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題名 審計委員會與財務主管的力量博弈與審計人員選擇：來自中國的證據
The Relative Power of CFOs and Audit Committees and Choice of Audit Firm: Evidence from China
作者 楊苓梓
貢獻者 金成隆<br>金成隆
楊苓梓
關鍵詞 審計人員
十大會計師事務所
審計委員會
財務主管
國有制企業
Audit firm
Top ten
Accounting firms
Audit committee
CFO
State-owned enterprise
日期 2017
上傳時間 3-Jan-2018 16:18:47 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究的主要目的是在檢測財務主管相對於審計委員會的影響力，是否會影響到會計師的選擇。本研究以2007至2016間的中國上市公司為樣本，實證結果顯示:（1）財務主管相對於審計委員會的影響力愈大時，公司愈傾向於選擇非十大會計師事務所；（2）財務主管相對影響力於會計師選擇的影響，在國有企業是比較小的，而在私有企業是比較大的。
The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the relative power of CFOs and audit committees has an effect on its firms’ choice of audit firms. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007~2016, I find that: (1) companies with more powerful CFOs are more likely to hire lower-quality auditors, as measured by non-top10 audit firm; (2) The effect of CFOs’ relative power on the choice of audit firms is weaker for state-owned enterprises than for private enterprises.
參考文獻 財政部，企業內部控制基本規範，http://baike.baidu.com/view/17¬68792¬.¬h¬t¬m。
陳小悅，肖星，過曉豔，2000，配股權與上市公司利潤操縱，經濟研究，（1月）：30-36。
方軍雄，2009，我國上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性嗎，經濟研究(3月)：110-124。
胡世明，杜濱，2012，轉型經濟下國有企業政治關聯對績效影響的研究——以電力、煤氣及水的生產和供應業為例，華北電力大學學報，社會科學版（5 月）：34-41。
林鐘高，尤雪英，徐正剛，2002，獨立審計理論研究，立信會計出版社：257-266。
逯東，林高，2012 ，“官員型”高管、公司業績和非生產性支出———基於國有上市公司的經驗證據，金融研（6月）：139-152。
倪昌紅，鄒國慶，2010，高管團隊的政治聯結能改善企業績效嗎——基於戰略視角的分析，財經科學（7月）：79-86。
錢華，2006，審計委員會與內部審計關係研究，審計與經濟研究， 第21期（6月）：49-51。
蔡奮，2012，政治聯繫與企業績效研究綜述，中國鄉鎮企業會計（2月）：171-173。
孫錚，王躍堂，1999，資源配置與盈餘操縱之實證研究，財經研究（4月）：3-9。
王世權，2011，監事會的本源性質、作用機制與中國上市公司治理創新，管理評論（4月）：55-62。
王守海，李雲，2012，管理層幹預、審計委員會獨立性與盈餘管理，審計研究(5月): 68-75。
王雄元，2008，審計委員會特徵與會計師事務所變更的經驗研究。審計研究, 第12期(7月)：87-96。
王詠梅，王鵬，2006，“四大”與“非四大”審計品質市場認同度的差異性研究，審計研究（5月）：49-56。
吳玉心，2003，審計委員會——上市公司內部控制中的重要制度安排，審計與經濟研究, 第18期（1月）：27-29。
夏冬林，2000，我國上市公司股東大會功能分析，會計研究 (3月)：22-25。
夏立軍，方軼強，2005，政府控制、治理環境與公司價值，經濟研究（5月）： 40-51。
楊有紅，趙佳佳，2006，審計委員會職責再造與關係梳理，會計研究（5月）：17-24。
張立民，邢春玉，溫菊英，2015，國有企業政治關聯、政府審計品質和企業績效——基於我國A股市場的實證研究，審計與經濟研究（5月）：22-28。
證監會，上市公司治理準，http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2013/01/11/7266257394
.pdf。
中國證券報，2011，中國上市公司 2011 年內部控制白皮書（A13 版）。
Arrow, K. J. 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29 (3): 155-173.
Abbott, L. J., and S. Parker. 2000. Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (19): 47-66.
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, G. F. Peters, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. An empirical investigation of audit fees, non-audit fees, and audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research (20): 215-234.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2004. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37: 315-342.
Becker, C., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1988. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 1-24.
Beck, M. J., and E. G. Mauldin. 2014. Who`s really in charge? audit committee versus CFO power and audit fees. The Accounting Review 89 (6): 2057-2085.
Belkaoui, Ahmed, and P. G. Karpik. 1989. Determinants of the corporate decision to disclose social information. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability April (1): 51-74.
Blanchard, O., and A. Shleifer. 2001. Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia. IMF Staff Papers 48: 171-179.
Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. J. Malloy. 2012. Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of ‘Independent’ Directors. Management Science 58 (6): 1039-1058.
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal Of Accounting and Economics 3 (3): 183-199.
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor independence, ‘Low Balling’ and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (3): 113-128.
Deegan, C., and B. Gordon. 1996. A study of the environmental disclosure practices of Australian corporations. Accounting and Business Research 26 (3): 187-199 .
Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1980. The nature of competition in the auditing profession: a descriptive and normative view. Regulation and the Accounting Profession. Lifetime Learning Publications: 77-94.
Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1982. Competition in auditing: an assessment. Symposium on Auditing Research IV. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Eichenseher, J. W., and D. Shields. 1985. Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4 (1): 13-31.
Fama, E., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43: 153-193.
Harris, M., and A, Raviv. 2008. A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies 21 (4): 1797-1832.
Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economics Review 88 (1): 96-118.
Li, H. B., and L. A. Zhou. 2005. Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics 89: 1743-1762.
Huang, X. J., and H. Zhang. 2011. Regional environment, political connections and the auditor selection: empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies. International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management.
Jensen M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and owenership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Jiang, John and Kathy. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management? Journal of Financial Economics 96 (3): 513-526.
Jin, H. H., Y. Y. Qian, and R. W. Barry. 2005. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics 89 (9): 1719-1742.
Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit
committees, and management earnings forecasts: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 453-486.
Keasey, Kevin and M. Wright. 1997. Corporate governance: responsibilities, risks and remuneration.
Lin, J., F. Cai, and Z. Li. 1998. Competition, policy burdens and state-owned enterprise reform. American Economic Review 88.
Lisic, L. L., T. L. Neal, I. Zhang, and Y. Zhang. 2012. CEO power, internal control, and audit committee effectiveness in substance vs. in form. SSRN Working Paper.
O’Keefe T., and P. Westort. 1992. Conformance to GAAS reporting standards in municipal audits and the economics of auditing: the effects of audit firm size. Research in Accounting Regulation (6): 39-77.
Poncet, S. 2004. A fragmented China: measure and determinants of China`s domestic market disintegration. Review of International Economics 5 (7): 89-95.
Qian Wang, T.J. Wong, and L. J. Xia. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics (46): 112-134.
Shockley, D. 1981. Perceptions of auditors’ independence: an empirical analysis. The Accounting Review 61 (4): 785-800.
Simunic, D. A., and M. T. Stein. 1987. Product differentiation in auditing: auditor choice in the market for unseasoned new issues. Accountant Research Foundation June: 55-74.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1981. The markets for independence and independent auditors. Working paper Series No. GPB 80-10. Graduate School of Management. University of Rochester.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185-21.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
103353046
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033530463
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 金成隆<br>金成隆zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 楊苓梓zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 楊苓梓zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2017en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-Jan-2018 16:18:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-Jan-2018 16:18:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Jan-2018 16:18:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1033530463en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115452-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 103353046zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究的主要目的是在檢測財務主管相對於審計委員會的影響力，是否會影響到會計師的選擇。本研究以2007至2016間的中國上市公司為樣本，實證結果顯示:（1）財務主管相對於審計委員會的影響力愈大時，公司愈傾向於選擇非十大會計師事務所；（2）財務主管相對影響力於會計師選擇的影響，在國有企業是比較小的，而在私有企業是比較大的。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the relative power of CFOs and audit committees has an effect on its firms’ choice of audit firms. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007~2016, I find that: (1) companies with more powerful CFOs are more likely to hire lower-quality auditors, as measured by non-top10 audit firm; (2) The effect of CFOs’ relative power on the choice of audit firms is weaker for state-owned enterprises than for private enterprises.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄

壹、前言 2
第一節、研究動機 2
第二節、研究目的 4
第三節、研究思路與研究框架 5
貳、文獻綜述 7
第一節、審計委員會與財務主管的制衡與監督 7
第二節、相對影響力與審計人員選擇文獻綜述 9
第三節、國營企業與審計人員選擇文獻綜述 10
叁、研究設計 12
第一節、研究假說 12
第二節、資料來源與選取 14
第三節、變數設計 16
第四節、模型構建 21
肆、實證分析 22
第一節、 敘述性統計 22
第二節、相關係數分析 26
第三節、回歸分析 28
第四節、進一步檢驗 34
伍、 研究結論與展望 46
第一節、研究結論 46
第二節、研究展望 47
陸、參考文獻 48		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 793638 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033530463en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審計人員zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 十大會計師事務所zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審計委員會zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財務主管zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 國有制企業zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit firmen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Top tenen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Accounting firmsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit committeeen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CFOen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) State-owned enterpriseen_US
dc.title (題名) 審計委員會與財務主管的力量博弈與審計人員選擇：來自中國的證據zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Relative Power of CFOs and Audit Committees and Choice of Audit Firm: Evidence from Chinaen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 財政部，企業內部控制基本規範，http://baike.baidu.com/view/17¬68792¬.¬h¬t¬m。
陳小悅，肖星，過曉豔，2000，配股權與上市公司利潤操縱，經濟研究，（1月）：30-36。
方軍雄，2009，我國上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性嗎，經濟研究(3月)：110-124。
胡世明，杜濱，2012，轉型經濟下國有企業政治關聯對績效影響的研究——以電力、煤氣及水的生產和供應業為例，華北電力大學學報，社會科學版（5 月）：34-41。
林鐘高，尤雪英，徐正剛，2002，獨立審計理論研究，立信會計出版社：257-266。
逯東，林高，2012 ，“官員型”高管、公司業績和非生產性支出———基於國有上市公司的經驗證據，金融研（6月）：139-152。
倪昌紅，鄒國慶，2010，高管團隊的政治聯結能改善企業績效嗎——基於戰略視角的分析，財經科學（7月）：79-86。
錢華，2006，審計委員會與內部審計關係研究，審計與經濟研究， 第21期（6月）：49-51。
蔡奮，2012，政治聯繫與企業績效研究綜述，中國鄉鎮企業會計（2月）：171-173。
孫錚，王躍堂，1999，資源配置與盈餘操縱之實證研究，財經研究（4月）：3-9。
王世權，2011，監事會的本源性質、作用機制與中國上市公司治理創新，管理評論（4月）：55-62。
王守海，李雲，2012，管理層幹預、審計委員會獨立性與盈餘管理，審計研究(5月): 68-75。
王雄元，2008，審計委員會特徵與會計師事務所變更的經驗研究。審計研究, 第12期(7月)：87-96。
王詠梅，王鵬，2006，“四大”與“非四大”審計品質市場認同度的差異性研究，審計研究（5月）：49-56。
吳玉心，2003，審計委員會——上市公司內部控制中的重要制度安排，審計與經濟研究, 第18期（1月）：27-29。
夏冬林，2000，我國上市公司股東大會功能分析，會計研究 (3月)：22-25。
夏立軍，方軼強，2005，政府控制、治理環境與公司價值，經濟研究（5月）： 40-51。
楊有紅，趙佳佳，2006，審計委員會職責再造與關係梳理，會計研究（5月）：17-24。
張立民，邢春玉，溫菊英，2015，國有企業政治關聯、政府審計品質和企業績效——基於我國A股市場的實證研究，審計與經濟研究（5月）：22-28。
證監會，上市公司治理準，http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2013/01/11/7266257394
.pdf。
中國證券報，2011，中國上市公司 2011 年內部控制白皮書（A13 版）。
Arrow, K. J. 1962. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic Studies 29 (3): 155-173.
Abbott, L. J., and S. Parker. 2000. Auditor selection and audit committee characteristics. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (19): 47-66.
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, G. F. Peters, and K. Raghunandan. 2003. An empirical investigation of audit fees, non-audit fees, and audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research (20): 215-234.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. 2004. Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37: 315-342.
Becker, C., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1988. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15: 1-24.
Beck, M. J., and E. G. Mauldin. 2014. Who`s really in charge? audit committee versus CFO power and audit fees. The Accounting Review 89 (6): 2057-2085.
Belkaoui, Ahmed, and P. G. Karpik. 1989. Determinants of the corporate decision to disclose social information. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability April (1): 51-74.
Blanchard, O., and A. Shleifer. 2001. Federalism with and without political centralization: China versus Russia. IMF Staff Papers 48: 171-179.
Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. J. Malloy. 2012. Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of ‘Independent’ Directors. Management Science 58 (6): 1039-1058.
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal Of Accounting and Economics 3 (3): 183-199.
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor independence, ‘Low Balling’ and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics (3): 113-128.
Deegan, C., and B. Gordon. 1996. A study of the environmental disclosure practices of Australian corporations. Accounting and Business Research 26 (3): 187-199 .
Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1980. The nature of competition in the auditing profession: a descriptive and normative view. Regulation and the Accounting Profession. Lifetime Learning Publications: 77-94.
Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1982. Competition in auditing: an assessment. Symposium on Auditing Research IV. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Eichenseher, J. W., and D. Shields. 1985. Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4 (1): 13-31.
Fama, E., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43: 153-193.
Harris, M., and A, Raviv. 2008. A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies 21 (4): 1797-1832.
Hermalin, B., and M. Weisbach. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economics Review 88 (1): 96-118.
Li, H. B., and L. A. Zhou. 2005. Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics 89: 1743-1762.
Huang, X. J., and H. Zhang. 2011. Regional environment, political connections and the auditor selection: empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies. International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management.
Jensen M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and owenership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Jiang, John and Kathy. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most influence on earnings management? Journal of Financial Economics 96 (3): 513-526.
Jin, H. H., Y. Y. Qian, and R. W. Barry. 2005. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics 89 (9): 1719-1742.
Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit
committees, and management earnings forecasts: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 453-486.
Keasey, Kevin and M. Wright. 1997. Corporate governance: responsibilities, risks and remuneration.
Lin, J., F. Cai, and Z. Li. 1998. Competition, policy burdens and state-owned enterprise reform. American Economic Review 88.
Lisic, L. L., T. L. Neal, I. Zhang, and Y. Zhang. 2012. CEO power, internal control, and audit committee effectiveness in substance vs. in form. SSRN Working Paper.
O’Keefe T., and P. Westort. 1992. Conformance to GAAS reporting standards in municipal audits and the economics of auditing: the effects of audit firm size. Research in Accounting Regulation (6): 39-77.
Poncet, S. 2004. A fragmented China: measure and determinants of China`s domestic market disintegration. Review of International Economics 5 (7): 89-95.
Qian Wang, T.J. Wong, and L. J. Xia. 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics (46): 112-134.
Shockley, D. 1981. Perceptions of auditors’ independence: an empirical analysis. The Accounting Review 61 (4): 785-800.
Simunic, D. A., and M. T. Stein. 1987. Product differentiation in auditing: auditor choice in the market for unseasoned new issues. Accountant Research Foundation June: 55-74.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive accounting theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1981. The markets for independence and independent auditors. Working paper Series No. GPB 80-10. Graduate School of Management. University of Rochester.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185-21.		zh_TW