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題名 Does Corporate Governance Mitigate Bank Diversification Discount?
作者 陳聖賢
Liang, Hsin-Yu
Chen, I-Ju
Chen, Sheng-Syan
貢獻者 財管系
關鍵詞 Bank diversification; Banking; Corporate governance
日期 2016
上傳時間 11-Jun-2018 17:02:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study investigates the relations between corporate governance structures, level of diversification, and excess value of the U.S. banks for 2003–2008. Our analysis produces several major findings. First, diversified banks are different from specialized banks in their board structure, monitoring function of audit committee, and the level of antitakeover provisions. Second, governance mechanisms are associated with bank diversification: as the level of diversification increases, board independence, institutional ownership, and managerial entrenchment decrease whereas the ratio of certified inside board directors significantly increases. Our results show that governance structure—particularly the leadership structure, the ratio of certified inside directors on the board, and the level of managerial entrenchment—plays an important role in determining the excess value of diversified banks. The findings provide some insights for bank policymakers, including the proper design or regulation of bank governance structures, which is critical to bank performance because regulation is no longer a substitute for bank governance.
關聯 International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.45, pp.129-143
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.05.008
dc.contributor 財管系zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳聖賢zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liang, Hsin-Yuen_US
dc.creator (作者) Chen, I-Juen_US
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Sheng-Syanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2016
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jun-2018 17:02:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jun-2018 17:02:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jun-2018 17:02:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/117542-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates the relations between corporate governance structures, level of diversification, and excess value of the U.S. banks for 2003–2008. Our analysis produces several major findings. First, diversified banks are different from specialized banks in their board structure, monitoring function of audit committee, and the level of antitakeover provisions. Second, governance mechanisms are associated with bank diversification: as the level of diversification increases, board independence, institutional ownership, and managerial entrenchment decrease whereas the ratio of certified inside board directors significantly increases. Our results show that governance structure—particularly the leadership structure, the ratio of certified inside directors on the board, and the level of managerial entrenchment—plays an important role in determining the excess value of diversified banks. The findings provide some insights for bank policymakers, including the proper design or regulation of bank governance structures, which is critical to bank performance because regulation is no longer a substitute for bank governance.en_US
dc.format.extent 411807 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.45, pp.129-143zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bank diversification; Banking; Corporate governanceen_US
dc.title (題名) Does Corporate Governance Mitigate Bank Diversification Discount?en_US
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.iref.2016.05.008
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.05.008