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題名 稅制變革與逃漏稅：臺灣遺贈稅的分析
Tax Reform and Tax Evasion: Evidence from Estate and Gift Taxes of Taiwan作者 陳宜津
Chen, I-Chin貢獻者 洪福聲
Hung, Fu-Sheng
陳宜津
Chen, I-Chin關鍵詞 稅率
逃漏稅
遺產稅
贈與稅
Tax rate
Tax evasion
Estate tax
Gift tax日期 2018 上傳時間 1-Aug-2018 16:45:32 (UTC+8) 摘要 政府為營造輕稅簡政之賦稅環境、吸引留滯海外資金回流，於2009年1月21日修法公布「遺產及贈與稅法」，將「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」50%最高邊際稅率之累進稅率制度，修正為「10%的單一稅率制度」及提高免稅額。本研究於「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降政策施行9年後，租稅誘因的經濟實質效益較為明顯時，透過對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」理論與實證的探討，檢視「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降後，是否能降低民眾租稅規避誘因，提高「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」申報意願，進而使「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定案件」比例減少。 本研究以「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅制改革前後對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變化，並以2004年至2016年為研究期間，使用「主計總處」、財政部所屬五區國稅局的統計數據。透過「EViews」計量經濟軟體建立縱橫多元迴歸模型，進行「實證分析」與「相關統計檢定」。研究結果顯示「遺產稅」稅率調降，對「遺產稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變動是顯著的；但「贈與稅」稅率的調降，對贈與稅之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的影響則不顯著的。
The government of Taiwan implemented estate and gift tax reform to create a tax-free environment for light taxation and attracting citizens to redirect their overseas investment back to Taiwan. This law amendment was promulgated on January 21, 2009, in which the maximum tax rate in “The Law of Estate and Gift Tax" is reduced from 50% down to 10% and the amount of tax exemption is increased. After 9 years of implementing, the purpose of this thesis is to study whether or not the tax reform has reduced the tax evasion of the corresponding taxes.We collected data of 5-district National Tax Bureaus of Taiwan from year 2004 to 2016. Using panel regressions, we find that, in term of estate taxes, the reform successfully reduces tax evasion. However, in terms of gift taxes, the tax reform has no significant effect on tax evasion. We discuss some possible reasonings behind our findings.參考文獻 Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.Clotfelter, C. T. (1983). Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(3), 363-373.Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1986). Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 68(5), 217-223.Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1990). Tax rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from California Amnesty Data. National Tax Journal, 43(2), 189-199.Dubin, J. A., & Wilde, L. L. (1988). An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance. National Tax Journal, 41(1), 61-74.Friedland, N., Maital, S., & Rutenberg, A. (1978). A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion. Journal of public economics, 10(1), 107-116.Geeroms, H. J., & Wilmots, H. (1985). An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance. Public Finance/ Finances Publiques, 40(2), 190-209.Gordon, J. P. (1989). Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion. European Economic Review, 33(4), 797-805.Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1985). The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy. National Tax Journal, 38(3), 355-363.Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2(1), 1-32.Klepper, S., & Nagin, D. (1989). The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 5(1), 1-24.Lin, W. Z., & Yang, C. C. (2001). A Dynamic Portfolio Choice Model of Tax Evasion: Comparative Statics of Tax Rates and its Implication for Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(11), 1827-1840.Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice, 88(1-2), 161-170.Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance. International Economic Review, 27(3), 739-760.Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1988). A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(4), 793-798.Sandmo, A. (1981). Income Tax Evasion, Labour Supply, and the Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff. Journal of Public Economics, 16(3), 265-288.Slemrod, J. (1985). An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(2), 232-238.Spicer, M. W., & Becker, L. A. (1980). Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach. National tax journal, 33(2), 171-175.Spicer, M. W., & Hero, R. E. (1985). Tax Evasion and Heuristics: A Research Note. Journal of Public Economics, 26(2), 263-267.Spicer, M. W., & Lundstedt, S. B. (1976). Understanding Tax evasion. Public Finance, 31(2), 295-305.Tanzi, V. (1983). The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 1930-80. Staff Papers, 30(2), 283-305.Witte, A. D., & Woodbury, D. F. (1985). The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the US Individual Income Tax. National Tax Journal, 38(1), 1-13.Yitzhaki, S. (1987). On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion. Public Finance Quarterly, 15(2), 123-137. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
行政管理碩士學程
105921009資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105921009 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 洪福聲 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hung, Fu-Sheng en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳宜津 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, I-Chin en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳宜津 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, I-Chin en_US dc.date (日期) 2018 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Aug-2018 16:45:32 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Aug-2018 16:45:32 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Aug-2018 16:45:32 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0105921009 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/119144 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 行政管理碩士學程 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 105921009 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 政府為營造輕稅簡政之賦稅環境、吸引留滯海外資金回流，於2009年1月21日修法公布「遺產及贈與稅法」，將「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」50%最高邊際稅率之累進稅率制度，修正為「10%的單一稅率制度」及提高免稅額。本研究於「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降政策施行9年後，租稅誘因的經濟實質效益較為明顯時，透過對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」理論與實證的探討，檢視「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅率調降後，是否能降低民眾租稅規避誘因，提高「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」申報意願，進而使「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定案件」比例減少。 本研究以「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」稅制改革前後對「遺產稅」及「贈與稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變化，並以2004年至2016年為研究期間，使用「主計總處」、財政部所屬五區國稅局的統計數據。透過「EViews」計量經濟軟體建立縱橫多元迴歸模型，進行「實證分析」與「相關統計檢定」。研究結果顯示「遺產稅」稅率調降，對「遺產稅」之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的變動是顯著的；但「贈與稅」稅率的調降，對贈與稅之違章漏稅「裁罰案件」占「核定件數」比例的影響則不顯著的。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The government of Taiwan implemented estate and gift tax reform to create a tax-free environment for light taxation and attracting citizens to redirect their overseas investment back to Taiwan. This law amendment was promulgated on January 21, 2009, in which the maximum tax rate in “The Law of Estate and Gift Tax" is reduced from 50% down to 10% and the amount of tax exemption is increased. After 9 years of implementing, the purpose of this thesis is to study whether or not the tax reform has reduced the tax evasion of the corresponding taxes.We collected data of 5-district National Tax Bureaus of Taiwan from year 2004 to 2016. Using panel regressions, we find that, in term of estate taxes, the reform successfully reduces tax evasion. However, in terms of gift taxes, the tax reform has no significant effect on tax evasion. We discuss some possible reasonings behind our findings. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景與動機 1第二節 研究目的 2第三節 研究方法與架構 3第二章 文獻回顧 6第一節 逃漏稅相關文獻 6第三章 遺產稅及贈與稅現況 10第一節 遺產稅及贈與稅的源起 10第二節 遺產稅及贈與稅之稅率及免稅額的變革 11第三節 資料背景介紹 15第四章 實證模型與結果 20第一節 計量模型 20第二節 遺產稅的實證模型 24一、單根檢定 24二、各種模型之比較 25三、隨機效果模型之結果 26第三節 贈與稅的實證模型 29一、單根檢定 29二、各種模型之比較 30三、隨機效果模型之結果 32第五章 結論 34參考文獻 37附錄 40 zh_TW dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105921009 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 稅率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 逃漏稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 遺產稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 贈與稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax rate en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax evasion en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Estate tax en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Gift tax en_US dc.title (題名) 稅制變革與逃漏稅：臺灣遺贈稅的分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Tax Reform and Tax Evasion: Evidence from Estate and Gift Taxes of Taiwan en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.Clotfelter, C. T. (1983). Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(3), 363-373.Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1986). Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 68(5), 217-223.Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1990). Tax rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from California Amnesty Data. National Tax Journal, 43(2), 189-199.Dubin, J. A., & Wilde, L. L. (1988). An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance. National Tax Journal, 41(1), 61-74.Friedland, N., Maital, S., & Rutenberg, A. (1978). A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion. Journal of public economics, 10(1), 107-116.Geeroms, H. J., & Wilmots, H. (1985). An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance. Public Finance/ Finances Publiques, 40(2), 190-209.Gordon, J. P. (1989). Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion. European Economic Review, 33(4), 797-805.Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1985). The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy. National Tax Journal, 38(3), 355-363.Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2(1), 1-32.Klepper, S., & Nagin, D. (1989). The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 5(1), 1-24.Lin, W. Z., & Yang, C. C. (2001). A Dynamic Portfolio Choice Model of Tax Evasion: Comparative Statics of Tax Rates and its Implication for Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25(11), 1827-1840.Pommerehne, W. W., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice, 88(1-2), 161-170.Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance. International Economic Review, 27(3), 739-760.Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1988). A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(4), 793-798.Sandmo, A. (1981). Income Tax Evasion, Labour Supply, and the Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff. Journal of Public Economics, 16(3), 265-288.Slemrod, J. (1985). An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(2), 232-238.Spicer, M. W., & Becker, L. A. (1980). Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach. National tax journal, 33(2), 171-175.Spicer, M. W., & Hero, R. E. (1985). Tax Evasion and Heuristics: A Research Note. Journal of Public Economics, 26(2), 263-267.Spicer, M. W., & Lundstedt, S. B. (1976). Understanding Tax evasion. Public Finance, 31(2), 295-305.Tanzi, V. (1983). The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 1930-80. Staff Papers, 30(2), 283-305.Witte, A. D., & Woodbury, D. F. (1985). The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the US Individual Income Tax. National Tax Journal, 38(1), 1-13.Yitzhaki, S. (1987). On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion. Public Finance Quarterly, 15(2), 123-137. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.MEPA.016.2018.F09 -
