1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Commerce
  4. Theses
  5. Item

學術產出-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 經理人能力與現金持有的關聯—以日本企業為例
The Association between Managerial Ability and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan
作者 楊于萱
Yang, Yu-Hsuan
貢獻者 潘健民
Pan, Chien-Min
楊于萱
Yang, Yu-Hsuan
關鍵詞 經理人能力
現金持有
Managerial ability
Cash holdings
日期 2018
上傳時間 10-Jul-2018 15:33:18 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究以2005年至2017年之日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，主要探討日本企業之經理人能力與現金持有之關聯性。實證結果發現，日本企業之經理人能力與超額現金持有量具正向關聯性。在分析整體企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量呈顯著正相關，意即經理人能力愈好，則企業之超額現金持有量愈多。在分析超額現金持有量為正之企業樣本時，實證結果亦相同，意即當企業現金持有量超過正常現金持有量時，經理人能力愈好，則企業超額現金持有量愈多。然而，在分析超額現金持有量為負之企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量並不具顯著之關聯性。
Using data of firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2017, I investigate the association between managerial ability and cash holdings. The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between managerial ability and excess cash holdings of Japanese firms. This result suggests that managers with higher abilities tend to hold more excess cash. I also find that managerial abilities are positively associated with excess cash holdings for firms that have positive excess cash, but I do not find significant results for firms that have negative excess cash holdings.
參考文獻 Aoyagi, C., and G. Ganelli. 2017. Unstash the cash! Corporate governance reform in Japan. The Journal of Banking and Financial Economics 1 (7): 51-69
Aman, H., and P. Nguyen. 2012. The size and composition of corporate boards in Japan. Asian Business & Management 11 (4): 425-444.
Amihud, Y., B. Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2): 605-617.
Bates, T. W., K. M. Kahle, and R. M. Stulz. 2009. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to?. The Journal of Finance 64 (5): 1985-2021.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of manager on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.
Barnhart, S. W., and S. Rosenstein. 1998. Board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance: an empirical analysis. The Financial Review 33 (4): 1-16.
Chen, S. S., and Y. Z. Wang. 2012. Financial constraints and share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 105 (2): 311-331.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2): 329-356.
Demerjian, P. R., B. Lev, M. F. Lewis, and S. E. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498.
Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: a new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.
Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 301-325.
Harford, J. 1998. Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54 (6): 1969-1997
Ivanova, A., and F. Raei. 2014. Corporate cash holdings: Is Germany different? Working paper, International Monetary Fund.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831-880.
John, T. A. 1993. Accounting measures of corporate liquidity, leverage, and costs of financial distress. Financial Management 22 (3): 91-100.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Kato, K., M. Li, and D. J. Skinner. 2017. Is Japan really a “buy”? The corporate governance, cash holdings and economic performance of Japanese companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 44 (3-4): 480-523.
Klein, A., and E. Zur. 2009. Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors. Journal of Finance 64 (1): 187-229.
Kaplan, S. N., and L Zingales. 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1):169-215.
Keynes, J. M. 1934. The general theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan.
Milbourn, T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 233-262.
Macey, J. R., and G. P. Miller. 1997. Universal banks are not the answer to America’s corporate governance “problem”: A look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S.. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 (4): 57-73.
Mulligan, C. B. 1997. Scale economies, the value of time, and the demand for money: Longitudinal evidence from firms. Journal of Political Economics 105 (5): 1061-1079.
Myers, S. C., and N. S.Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 187-221.
Myers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39 (3) : 575-592.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5 (2): 147-175.
Nakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1): 3-46.
Palazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104 (1): 162-185.
Pinkowitz, L., and R. Williason. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. Review of Financial Studies 14 (4): 1059-1082.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan. 1995. The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (2): 407–443.
Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs’ outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. The Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813-1844.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about the capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1421-1460.
Sher, G. 2014. Cashing in for growth: Corporate cash holdings as an opportunity for investment in Japan. Working paper, International Monetary Fund.
Shinada, N. 2012. Firms’ cash holdings and performance: Evidence from Japanese corporate finance. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-E-031: 1-35.
Sanders, WM. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effect of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055-1078.
Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71.
Vogel, R.C., and G.S. Maddala. 1967. Cross-section estimates of liquid asset demand by manufacturing corporations. Journal of Finance 22 (4): 557-575.
Whited, T. M., and G. Wu. 2006. Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies 19 (2): 531-559.
Wailerdsak, N., and A. Suehiro. 2004. Top executive origins: Comparative study between Japan and Thailand. Asian Business & Management 3 (1): 85-104.
Weinstein, D. E., and Y. Yafeh. 1998. On the costs of a bank centered financial system: Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan. Journal of Finance 53 (2): 635–672.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40 (2): 185-211.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
105353012
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Pan, Chien-Minen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 楊于萱zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yang, Yu-Hsuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 楊于萱zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yang, Yu-Hsuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned 10-Jul-2018 15:33:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 10-Jul-2018 15:33:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 10-Jul-2018 15:33:18 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0105353012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118524-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 105353012zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以2005年至2017年之日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，主要探討日本企業之經理人能力與現金持有之關聯性。實證結果發現，日本企業之經理人能力與超額現金持有量具正向關聯性。在分析整體企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量呈顯著正相關，意即經理人能力愈好，則企業之超額現金持有量愈多。在分析超額現金持有量為正之企業樣本時，實證結果亦相同，意即當企業現金持有量超過正常現金持有量時，經理人能力愈好，則企業超額現金持有量愈多。然而，在分析超額現金持有量為負之企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量並不具顯著之關聯性。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Using data of firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2017, I investigate the association between managerial ability and cash holdings. The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between managerial ability and excess cash holdings of Japanese firms. This result suggests that managers with higher abilities tend to hold more excess cash. I also find that managerial abilities are positively associated with excess cash holdings for firms that have positive excess cash, but I do not find significant results for firms that have negative excess cash holdings.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、 緒論 7
第一節 研究動機與目的 7
第二節 研究架構 13
貳、 文獻探討與研究假說 14
第一節 經理人能力 14
第二節 現金持有 18
第三節 小結 23
參、 研究方法 25
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 25
第二節 變數定義與衡量 28
第三節 資料分析方法 42
肆、 實證結果與分析 43
第一節 敘述性統計 43
第二節 樣本相關檢定 46
第三節 經理人能力與超額現金持有之實證結果 50
伍、追加測試 55
伍、 結論與建議 60
陸、 參考文獻 63		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353012en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人能力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 現金持有zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial abilityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cash holdingsen_US
dc.title (題名) 經理人能力與現金持有的關聯—以日本企業為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Association between Managerial Ability and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japanen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aoyagi, C., and G. Ganelli. 2017. Unstash the cash! Corporate governance reform in Japan. The Journal of Banking and Financial Economics 1 (7): 51-69
Aman, H., and P. Nguyen. 2012. The size and composition of corporate boards in Japan. Asian Business & Management 11 (4): 425-444.
Amihud, Y., B. Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2): 605-617.
Bates, T. W., K. M. Kahle, and R. M. Stulz. 2009. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to?. The Journal of Finance 64 (5): 1985-2021.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of manager on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208.
Barnhart, S. W., and S. Rosenstein. 1998. Board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance: an empirical analysis. The Financial Review 33 (4): 1-16.
Chen, S. S., and Y. Z. Wang. 2012. Financial constraints and share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 105 (2): 311-331.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2): 329-356.
Demerjian, P. R., B. Lev, M. F. Lewis, and S. E. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498.
Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: a new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248.
Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 301-325.
Harford, J. 1998. Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54 (6): 1969-1997
Ivanova, A., and F. Raei. 2014. Corporate cash holdings: Is Germany different? Working paper, International Monetary Fund.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831-880.
John, T. A. 1993. Accounting measures of corporate liquidity, leverage, and costs of financial distress. Financial Management 22 (3): 91-100.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Kato, K., M. Li, and D. J. Skinner. 2017. Is Japan really a “buy”? The corporate governance, cash holdings and economic performance of Japanese companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 44 (3-4): 480-523.
Klein, A., and E. Zur. 2009. Entrepreneurial shareholder activism: Hedge funds and other private investors. Journal of Finance 64 (1): 187-229.
Kaplan, S. N., and L Zingales. 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1):169-215.
Keynes, J. M. 1934. The general theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan.
Milbourn, T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 233-262.
Macey, J. R., and G. P. Miller. 1997. Universal banks are not the answer to America’s corporate governance “problem”: A look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S.. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 (4): 57-73.
Mulligan, C. B. 1997. Scale economies, the value of time, and the demand for money: Longitudinal evidence from firms. Journal of Political Economics 105 (5): 1061-1079.
Myers, S. C., and N. S.Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 187-221.
Myers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39 (3) : 575-592.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5 (2): 147-175.
Nakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387.
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1): 3-46.
Palazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104 (1): 162-185.
Pinkowitz, L., and R. Williason. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. Review of Financial Studies 14 (4): 1059-1082.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan. 1995. The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (2): 407–443.
Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs’ outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. The Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813-1844.
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about the capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1421-1460.
Sher, G. 2014. Cashing in for growth: Corporate cash holdings as an opportunity for investment in Japan. Working paper, International Monetary Fund.
Shinada, N. 2012. Firms’ cash holdings and performance: Evidence from Japanese corporate finance. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-E-031: 1-35.
Sanders, WM. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effect of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055-1078.
Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71.
Vogel, R.C., and G.S. Maddala. 1967. Cross-section estimates of liquid asset demand by manufacturing corporations. Journal of Finance 22 (4): 557-575.
Whited, T. M., and G. Wu. 2006. Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies 19 (2): 531-559.
Wailerdsak, N., and A. Suehiro. 2004. Top executive origins: Comparative study between Japan and Thailand. Asian Business & Management 3 (1): 85-104.
Weinstein, D. E., and Y. Yafeh. 1998. On the costs of a bank centered financial system: Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan. Journal of Finance 53 (2): 635–672.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40 (2): 185-211.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.014.2018.F07-