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題名 集團間競租模型中集團內分租規則對競租活動之影響
The Impact of Sharing Rule on Rent-Seeking Activities under the Two-Stage Between-Group Rent-Seeking Model
作者 翁仁甫
吳亭儀
Ueng, Zen-Fu
Wu, Ting-I
關鍵詞 集團間競租 ; 租利分配規則 ; 競租投入(支出)水準
Between-group rent-seeking ; Sharing rule ; Rent-seeking outlays
日期 2017-06
上傳時間 31-Oct-2017 15:37:22 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文以 Katz and Tokatlidu(1996)所建立之兩階段集團間競租模型為基礎,另引用 Nitzan(1991a, 1991b)在其單階段聯合集團競租分析中所提出的集團內租利分配規則,做為第二階段賽局集團內部進行租利分配時的分租規則,建構一個兩階段集團間競租競賽模型並進行相關分析。全文討論的焦點在於探究集團內部租利分配規則的變動,究竟會對於集團內、集團間以及社會整體競租活動產生怎樣的影響效果。有別於 Nitzan(1991a)以及經濟直觀上認為當集團提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時,將會降低競租社會投入水準的觀點,本文發現個別集團單獨的提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時,在某些情況下會讓社會總競租投入(支出)水準增加而非下降。
This paper extends Katz and Tokatlidu`s (1996) two-stage group rentseeking model by applying Nitzan`s single-stage intra-group rent sharing rule to the second stage game to construct a two-stage between-group rent-seeking model. Based on this two-stage between-group rent-seeking model, our discussion focuses on the effects of changing in intra-group rent sharing rule on intragroup, inter-group, and social rent-seeking activities. While Nitzan (1991a) and the conventional wisdom find that a more egalitarian rent sharing rule will reduce the social rent-seeking outlays in a single-stage game, our finding shows that the social rent-seeking outlays may increase rather than decrease when a single group takes a more egalitarian rent sharing rule in a two-stage game.
關聯 Review of Social Sciences
社會科學論叢, 11(1), 1-24
資料類型 article
dc.creator (作者) 翁仁甫zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 吳亭儀zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Ueng, Zen-Fuen_US
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Ting-Ien_US
dc.date (日期) 2017-06-
dc.date.accessioned 31-Oct-2017 15:37:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 31-Oct-2017 15:37:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 31-Oct-2017 15:37:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/114259-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文以 Katz and Tokatlidu(1996)所建立之兩階段集團間競租模型為基礎,另引用 Nitzan(1991a, 1991b)在其單階段聯合集團競租分析中所提出的集團內租利分配規則,做為第二階段賽局集團內部進行租利分配時的分租規則,建構一個兩階段集團間競租競賽模型並進行相關分析。全文討論的焦點在於探究集團內部租利分配規則的變動,究竟會對於集團內、集團間以及社會整體競租活動產生怎樣的影響效果。有別於 Nitzan(1991a)以及經濟直觀上認為當集團提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時,將會降低競租社會投入水準的觀點,本文發現個別集團單獨的提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時,在某些情況下會讓社會總競租投入(支出)水準增加而非下降。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper extends Katz and Tokatlidu`s (1996) two-stage group rentseeking model by applying Nitzan`s single-stage intra-group rent sharing rule to the second stage game to construct a two-stage between-group rent-seeking model. Based on this two-stage between-group rent-seeking model, our discussion focuses on the effects of changing in intra-group rent sharing rule on intragroup, inter-group, and social rent-seeking activities. While Nitzan (1991a) and the conventional wisdom find that a more egalitarian rent sharing rule will reduce the social rent-seeking outlays in a single-stage game, our finding shows that the social rent-seeking outlays may increase rather than decrease when a single group takes a more egalitarian rent sharing rule in a two-stage game.en_US
dc.format.extent 2149259 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Review of Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation (關聯) 社會科學論叢, 11(1), 1-24zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 集團間競租 ; 租利分配規則 ; 競租投入(支出)水準zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Between-group rent-seeking ; Sharing rule ; Rent-seeking outlaysen_US
dc.title (題名) 集團間競租模型中集團內分租規則對競租活動之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Impact of Sharing Rule on Rent-Seeking Activities under the Two-Stage Between-Group Rent-Seeking Modelen_US
dc.type (資料類型) article-