| dc.contributor | 風險與保險研究中心 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 曾郁仁 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Rachel J.;Muermann, Alexander;Tzeng, Larry Y. | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2016-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Jan-2018 15:49:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Jan-2018 15:49:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Jan-2018 15:49:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115541 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We examine insurance markets with two-dimensional asymmetric information on risk type and on preferences related to regret. In contrast to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the equilibrium can be efficient; that is, it can coincide with the equilibrium under full information. Furthermore, we show that pooling, semipooling, and separating equilibria can exist. Specifically, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the level of insurance coverage and risk type. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, the equilibrium includes a contract that is offered but not purchased. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 509844 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Risk and Insurance,83(1), 181-216 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Adverse Selection; Asymmetric Information; Equilibria; Equilibrium; Information; Insurance; Preference | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Hidden Regret in Insurance Markets | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/jori.12096 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jori.12096 | |
