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題名 Lightweight Non-Distance-Bounding Means to Address RFID Relay Attacks
作者 杜雨儒
Tu, Yuju
Piramuthu, Selwyn
貢獻者 資管系
關鍵詞 RFID; Relay attacks; Non-distance-bounding; Authentication
日期 2017-10
上傳時間 28-Sep-2017 17:39:34 (UTC+8)
摘要 A relay attack is accomplished by simply relaying messages between a prover (e.g., an RFID tag) and a verifier (e.g., an RFID reader) with the goal of convincing the verifier of its close physical proximity to the prover. In almost all relay attack scenarios, the verifier essentially communicates with a prover that is outside the verifier`s read-range. Relay attacks are notorious since they occur without the knowledge of the reader and/or tag, and has the potential to cause damage to honest parties (here, RFID reader and/or tag). Almost all means to address relay attacks in RFID systems to date are based on the proximity check idea that involves the measurement of message round trip times between tag and reader. With the speed of light at play, such measurements need not necessarily be accurate and could result in the false assumption of relay attack absence. Our review of published literature on approaches that use non-distance-based means to address relay attacks revealed ambient conditions` potential. We critically evaluate ambient conditions and develop a lightweight mutual authentication protocol that is based on magnetometer readings to address relay attacks.
關聯 Decision Support Systems, 102, 12-21
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.06.008
dc.contributor 資管系zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 杜雨儒zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tu, Yujuen_US
dc.creator (作者) Piramuthu, Selwynen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017-10-
dc.date.accessioned 28-Sep-2017 17:39:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 28-Sep-2017 17:39:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 28-Sep-2017 17:39:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/113137-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) A relay attack is accomplished by simply relaying messages between a prover (e.g., an RFID tag) and a verifier (e.g., an RFID reader) with the goal of convincing the verifier of its close physical proximity to the prover. In almost all relay attack scenarios, the verifier essentially communicates with a prover that is outside the verifier`s read-range. Relay attacks are notorious since they occur without the knowledge of the reader and/or tag, and has the potential to cause damage to honest parties (here, RFID reader and/or tag). Almost all means to address relay attacks in RFID systems to date are based on the proximity check idea that involves the measurement of message round trip times between tag and reader. With the speed of light at play, such measurements need not necessarily be accurate and could result in the false assumption of relay attack absence. Our review of published literature on approaches that use non-distance-based means to address relay attacks revealed ambient conditions` potential. We critically evaluate ambient conditions and develop a lightweight mutual authentication protocol that is based on magnetometer readings to address relay attacks.en_US
dc.format.extent 794520 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Decision Support Systems, 102, 12-21zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) RFID; Relay attacks; Non-distance-bounding; Authenticationen_US
dc.title (題名) Lightweight Non-Distance-Bounding Means to Address RFID Relay Attackszh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.dss.2017.06.008-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.06.008-