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題名 Does competition inhibit fairness and altruism?
作者 Caginalp, Gunduz
何靜嫺
Ho, Shirley J.
貢獻者 經濟系
關鍵詞 Ultimatum game; Altruism; Competition; Incomplete information
日期 2018-06
上傳時間 24-Jul-2018 17:29:06 (UTC+8)
摘要 In many business situations, one party makes an offer (e.g., broker offers a commission to client) that can either be accepted or rejected by the other party. If it is rejected, both gain nothing. Common sense, business experience and theory suggest that the proposer would partition the sum so that the other party receives a minimal amount. However, experiments have shown that the offer is more equitable, and behavioralists explain this as altruism. In this paper, we reconcile these two conflicting conclusions by introducing multiple proposers and an important element that is present in most business situations: competition for gains among those proposing. We find that this element of competition restores the theoretical expectation of a purely monetary self-interest decision, and reduces the role for altruism. Our results suggest that while behavioral altruism/fairness considerations are dominant in isolated experiments, the competitiveness of business situations tends to marginalize these factors, and renders business decisions closer to the pure self-interest model.
關聯 Economic Modelling, Volume 72, Pages 54-64
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.01.005
dc.contributor 經濟系
dc.creator (作者) Caginalp, Gunduzen_US
dc.creator (作者) 何靜嫺zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Ho, Shirley J.en_US
dc.date (日期) 2018-06
dc.date.accessioned 24-Jul-2018 17:29:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Jul-2018 17:29:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Jul-2018 17:29:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118878-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) In many business situations, one party makes an offer (e.g., broker offers a commission to client) that can either be accepted or rejected by the other party. If it is rejected, both gain nothing. Common sense, business experience and theory suggest that the proposer would partition the sum so that the other party receives a minimal amount. However, experiments have shown that the offer is more equitable, and behavioralists explain this as altruism. In this paper, we reconcile these two conflicting conclusions by introducing multiple proposers and an important element that is present in most business situations: competition for gains among those proposing. We find that this element of competition restores the theoretical expectation of a purely monetary self-interest decision, and reduces the role for altruism. Our results suggest that while behavioral altruism/fairness considerations are dominant in isolated experiments, the competitiveness of business situations tends to marginalize these factors, and renders business decisions closer to the pure self-interest model.en_US
dc.format.extent 1147916 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) Economic Modelling, Volume 72, Pages 54-64
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ultimatum game; Altruism; Competition; Incomplete informationen_US
dc.title (題名) Does competition inhibit fairness and altruism?en_US
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1016/j.econmod.2018.01.005
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2018.01.005