-924.Cheung, Y.-L., P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. 2006. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2): 343-386.Chyz, J. A. 2013. Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2-3): 311-328.Clausing, K. A. 2009. Multinational firm tax avoidance and tax policy. National Tax Journal 62(4): 703-725Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 145-179.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2009a. Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (3): 537-546.———. 2009b. Earnings management, corporate tax shelters, and book-tax alignment. National Tax Journal: 169-186.Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3): 430-465.Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 83 (1): 61-82.Erickson, M., B. W. Mayhew, and W. L. Felix. 2000. Why do audits fail? Evidence from Lincoln Savings and Loan. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): 165-194.Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch, and S. O. Rego. 2009. Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review 84 (2): 467-496.Graham, J. R., and A. L. Tucker. 2006. Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics 81 (3): 563-594.Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3): 127-178.Hanlon, M., and J. Slemrod. 2009. What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics 93 (1-2): 126-141.Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.Khurana, I. K., and W. J. Moser. 2013. Institutional Shareholders` Investment Horizons and Tax Avoidance. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 35 (1): 111-134.Kohlbeck, M., and B. W. Mayhew. 2010. Valuation of firms that disclose related party transactions. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29 (2):115-137.Lanis, R., and G. Richardson. 2011. The effect of board of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 30 (1): 50-70.Manzon Jr, G. B., and G. A. Plesko. 2002. The Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. The Tax Law Review 55: 175.Mills, L. F. 1998. Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 343-356.Phillips, J. D. 2003. Corporate tax-planning effectiveness: The role of compensation-based incentives. The Accounting Review 78 (3): 847-874.Rego, S. O. 2003. Tax‐Avoidance Activities of US Multinational Corporations*. Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (4): 805-833. Swartz, M. and S. Watkins, 2003, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron, New York, NY, Doubleday.Swenson, D. L. 2001. Tax reforms and evidence of transfer pricing. National Tax Journal 54(1): 7-25.Wilson, R. J. 2009. An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting Review 84 (3): 969-999.Yeh, Y. H., P. G. Shu, and Y. H. Su. 2012. Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 20 (5): 755-776. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353113資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033531131 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 何怡澄 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 游竣淵 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 游竣淵 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2016 en_US dc.date.accessioned 13-Sep-2017 16:53:26 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 13-Sep-2017 16:53:26 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 13-Sep-2017 16:53:26 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1033531131 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112850 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 103353113 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近來反避稅浪潮興起,促使各界再度檢視公司租稅規避的行為。關係人交易不透明且複雜的特性,常被公司用以進行不當的利益安排,達到減輕稅負的目的。本研究採用台灣上市電子業公司2013-2014年的關係人交易資料,探討關係人交易與租稅規避的關聯性。本研究將關係人交易類型分成簡單與複雜兩種類型。並將關係人分為關係個人、關係個體,更進一步將關係個體分為其他關係個體及集團企業型態。實證結果顯示公司與其他關係個體進行簡單交易時,稅規避程度較高。可以推論公司與不同關係人進行不同交易類型的避稅效果不同。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Due to the emerging of anti-tax avoidance, the act of companies arranging tax avoidance is being examined. Related party transaction is complicated and nontransparent, therefore companies often use it to undergo inappropriate interest arrangement to ease tax burden. This research examines the related party transactions of Taiwan public electronic companies from 2013 to 2014 to study the relationship between related party transaction and tax avoidance. This research divides transactions into two types, simple and complicated. Related parties are divided into individual and enterprise, and enterprise are further divided into other related enterprise and conglomerate. Research shows higher tax avoidance when companies adopt simple transaction with other related enterprise. In solution this research infers tax avoidance effects will differ when types of transactions and related parties are different. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章 緒論 5第一節 研究背景與動機 5第二節 研究目的及問題 7第三節 研究流程 7第貳章 文獻回顧 10第一節 租稅規避 11第二節 公司治理與租稅規避 12第三節 關係人交易 14第四節 假說建立 18第參章 研究方法 22第一節 實證模型 22第二節 變數定義說明 24第三節 資料來源與樣本篩選過程 39第肆章 實證結果 41第一節 敘述統計 41第二節 模型檢定 45第三節 迴歸結果分析 51第四節 F-檢定之分析(F-test)-檢定不同關係人與交易類型迴歸係數 58第伍章 結論與建議 60第一節 研究結論與建議 60第二節 研究範圍與研究限制 62圖目錄圖 1 研究流程圖 9圖 2 研究架構圖 10表目錄表 1 樣本篩選流程表 40表 2 敘述統計:財稅差異迴歸之樣本 42表 3 敘述統計:有效稅率迴歸之樣本 44表4 相關係數表:被解釋變數為總財稅差異或永久性財稅差異 46表5 相關係數表:被解釋變數為有效稅率 47表6 變異膨脹係數 49表6 變異膨脹係數(續) 50表 7 迴歸分析:假說1─關係人交易 54表 8 迴歸分析:假說2─關係人交易類型 55表 9 迴歸分析:假說3─交易類型與關係人類型 56表 10 迴歸分析:假說4─公司關係人類型 57表 11 檢定不同關係人與交易類型迴歸係數 60 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033531131 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 關係人交易 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 關係人類型 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax avoidance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Related party transactions en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Related party types en_US dc.title (題名) 關係人交易對公司租稅規避之影響: 以台灣上市電子業為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Effect of Related Party Transaction to Tax Avoidance: the Case of Taiwan Public Electronic Company en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文參考文獻:王建煊與吳家勳 (2012),租稅法,台北:華泰文化。馬嘉應與賴榮舟 (2013),關係公司間財務安排移轉訂價議題之探討,財稅研究,台北:財稅研究雜誌社。(27 p.23-33)陳明進,2002,營利事業有效稅率決定因素之實證研究,會計評論,(34):57-75。———,2003,我國租稅優惠對營利事業租稅負擔之影響,管理評論,22(1):127-151。陳明進與蔡麗雯 (2006),稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究,管理學報,23(6):739-763。曾柏維 (2015),集團企業交易與租稅規避之關聯性研究,國立政治大學財政學研究所,未發表之碩士論文。黃美祝與楊佩璇 (2011),集團企業與非避稅程度之比較,會計學報,4(1):1-22 。葛克昌 (1977),租稅規避之研究,國立臺灣大學法論叢,6(2):167-187 。英文參考文獻:Austin, C. R., and R. J. Wilson. 2013. Are reputational costs a determinant of tax avoidance? Paper presented at 2013 American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting: Tax Avoidance in an International Setting.Bae, K. H., J. K. Kang, and J. M. Kim. 2002. Tunneling or value added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups. The Journal of Finance 57 (6): 2695-2740.Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95 (1): 41-61.Cheung, Y.-L., Y. Qi, P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. 2009. Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions. Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (5): 914-924.Cheung, Y.-L., P. R. Rau, and A. Stouraitis. 2006. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2): 343-386.Chyz, J. A. 2013. Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering. Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2-3): 311-328.Clausing, K. A. 2009. Multinational firm tax avoidance and tax policy. National Tax Journal 62(4): 703-725Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 145-179.Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. 2009a. Corporate tax avoidance and firm value. The Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (3): 537-546.———. 2009b. Earnings management, corporate tax shelters, and book-tax alignment. National Tax Journal: 169-186.Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2008. The law and economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88 (3): 430-465.Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 83 (1): 61-82.Erickson, M., B. W. Mayhew, and W. L. Felix. 2000. Why do audits fail? Evidence from Lincoln Savings and Loan. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): 165-194.Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch, and S. O. Rego. 2009. Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review 84 (2): 467-496.Graham, J. R., and A. L. Tucker. 2006. Tax shelters and corporate debt policy. Journal of Financial Economics 81 (3): 563-594.Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (2-3): 127-178.Hanlon, M., and J. Slemrod. 2009. What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics 93 (1-2): 126-141.Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.Khurana, I. K., and W. J. Moser. 2013. Institutional Shareholders` Investment Horizons and Tax Avoidance. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 35 (1): 111-134.Kohlbeck, M., and B. W. Mayhew. 2010. Valuation of firms that disclose related party transactions. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29 (2):115-137.Lanis, R., and G. Richardson. 2011. The effect of board of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 30 (1): 50-70.Manzon Jr, G. B., and G. A. Plesko. 2002. The Relation between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income. The Tax Law Review 55: 175.Mills, L. F. 1998. Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 343-356.Phillips, J. D. 2003. Corporate tax-planning effectiveness: The role of compensation-based incentives. The Accounting Review 78 (3): 847-874.Rego, S. O. 2003. Tax‐Avoidance Activities of US Multinational Corporations*. Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (4): 805-833. Swartz, M. and S. Watkins, 2003, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron, New York, NY, Doubleday.Swenson, D. L. 2001. Tax reforms and evidence of transfer pricing. National Tax Journal 54(1): 7-25.Wilson, R. J. 2009. An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting Review 84 (3): 969-999.Yeh, Y. H., P. G. Shu, and Y. H. Su. 2012. Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 20 (5): 755-776. zh_TW
