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題名 布蘭登與麥道爾論理由空間中的世界表徵
Brandom and McDowell on representing the world in the space of reasons
作者 張淑惠
Chang, Shu-Hui
貢獻者 林從一
Lin, Chung-I
張淑惠
Chang, Shu-Hui
關鍵詞 塞拉斯
布蘭登
麥道爾
所與
理由空間
表徵
推論主義
意義與內容規範論
三角測量
觀察兩層說
Sellars
Brandom
McDowell
The given
The space of reasons
Representation
Inferentialism
Meaning and content normativism
Triangulation
Two-ply account of observation
日期 2018
上傳時間 29-Aug-2018 15:54:25 (UTC+8)
摘要 中文摘要
     
     本論文形塑並且探討布蘭登（Robert B. Brandom）和麥道爾（John McDowell）所處理的心靈表徵之議題。首先，藉由討論塞拉斯（Wilfrid Sellars）的看法，關於表徵活動的說明要避免「所與」（the Given）的謬誤，亦即避免認知的內容由非認知的項目構成。同時，心靈被界定為「理由的邏輯空間」。最後，在麥道爾的闡發之下「理由空間」應該要「向世界開放」。然而，由於「理由空間」這個觀念使得心靈和世界被置入兩個互不相屬的空間，而令「避免所與」和「向世界開放」的要求陷入兩難。
     於是布蘭登和麥道爾所處理的議題便是：如何在心靈的理由空間表徵世界而不陷入上述兩難？本論文研究布蘭登和麥道爾的學說，尋求兩位哲學家如何回應議題。布蘭登的方案主張「理由空間」是社會推論的語意空間，而世界是概念式的，說話者藉由「適當推論」的表徵規範而使被表徵的事實命題被理解。麥道爾的方案主張表徵經驗對象就是在經驗和思想之間形成理由關係，經驗和世界都在概念的理由空間中。本論文論證：布蘭登錯誤地將「刺激」（事實）與「知覺判斷」之間的規範關係以因果關係來說明。其次，麥道爾運用建構式哲學來做治療性哲學，在說明理性是「第二自然」時面臨了方法與目的之間的緊張與矛盾。
     本論文進一步分析了布蘭登和麥道爾方案所蘊含的「意義或內容規範論」。另外，藉由探討「兩個空間」之間的可能關係，本論文論證：基於認知視角的必然性和優先性，「理由空間」應該要擴展到自然的空間、納入自然空間中的項目。這一個論點正是呼應了麥道爾的「理性限制（rational constraint）的原則」。由於這個論證，本論文得以在科學的自然觀和麥道爾的亞里斯多德式自然觀之外，為布蘭登的方案提出第三種的自然觀。
     布蘭登接受較弱意義的「理性限制的原則」但是沒有提出自己的方案。本論文陸續在不同的階段為布蘭登逐步構作知識論上強的de re ascription方案 - 規範性的「三角測量」知覺理論。這個方案符合了「理性限制的原則」。由於建立了推論主義的知覺理論，本論文能夠進一步為布蘭登成功地回應麥道爾關於推論主義如何說明「經驗內容」和「推論比表徵更基礎」的質疑。最後，本論文考察了兩位哲學家關於基礎論與融貫論的知識論立場，詳細分析他們關於「非推論知識」的爭辯，以及布蘭登「觀察兩層說」的新穎內涵與應用。
     
     
     
     關鍵字：塞拉斯；布蘭登；麥道爾；所與；理由空間；表徵；推論主義；意義
     與內容規範論；三角測量；觀察兩層說
Abstract
     
     This thesis addresses the problem of representation facing Brandom’s and McDowell’s philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology. In agree with Sellars, both Brandom and McDowell insist that any legitimate account of representation must not fall trap on fallacy of “the Given”, the idea that non-cognitive items can serve as basis of knowledge. Both Brandom and McDowell also agree with Sellars in that the mind in general, and representation in particular, characteristically resides in“the logical space of reasons”, which is different in kind from “the logical space of laws”used to characterize nature. The main concern here can be sharpened by McDowell’s idea that in representing , the space of reasons must “open to the world”. But it appears that the very conception of space of reasons makes it a dilemma to avoid the Given as well as to open to the world .
     So the main issue of this thesis is that how to represent the world in the space of reasons without fall victim to the dilemma . I explore Brandom’s and McDowell’s ways out of the dilemma. For Brandom , the space of reasons is constituted by social-linguistic practical inference , and facts in the world are conceptual. Representing the fact is to understand it by proper inference. For McDowell , representing an empirical object is to be in rational relation between experience and thought , and both experience and the world are in the conceptual space of reasons . I point out some defects in both accounts. I argue that Brandom mistakes the normative relation between “stimulus”(which is facts) and perceptual judgments for causal relation . I also point out that McDowell’s method of constructive philosophy for ultimately therapeutic philosophy results in a serious tension in explicating human rationality as“second nature”.
     I try to analyze the meaning or content normativism implied in both accounts , which connects normativity with reasons . Most importantly , in enquiring the possible relation between “the space of reasons”and“the space of laws” , I argue that the necessity and priority of cognitive perspective demands us to extend the former space to the latter space to accommodate items of the latter . This point just echoes McDowell’s principle of“rational constraint”. I further construe third conception of nature for Brandom’s account as a counterpart to McDowell’s Aristotelian conception of nature , as well as a counterpart to the scientific conception of nature .
     Brandom accepts a weaker sense of rational constraint , but he didn’t provide his own alternative . I elaborate for Brandom’s inferentialism at different phases an normative triangulation theory of perception , which Brandom calls“epistemologically strong de re ascription”. This alternative meets McDowell’s requirement , and it also helps to address McDowell’s criticisms that Brandom fails to explain “empirical content”and“ that inference is more basic than representation”. Finally , I investigate Brandom’s and McDowell’s positions about foundationalism and coherentism . Then I analyze their debate about non-inferential knowledge , exploring and assessing the boldness of the deep idea of Brandom’s two-ply account of observation .
     
     
     
     Keywords : Sellars ; Brandom ; McDowell ; the Given ; the space of reasons ; representation ; inferentialism ; meaning and content normativism ; triangulation ; two-ply account of observation
參考文獻 參考文獻
     
     中文：
     林從一，2004，《思想・語言・社會・世界：戴維森的詮釋理論》，台北：允
     晨文化。
     
     英文：
     
     Brandom, Robert B.（1994）. Making It Explicit : Reasoning, Representing, and
     Discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     （2000）. Articulating Reasons : An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge,
     MA : Harvard University Press.
     （1995）. Knowledge and The Social Articulation of Reasons. Philosophy and
     Phenomenological Research, 895-908 .
     （1998）. Perception and Rational Constraint. Philosophy and Phenomenological
     Research, LVIII : 369-374.
     （2002）. The Centrality of Sellars’s “Two Ply Account of Observation”to
     The Arguments of “Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind”. In Tales of The
     Mighty Dead : Historical Essays in The Metaphysic s of Intentionality .Robert
     Brandom . 348-367. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
     （2002）. Non-Inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary
     Qualities. In Reading McDowell : On Making It Explicit. Ed. by Nicholas H.
     Smith . 92-106 . New York : Routledge .
     （2010）. Reply to John McDowell’s “Brandom on Observation”: Chicken-
     Sexers and Ryleans . In Reading Brandom : On Making It Explicit. Ed. by
     Nicholas H. Smith. 320-326. New York : Routledge.
     BonJour, Laurence.（2010）. Epistemology : Classic Problems and Contemporary
     Responses. Second Edition. Plymouth, UK : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Inc.
     Davidson, Donald.（1980）. Mental Event . In Essays on Events and Actions . Donald
     Davidson . 207-225 . Oxford : Clarendon press.
     （2001a）. Belief and The Basis of Meaning. In Inquires into Truth and
     Interpretation . Donald Davidson . 141-155 . Oxford : Clarendon Press .
     （2001b）. Thought and Talk . In In Inquires into Truth and
     Interpretation . Donald Davidson . 155-171 . Oxford : Clarendon Press .
     （2001c）. Rational Animal. In Subjective , Intersubjective , Objective . Donald
     Davidson . 95-107 . Oxford : Clarendon Press .
     （2001d）. The Second Person. In Subjective , Intersubjective , Objective .
     Donald Davidson . 107-123 . Oxford : Clarendon Press .
     （2001e）. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In subjective,
     Intersubjective, Objective. Donald Davidson. Oxford : Clarendon Press.
     James, William.（1890）. The Principles of Psychology, New York: Henry Holt and
     Company.
     McDowell, John.（1996）. Mind and World, with a new introduction. Cambridge, MA :
     Harvard University Press.
     （1995）. Knowledge and The Internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological
     Research , 877-893 .
     （1997）. Brandom on Representation and Inference. Philosophy and
     Phenomenological Research . 157-162 .
     （2009a）. Conceptual Capacities in Perception. In Having The Word in View :
     Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. John McDowell . 127-144 . Cambridge MA :
     Harvard University Press .
     （2009b）. Wittgensteinian“Quietism”, Symposium : Apology for Quietism,
     part 3 . Common Knowledge. 365-372. Duke University Press.
     （2010）. Brandom on Observation. In Reading Brandom : On Making It
     Explicit. Ed. By Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer. 129-144. New York :
     Routledge.
     Margolis, E and S. Laurence.（2003）. Concepts . In The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy
     of Mind . 190-195 . Oxford : Blackwell publishing .
     Sellars, Wilfrid.（1997）. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, with an introduction
     and a study guide. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
     
     網路資源 :
     
     Bogen, James.（2017）. Theory and Observation in Science. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/. 查閱日期：2018年3月。
     
     Connolly, Kevin. （2017）. Perceptual Learning. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https://plato.stanford.edu/enteries/perceptual-learning/.查閱日期：2018年3月。
     
     Glüer,Kathrin and Asa Wikforss .（2009）. The Normativity of Meaning and Content. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-normativity/. 查閱日期：2011年3月。
描述 博士
國立政治大學
哲學系
98154502
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098154502
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林從一zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Lin, Chung-Ien_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張淑惠zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chang, Shu-Huien_US
dc.creator (作者) 張淑惠zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chang, Shu-Huien_US
dc.date (日期) 2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned 29-Aug-2018 15:54:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 29-Aug-2018 15:54:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 29-Aug-2018 15:54:25 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0098154502en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/119747-
dc.description (描述) 博士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 哲學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 98154502zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 中文摘要
     
     本論文形塑並且探討布蘭登（Robert B. Brandom）和麥道爾（John McDowell）所處理的心靈表徵之議題。首先，藉由討論塞拉斯（Wilfrid Sellars）的看法，關於表徵活動的說明要避免「所與」（the Given）的謬誤，亦即避免認知的內容由非認知的項目構成。同時，心靈被界定為「理由的邏輯空間」。最後，在麥道爾的闡發之下「理由空間」應該要「向世界開放」。然而，由於「理由空間」這個觀念使得心靈和世界被置入兩個互不相屬的空間，而令「避免所與」和「向世界開放」的要求陷入兩難。
     於是布蘭登和麥道爾所處理的議題便是：如何在心靈的理由空間表徵世界而不陷入上述兩難？本論文研究布蘭登和麥道爾的學說，尋求兩位哲學家如何回應議題。布蘭登的方案主張「理由空間」是社會推論的語意空間，而世界是概念式的，說話者藉由「適當推論」的表徵規範而使被表徵的事實命題被理解。麥道爾的方案主張表徵經驗對象就是在經驗和思想之間形成理由關係，經驗和世界都在概念的理由空間中。本論文論證：布蘭登錯誤地將「刺激」（事實）與「知覺判斷」之間的規範關係以因果關係來說明。其次，麥道爾運用建構式哲學來做治療性哲學，在說明理性是「第二自然」時面臨了方法與目的之間的緊張與矛盾。
     本論文進一步分析了布蘭登和麥道爾方案所蘊含的「意義或內容規範論」。另外，藉由探討「兩個空間」之間的可能關係，本論文論證：基於認知視角的必然性和優先性，「理由空間」應該要擴展到自然的空間、納入自然空間中的項目。這一個論點正是呼應了麥道爾的「理性限制（rational constraint）的原則」。由於這個論證，本論文得以在科學的自然觀和麥道爾的亞里斯多德式自然觀之外，為布蘭登的方案提出第三種的自然觀。
     布蘭登接受較弱意義的「理性限制的原則」但是沒有提出自己的方案。本論文陸續在不同的階段為布蘭登逐步構作知識論上強的de re ascription方案 - 規範性的「三角測量」知覺理論。這個方案符合了「理性限制的原則」。由於建立了推論主義的知覺理論，本論文能夠進一步為布蘭登成功地回應麥道爾關於推論主義如何說明「經驗內容」和「推論比表徵更基礎」的質疑。最後，本論文考察了兩位哲學家關於基礎論與融貫論的知識論立場，詳細分析他們關於「非推論知識」的爭辯，以及布蘭登「觀察兩層說」的新穎內涵與應用。
     
     
     
     關鍵字：塞拉斯；布蘭登；麥道爾；所與；理由空間；表徵；推論主義；意義
     與內容規範論；三角測量；觀察兩層說		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Abstract
     
     This thesis addresses the problem of representation facing Brandom’s and McDowell’s philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology. In agree with Sellars, both Brandom and McDowell insist that any legitimate account of representation must not fall trap on fallacy of “the Given”, the idea that non-cognitive items can serve as basis of knowledge. Both Brandom and McDowell also agree with Sellars in that the mind in general, and representation in particular, characteristically resides in“the logical space of reasons”, which is different in kind from “the logical space of laws”used to characterize nature. The main concern here can be sharpened by McDowell’s idea that in representing , the space of reasons must “open to the world”. But it appears that the very conception of space of reasons makes it a dilemma to avoid the Given as well as to open to the world .
     So the main issue of this thesis is that how to represent the world in the space of reasons without fall victim to the dilemma . I explore Brandom’s and McDowell’s ways out of the dilemma. For Brandom , the space of reasons is constituted by social-linguistic practical inference , and facts in the world are conceptual. Representing the fact is to understand it by proper inference. For McDowell , representing an empirical object is to be in rational relation between experience and thought , and both experience and the world are in the conceptual space of reasons . I point out some defects in both accounts. I argue that Brandom mistakes the normative relation between “stimulus”(which is facts) and perceptual judgments for causal relation . I also point out that McDowell’s method of constructive philosophy for ultimately therapeutic philosophy results in a serious tension in explicating human rationality as“second nature”.
     I try to analyze the meaning or content normativism implied in both accounts , which connects normativity with reasons . Most importantly , in enquiring the possible relation between “the space of reasons”and“the space of laws” , I argue that the necessity and priority of cognitive perspective demands us to extend the former space to the latter space to accommodate items of the latter . This point just echoes McDowell’s principle of“rational constraint”. I further construe third conception of nature for Brandom’s account as a counterpart to McDowell’s Aristotelian conception of nature , as well as a counterpart to the scientific conception of nature .
     Brandom accepts a weaker sense of rational constraint , but he didn’t provide his own alternative . I elaborate for Brandom’s inferentialism at different phases an normative triangulation theory of perception , which Brandom calls“epistemologically strong de re ascription”. This alternative meets McDowell’s requirement , and it also helps to address McDowell’s criticisms that Brandom fails to explain “empirical content”and“ that inference is more basic than representation”. Finally , I investigate Brandom’s and McDowell’s positions about foundationalism and coherentism . Then I analyze their debate about non-inferential knowledge , exploring and assessing the boldness of the deep idea of Brandom’s two-ply account of observation .
     
     
     
     Keywords : Sellars ; Brandom ; McDowell ; the Given ; the space of reasons ; representation ; inferentialism ; meaning and content normativism ; triangulation ; two-ply account of observation		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 目 錄
     獻詞
     中文摘要
     Abstract
     
     第一章 論題的形塑 ………………………………………………………………1
     
     前言 塞拉斯（Wilfrid Sellars）的遺產………………………………………..1
     
     第一節 反對「所與」（the Given）……………………………………………2
     1.1 哲學中的「所與」觀念…………………………………………………..2
     1.2 塞拉斯的「釐清混淆」論證……………………………………………..3
     1.3 「不一致的三聯主張」論證……………………………………………..4
     1.4 「所與」失敗的教訓……………………………………………………..6
     
     第二節 「知道」是「立足於理由空間」……………………………………...7
     2.1 非推論知識的權威何在？………………………………………………..7
     2.2 「知道」是「立足於理由空間」………………………………………..9
     2.3 「理由空間」內部化的危機……………………………………………..11
     
     第三節 論題：如何避免「所與」並在開放的理由空間表徵世界？……...16
     3.1 布蘭登和麥道爾的論題…………………………………………………16
     3.2 布蘭登和麥道爾的方案…………………………………………………17
     3.3 各篇章的內容……………………………………………………………17
     
     第二章 布蘭登的方案…………………………………………………………….18
     
     第一節 智人心靈的表徵決定於概念的構成原則……………………………18
     1.1 RDRD、判斷、觀察兩層說……………………………………………...18
     1.2 向世界開放：反對「非概念內容」……………………………………..20
     1.3 避免「所與」……………………………………………………………..22
     
     第二節 構成概念的理由空間：語意推論主義………………………………25
     2.1 語意由踐行的規範所賦予……………………………………………….25
     2.2 斷言的規範性與社會性………………………………………………….28
     2.3 對義務地位記分（deontic scorekeeping）……………………………….32
     2.4 概念內容、實質推論、概念適用的情狀……………………………….35
     第三節 從「推論」到「表徵」……………………………………………...39
     3.1 挑出個別對象……………………………………………………………40
     3.2 表徵作為溝通……………………………………………………………43
     3.3 知識論上的「弱de re」與「強de re」………………………………...44
     3.4 構作布蘭登式「強de re」方案…………………………………………46
     3.5 概念與對象之間的規範適用關係……………………………………….49
     
     第四節 概念規範的客觀性……………………………………………………53
     4.1 布蘭登方案的「客觀性」概念………………………………………….53
     4.2 規範態度不是主觀的…………………………………………………….55
     4.3 朝向客觀性……………………………………………………………….57
     
     小結………………………………………………………………………………60
     
     第三章 麥道爾的方案……………………………………………………………61
     
     第一節 重新界定理由空間的動機…………………………………………...61
     1.1 哲學焦慮…………………………………………………………………61
     1.2 治療性的哲學取徑………………………………………………………63
     1.3 「明顯的事實」與「提醒的藥方」……………………………………66
     
     第二節 對其他方案的診斷……………………………………………………68
     2.1 對「所與」方案的診斷………………………………………………….68
     2.2 對「融貫論」的診斷…………………………………………………….71
     2.3 對「赤裸自然主義」（bald naturalism）的診斷…………………………74
     
     第三節 心靈與世界合併為一個概念的理由空間……………………………75
     3.1 經驗的內容是概念式的…………………………………………………..75
     3.2 世界的內容是概念式的…………………………………………………..80
     3.3 「第二自然」的自然主義………………………………………………..85
     
     小結………………………………………………………………………………91
     
     第四章 開放的理由空間…………………………………………………………..92
     
     第一節 理由空間的不同取徑…………………………………………………92
     
     1.1 概念的表徵受到理由空間的規範……………………………………….92
     1.1.1 內容規範論……………………………………………………….93
     1.1.2 表徵行動應該依據好理由……………………………………….94
     1.1.3 布蘭登方案的規範性與理由…………………………………….96
     1.1.4 麥道爾方案的規範性與理由……………………………………100
     
     1.2 開放性：事實作為理由…………………………………………………103
     1.2.1 心靈與世界之間的「認知關係」………………………………103
     1.2.2 因果關係與認知關係……………………………………………105
     1.2.3 麥道爾的方案：事實是經驗判斷的理由………………………108
     1.2.4 布蘭登的方案：事實是理由的構成要素………………………108
     
     1.3 避免「所與」：事實是概念式的………………………………………..109
     
     1.4 第三種「自然」觀念……………………………………………………112
     
     第二節 理性限制（rational constraint）的原則……………………………113
     
     2.1 理性限制的原則…………………………………………………………113
     
     2.2 麥道爾的強方案…………………………………………………………114
     2.2.1 經驗真的是「理由」嗎？……………………………………….114
     2.2.2 經驗是「認知的中介物」嗎？………………………………….115
     
     2.3 布蘭登的弱方案…………………………………………………………117
     2.3.1 推論的知識可靠主義…………………………………………….119
     2.3.2 三角測量的規範性限制………………………………………….121
     
     2.4 對強方案與弱方案的評估………………………………………………125
     
     第三節 推論主義下的經驗內容……………………………………………..126
     
     3.1 如何說明經驗內容？……………………………………………………127
     
     3.2 推論比表徵更基礎嗎？…………………………………………………128
     
     第五章 理由空間中的知識………………………………………………………131
     
     第一節 理由空間與知識的基礎……………………………………………..131
     1.1 基礎主義與融貫主義的基本區分……………………………………...132
     1.2 新的「基礎知識」觀念………………………………………………...133
     1.3 新的「融貫知識」觀念………………………………………………...133
     1.4 論兩個方案的知識論立場……………………………………………...134
     
     第二節 非推論知識…………………………………………………………..134
     
     2.1 布蘭登的方案：觀察兩層說……………………………………………135
     2.1.1 極簡主義的說明………………………………………………….137
     2.1.2 理論概念的觀察使用：μ介子的案例………………………….138
     2.1.3 知覺學習的案例………………………………………………….139
     2.1.4 RDRD與概念之間的關係……………………………………….144
     
     2.2 麥道爾的說明……………………………………………………………148
     
     2.3 觀察兩層說的可靠性等差及其優點……………………………………150
     第六章 結論：「理由空間」的再探與評估……………………………………..154
     參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………157		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098154502en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 塞拉斯zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 布蘭登zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 麥道爾zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 所與zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 理由空間zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 表徵zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 推論主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 意義與內容規範論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 三角測量zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 觀察兩層說zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sellarsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Brandomen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) McDowellen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) The givenen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) The space of reasonsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Representationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Inferentialismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Meaning and content normativismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Triangulationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Two-ply account of observationen_US
dc.title (題名) 布蘭登與麥道爾論理由空間中的世界表徵zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Brandom and McDowell on representing the world in the space of reasonsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
     
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     網路資源 :
     
     Bogen, James.（2017）. Theory and Observation in Science. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/. 查閱日期：2018年3月。
     
     Connolly, Kevin. （2017）. Perceptual Learning. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https://plato.stanford.edu/enteries/perceptual-learning/.查閱日期：2018年3月。
     
     Glüer,Kathrin and Asa Wikforss .（2009）. The Normativity of Meaning and Content. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-normativity/. 查閱日期：2011年3月。		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/DIS.NCCU.Phi.004.2018.A02-