| dc.contributor | 財政系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 賴育邦 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lai, Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2018-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Feb-2018 11:45:31 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Feb-2018 11:45:31 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Feb-2018 11:45:31 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115955 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The two dividends in the double-dividend hypothesis are assumed to be independent. This assumption can be misleading when it comes to formulating policy. I construct a model where the pollution tax rate is voted for by heterogeneous people. In addition to the revenue-recycling effect, the equilibrium pollution tax rate depends on two opposite forces: the tax-cutting effect and the profit effect. The two forces show that an instrument that exploits a greater revenue-recycling effect can cause a more severe environmental deterioration, thereby resulting in the infeasibility of the hypothesis. The introduction of the interdependence between the two dividends can also mean that non-revenue-raising instruments are more efficient than revenue-raising instruments. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 158894 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol.120, No.1, pp.211-241 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Environmental policy;green tax reform;income inequality;political economy | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The Feasibility of The Double-Dividend Hypothesis in a Democratic Economy | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1111/sjoe.12213 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12213 | |
