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題名 Corporate Governance and the Investment Efficiency of Diversified Corporate Asset Buyers
作者 陳聖賢
Chen, I-Ju
Chen, Sheng-Syan
貢獻者 財管系
日期 2017
上傳時間 11-Jun-2018 18:15:59 (UTC+8)
摘要 Many corporate assets are bought and sold each year in the U.S. and most scholars believe these transactions improve economic efficiency. But given the reality that the interests of corporate managers may diverge from those of their shareholders and reflect empire‐building or other managerial entrenchment strategies—and that such agency problems tend to be worse in highly diversified, multi‐divisional companies—the authors tested the proposition that diversified corporate asset buyers with more effective governance structures can be expected to allocate capital more efficiently, as reflected in higher rates of return on operating capital and more favorable market reactions to the announcements of their purchases. Using a sample of diversified U.S. companies that announced large asset purchases between 1988 and 2006, the authors report finding that the investment allocation process following such asset purchases was more consistent with value creation in the case of diversified buyers with more effective governance structures, which were identified by their greater board independence, higher‐quality audit committees, and higher levels of stock ownership by institutional ownership, directors, and CEOs.
關聯 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.29, No.1, pp.99-114
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12224
dc.contributor 財管系zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 陳聖賢zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, I-Juen_US
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Sheng-Syanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2017
dc.date.accessioned 11-Jun-2018 18:15:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Jun-2018 18:15:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Jun-2018 18:15:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/117574-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Many corporate assets are bought and sold each year in the U.S. and most scholars believe these transactions improve economic efficiency. But given the reality that the interests of corporate managers may diverge from those of their shareholders and reflect empire‐building or other managerial entrenchment strategies—and that such agency problems tend to be worse in highly diversified, multi‐divisional companies—the authors tested the proposition that diversified corporate asset buyers with more effective governance structures can be expected to allocate capital more efficiently, as reflected in higher rates of return on operating capital and more favorable market reactions to the announcements of their purchases. Using a sample of diversified U.S. companies that announced large asset purchases between 1988 and 2006, the authors report finding that the investment allocation process following such asset purchases was more consistent with value creation in the case of diversified buyers with more effective governance structures, which were identified by their greater board independence, higher‐quality audit committees, and higher levels of stock ownership by institutional ownership, directors, and CEOs.en_US
dc.format.extent 1447843 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.29, No.1, pp.99-114zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Corporate Governance and the Investment Efficiency of Diversified Corporate Asset Buyersen_US
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1111/jacf.12224
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12224