| dc.contributor | 財管系 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳聖賢; 黃嘉威 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Sheng-Syan | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Ching-Yu | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Chia-Wei | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2016-03 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 15-Jun-2018 11:53:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 15-Jun-2018 11:53:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 15-Jun-2018 11:53:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/117775 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Firms can effectively stave off outside takeover bids using private investments in public equity (PIPEs) when they face strong takeover pressure. Greater takeover pressure makes PIPE issuers more likely to grant investors large blocks of shares, price discounts, generous dividends, and board seats. Takeover pressure also encourages issuers to place more shares with friendly investors such as managerial investors and strategic alliance investors. The evidence is consistent with the regular methods of the white squire defense. PIPEs can be a preferred method in the choice of a white squire defense when poorly performing and highly overleveraged firms face severe takeover pressure. There is a negative relation between takeover probability and post-issue performance of issuers, which supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis over the shareholder interest hypothesis. Therefore PIPEs can increase, not mitigate, agency problems. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 579523 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.64, pp.16-35 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | White squire; Takeover defense; Private investment in public equity | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | The White Squire Defense: Evidence from Private Investments in Public Equity | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.11.017 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.11.017 | - |
