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題名 政治獻金與租稅規避之關聯
Corporate Political Contributions and Tax Avoidance
作者 趙珮淳
Chao, Pei-Tsun
貢獻者 何怡澄
Ho, Yi-Cheng
趙珮淳
Chao, Pei-Tsun
關鍵詞 政治獻金
政治關聯
租稅規避
Political contribution
Political connection
Tax avoidance
日期 2018
上傳時間 24-Jul-2018 11:02:34 (UTC+8)
參考文獻 于宗先，2004，“政治獻金的經濟觀”，經濟前瞻，32-35。
林嬌能，2016，獨立董事在企業租稅規劃的監督效果，會計審計論叢，6〈1）：55-86。
張凱雯，2010，董事政治關聯及政治獻金對企業價值之影響，國立臺灣科技大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳明進與蔡麗雯，2006，財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究，管理學報，第23 期（6）：739-763。
陳信憲、陳雯香，2011，政治獻金對台灣公司股票報酬之影響，台灣銀行季刊第六十二卷第二期p275-287。
Alexander, H. E. (1984). Financing Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press. Washington.
Austen-Smith, D. (1995). Campaign contributions and access. The American Political Science Review 89 (3):566-581.
Balakrishnan, K., J. L. Blouin and W. R. Guay. (2013). Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Corporate Transparency? Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792783
Barrick, John A. and Brown, Jennifer L.(2018), Tax-Related Corporate Political Activity Research: A Literature Review. Journal of American Taxation Association, Forthcoming.
Bauer, R., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Dexter, L. (1963). American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press.
Belo, F., Gala, V.D., Li, J. (2013). Government Spending, Political Cycles, and the Cross Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 107: 305-324.
Brown, J. L., Drake, K., & Wellman, L. (2015). The benefits of a relational approach to corporate political activity: Evidence from political contributions to tax
policymakers. American Accounting Association, 37(1), 69-102.
Boubakri, N., S. A. Mansi and W. Saffar. (2013). Political institutions, connectedness, and corporate risk-taking. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(3), 195-215.
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive than Non-Family Firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.
Chen, Z., S. Dyreng and B. Li. (2018). Corporate Political Contributions and Tax Avoidance. 2014 American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L. (2008). Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88: 554- 580.
Cooper, M.J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A.V. (2010). Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 65, 687-724.
Correia, M., (2014). Political Connections, Political Connections and SEC Enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics 57: 241-262.
Dahl, R. (1959). Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science. The American Political Science Review 53(1): 1-34.
Dean, J. W. (2002). Some questions about Enron’s campaign contributions: Did Enron successfully buy influence with the money it spent? FindLaw, January 18.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79(1): 145-179.
Desai, M. A., A. Dyck, and L. Zingales. (2007). Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 84(3): 591-623.
Drope, J., Hansen, W., (2008). Futility and Free-Riding: Corporate Political Participation and Tax Rates in the United States. Business and Politics 10: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Duchin, R. and D. Sosyura. (2012). The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(1), 24-48.
Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review83: 61-82
Faccio, Mara. (2006), Politically connected firms, American Economic Review 96, 369– 386.
Faccio, Mara and David C. Parsley. (2007). Sudden deaths: Taking stock of political connections, Centre for Economic Policy Research NO.5460.
Faccio, M., R. W. Masulis and J. J. Mcconnell. (2006). Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts. Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91(4), 1095–1102.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. (2009). Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. (2013). Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts. Review of Finance,17(5),1617-1648.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review9 (2):193-206.
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman, (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics50 (2): 127-178.
Hill, D., Kelly, G., Lockhart, G., Van Ness, R. (2013). Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying. Financial Management, 42(4),931-957..
Hillman, A. J., and M. A. Hitt. (1999). Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review 24 (4):825-842.
Hoopes, J. L., D. Mescall and J. A. Pittman. (2012). Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance? The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1603-1639.
Houston, J. F., L. Jiang, C. Lin and Y. Ma. (2014). Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(1), 193-243.
Humphries, C. (1991). Corporations, PACs and the strategic link between contributions and lobbying activities. The Western Political Quarterly:353-372.
Hunter, W. J. and M. A. Nelson. (1995). Tax enforcement: A public choice perspective. Public Choice, 82(1-2), 53–67.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics 3(4):305-360.
Kim, C. F. and L. Zhang. (2016). Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness. Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(1), 78-114.
Law, K., and L. M. Mills. (2016). Managerial characteristics and corporate taxes. Review of Accounting Studies forthcoming.
Meade, J., and S. Li. (2012). Strategic corporate tax lobbying: Working paper, University of Houston.
Mills, L. F., S. E. Nutter and C. M. Schwab. (2013). The Effect of Political Sensitivity and Bargaining Power on Taxes: Evidence from Federal Contractors. The Accounting Review, 88(3), 977-1005.
Rego, S. (2003). Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805-833.
Schuler, D. A., K. Rehbein, and R. D. Cramer. (2002). Pursuing strategic advantage through policital means: A multivariate approach. Academy of Management Journal 45 (4):659- 672.
Shevlin, T. (2007). The Future of Tax Research: From an Accounting Professor’s Perspective. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 29(2), 87–93.
Snyder, J. M., Jr. (1992). Long-term investing in politicians; or, give early, give often. Journal of Law and & Economics 35 (1):15-44.
Wright, J. R. (1990). Contributions, lobbying, and committee voting in the US House of Representatives. The American Political Science Review 84:417-438.
Young, M., M. Reksulak and W. F. Shughart. (2001). The Political Economy of the IRS. Economics & Politics, 13(2).
Yu, F., Yu, X., (2011). Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46: 1865-1891.
Zelenak, L., (1988). Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constituional? Tax Law Review 44: 563-625
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5:119-149.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
104255017
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550171
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何怡澄zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Ho, Yi-Chengen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 趙珮淳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chao, Pei-Tsunen_US
dc.creator (作者) 趙珮淳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chao, Pei-Tsunen_US
dc.date (日期) 2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned 24-Jul-2018 11:02:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Jul-2018 11:02:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Jul-2018 11:02:34 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1042550171en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118835-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財政學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 104255017zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論. 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討與假說 6
第一節 租稅規避7
第二節 企業之政治關聯 9
第三節 研究假說 11
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節 樣本篩選與資料來源 14
第二節 租稅規避指標 17
第三節 政治獻金指標 18
第四節 控制變數 20
第五節 實證模型 27
第四章 實證方法 30
第一節 樣本敘述統計 30
第二節 實證結果 44
第三節 額外測試 56
第五章 結論與研究限制 59
第一節 結論與建議 59
第二節 研究限制 59
第六章 參考文獻 61		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550171en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治獻金zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治關聯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 租稅規避zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political contributionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political connectionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax avoidanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 政治獻金與租稅規避之關聯zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Corporate Political Contributions and Tax Avoidanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 于宗先，2004，“政治獻金的經濟觀”，經濟前瞻，32-35。
林嬌能，2016，獨立董事在企業租稅規劃的監督效果，會計審計論叢，6〈1）：55-86。
張凱雯，2010，董事政治關聯及政治獻金對企業價值之影響，國立臺灣科技大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳明進與蔡麗雯，2006，財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究，管理學報，第23 期（6）：739-763。
陳信憲、陳雯香，2011，政治獻金對台灣公司股票報酬之影響，台灣銀行季刊第六十二卷第二期p275-287。
Alexander, H. E. (1984). Financing Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press. Washington.
Austen-Smith, D. (1995). Campaign contributions and access. The American Political Science Review 89 (3):566-581.
Balakrishnan, K., J. L. Blouin and W. R. Guay. (2013). Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Corporate Transparency? Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1792783
Barrick, John A. and Brown, Jennifer L.(2018), Tax-Related Corporate Political Activity Research: A Literature Review. Journal of American Taxation Association, Forthcoming.
Bauer, R., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Dexter, L. (1963). American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press.
Belo, F., Gala, V.D., Li, J. (2013). Government Spending, Political Cycles, and the Cross Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 107: 305-324.
Brown, J. L., Drake, K., & Wellman, L. (2015). The benefits of a relational approach to corporate political activity: Evidence from political contributions to tax
policymakers. American Accounting Association, 37(1), 69-102.
Boubakri, N., S. A. Mansi and W. Saffar. (2013). Political institutions, connectedness, and corporate risk-taking. Journal of International Business Studies, 44(3), 195-215.
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010). Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive than Non-Family Firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(1), 41-61.
Chen, Z., S. Dyreng and B. Li. (2018). Corporate Political Contributions and Tax Avoidance. 2014 American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L. (2008). Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88: 554- 580.
Cooper, M.J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A.V. (2010). Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 65, 687-724.
Correia, M., (2014). Political Connections, Political Connections and SEC Enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics 57: 241-262.
Dahl, R. (1959). Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science. The American Political Science Review 53(1): 1-34.
Dean, J. W. (2002). Some questions about Enron’s campaign contributions: Did Enron successfully buy influence with the money it spent? FindLaw, January 18.
Desai, M. A., and D. Dharmapala. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79(1): 145-179.
Desai, M. A., A. Dyck, and L. Zingales. (2007). Theft and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics 84(3): 591-623.
Drope, J., Hansen, W., (2008). Futility and Free-Riding: Corporate Political Participation and Tax Rates in the United States. Business and Politics 10: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Duchin, R. and D. Sosyura. (2012). The politics of government investment. Journal of Financial Economics, 106(1), 24-48.
Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. (2008). Long-run corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review83: 61-82
Faccio, Mara. (2006), Politically connected firms, American Economic Review 96, 369– 386.
Faccio, Mara and David C. Parsley. (2007). Sudden deaths: Taking stock of political connections, Centre for Economic Policy Research NO.5460.
Faccio, M., R. W. Masulis and J. J. Mcconnell. (2006). Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts. Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.
Fisman, R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91(4), 1095–1102.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. (2009). Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360.
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J. (2013). Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts. Review of Finance,17(5),1617-1648.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of management review9 (2):193-206.
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman, (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics50 (2): 127-178.
Hill, D., Kelly, G., Lockhart, G., Van Ness, R. (2013). Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying. Financial Management, 42(4),931-957..
Hillman, A. J., and M. A. Hitt. (1999). Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review 24 (4):825-842.
Hoopes, J. L., D. Mescall and J. A. Pittman. (2012). Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance? The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1603-1639.
Houston, J. F., L. Jiang, C. Lin and Y. Ma. (2014). Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(1), 193-243.
Humphries, C. (1991). Corporations, PACs and the strategic link between contributions and lobbying activities. The Western Political Quarterly:353-372.
Hunter, W. J. and M. A. Nelson. (1995). Tax enforcement: A public choice perspective. Public Choice, 82(1-2), 53–67.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics 3(4):305-360.
Kim, C. F. and L. Zhang. (2016). Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness. Contemporary Accounting Research, 33(1), 78-114.
Law, K., and L. M. Mills. (2016). Managerial characteristics and corporate taxes. Review of Accounting Studies forthcoming.
Meade, J., and S. Li. (2012). Strategic corporate tax lobbying: Working paper, University of Houston.
Mills, L. F., S. E. Nutter and C. M. Schwab. (2013). The Effect of Political Sensitivity and Bargaining Power on Taxes: Evidence from Federal Contractors. The Accounting Review, 88(3), 977-1005.
Rego, S. (2003). Tax-Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 20(4), 805-833.
Schuler, D. A., K. Rehbein, and R. D. Cramer. (2002). Pursuing strategic advantage through policital means: A multivariate approach. Academy of Management Journal 45 (4):659- 672.
Shevlin, T. (2007). The Future of Tax Research: From an Accounting Professor’s Perspective. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 29(2), 87–93.
Snyder, J. M., Jr. (1992). Long-term investing in politicians; or, give early, give often. Journal of Law and & Economics 35 (1):15-44.
Wright, J. R. (1990). Contributions, lobbying, and committee voting in the US House of Representatives. The American Political Science Review 84:417-438.
Young, M., M. Reksulak and W. F. Shughart. (2001). The Political Economy of the IRS. Economics & Politics, 13(2).
Yu, F., Yu, X., (2011). Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46: 1865-1891.
Zelenak, L., (1988). Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constituional? Tax Law Review 44: 563-625
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5:119-149.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.030.2018.F07-