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題名 公共選擇與投票行爲理論之研究
作者 鄭瓊秋
貢獻者 劉永憲
鄭瓊秋
日期 1982
上傳時間 11-Oct-2018 09:31:52 (UTC+8)
摘要 提要
傳統的經濟理論假設完全競爭市場的存在，市場的價格制度可以充分發揮其功能，而使資源作最有效的配置。然而，在現實社會裡，由於生產成本遞減，邊際成本等於零、集體消費及外部效果等很多情況的存在，致使市場制度無法順利運行；在此種情況下，若任由市場制度自由操作，而不給予外力的協助，則會使經濟資源的配置缺乏「效率 」（efficiency）。因此，當現實社會處於市場機能失去作用（market failure）時，則需要公共部門採取措施以資補救。其次，由於社會上一般人士對於現行價格制度所形成的所得分配狀況不表贊同，政府基於倫理的判斷，也應採取措施予以補救。
制度與思想的產生均源於對問題的設法解決。由於理想的私經濟市場機能可能失效，近年來許多有關政治經濟學（Political Economy）的文獻多集中於分析如何經由投票以從事最適的公共選擇，本文主要的研究動機在於提出各學者所建立的理論模型，分別探討如何利用投票方法，正確地顯示人民對公兵財貨或公共服務的需求，以謀此等問題的合理解決，提高社會全體的福利。
綜合對公共選擇的各種決策原則與規範的檢討，以及檢定相關的實證研究，可以知道欲達成團體共識有諸多困難。例如：循環現象、選票交易、價值判斷、偏好顯示、知識訊息、 … …、 對於上面問題的設法解決，已發展成公共選擇理論（Public Choice Theory），撰寫本文之目的，卽在研討各種有關的理論方法、發掘各項尚待解決的問題，並提出本文作者不成熟的見解。
本文結構計分七章；第一章「前言」； 第二章為「非市場經濟決策的情況與基礎」；第三章為「決策規則與投票行為的探討」；第四章為「規範面的公共選擇」；第五章為「公共選擇的實際應用」；第六章為「偏好顯示、財政認知與公共選擇」；第七章為「結論」。
參考文獻 參考文獻
一、中文部分
1.林華德，財政理論與政策（台北：東華書局，民國六十六年十月，三版）。
2.馬起華「投票行為之研究」，國立政治大學學報，第十一期（民國五十四年五月，頁三三三～三五四。
3.陳秀良譯，政治學（台北：成文出版社有限公司，民國六十七年三月，初版）。
4.張金鑑，動態政治學（台北：七友出版傳播事業有限公司，民國六十六年九月，初版）。
5.華力進，政治學（台北：經世書局，民國六十九年十一月，初版）。
6.湯絢章譯，公共政策制訂（台北：幼獅文化事業出版公司，民國六十八年八月）。
7.葉賡勛，多數決的理論與實際（台北：世紀書局，民國六十六年三月，初版）。
8.劉永憲，財政學原理（台北：文笙書屆，民國七十年八月，初版）。
9.薛天棟譯，經濟分析本論（台北：協志工業叢書出版股份有限公司，民國六十三年九月，初版）。
二、英文部分
1. Arrow, K. J. (1951, rev. ed. 1963), Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2. Barr, J.L. and Davis , O. A. (1966), “An Elementary Political and Economic Theory of Local Government, “ Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 33, PP.149-165.
3. Bator, F. M. (1958), “ The Anatomy of Market Failure,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, Vol. 72, PP. 376-377
4. Bergson, A. (1938), A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, PP. 314-544.
5. Bergstrom, T. C. and Goodman , R. F. (1975), “ Private Demand for Public Goods, “American Economic Review, vol. 63, PP. 280-296.
6. Birdall, W. C., “A Study of the Demand for Public Goods, “in Musgrave, R. A. (1968) (ed.) Essays in Fiscal. Federalism, Washington,D. C.: The Brookings Institution, third printing.
7. Black, D. (1948), On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, PP. 25-34.
8. ________, (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
9. Boadway , R. W. (1979), Public Sector Economics, Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.).
10. Borcherding, T. E. and Deacon, R. T. (1972), “The Demand for the Services of Non- federal Government, “ American Economic Review, vol.62, PP. 842-853.
11. Bowen, H. R. (1943), “The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 58,PP. 27-48.
12. Breton, A. (1966), “A Theory of the Demand for Public Goods,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, PP. 455-467.
13. ________,(1974), The Economic Theory of Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,.
14. Browning , E. and Browning, J. M. (1978), Public Finance and the Price System, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
15. Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner ,R. E. (1977), Democracy In Deficit : The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
16. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1974), The Calculus of Consent, fifth printing, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
17. Buchanan, J. M. and Flowers, M. R. (1980), The Public Finance, fifth ed., Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
18. Buchanan, J. M. (1972), “Rawls on Justice as Fairness,” Public Choice, Vol. 13, PP. 123-128.
19. ________(1954), “Individual Choice In Voting and the Market, ”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, PP. 334-343.
20.________ (1969), The Demand and Supply of public Goods, 2nd Printing, Chicago: Rand Mcnally.
21. Clarke, E. H (1971),“Multi-part Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, Vol.11, PP. 17-33.
22. Colemen, J. S. (1966),“ The possibility of a Social Welfare Function, ” American Economic Review, Vol. 56, PP. 1105-1122.
23. Colm, G. (1956), “Comment on Samuelson’s Theory of Public Finance, ” Review of Economics and Statistics ,Vol. 38, PP. 408-412.
24. Comanor, W. S. (1976), “The Median voter Rule and the theory of Political Choice, ” Journal of Public Economics, Vol.5. PP. 169-177.
25. Deacon, R, T. (1977), “Private Choice and Collective Outcomes: Evidence from Public Sector Demand Analysis,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 30, PP. 371-386.
26. Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.
27. Gevers, L. and Proost, S. (1978), “Some Effects of Taxation and Collective Goods in Postwar America: A Tentative Appraisal, Journal of Public Economic, Vol. 9, PP. 115-137.
28. Groves, T. and Loeb, M. (1975), “Incentives and Public Inputs,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 4, PP. 211-226.
29. Herber , B. P. (1975), Modern Public Finance: The Study of Public Sector Economics, Illinois : Richard D. Irwin, Inc., third ed..
30. Hildreth, C. (1953), “Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings,” Econometrica, Vol. 21 , PP. 81-94.
31. Hotelling, H. (1929), Stability in Competition,“Economic Journal, Vol. 39, PP. 41-57.
32. Kamien, M. and Schwartz, N. (1970), “Revelation of Preference for a Public Good with Imperfect Exclusion,” Pullic Choice, Vol. 7, p. 19.
33. Kemp, M. C. and Asimakopulos, A. (1952), “A Note On ‘Social Welfare Functions’ and Cardinal Utility,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 18, PP. 195-200.
34. Klevorick, A. K. (1974), “Discussion,”American Economic Review, Vol. 64,. PP. 158-161.
35. Little, I. M. D. (1952), “Social Choice and Individual Values,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol, 60. PP. 422-432.
36. Margolis, J. (1955),“ A Comment on the Pure Theory of Publec Expenditure,”Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.37, PP. 347-349.
37. Meade, J. E. (1952), “External Economies and a Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation, ” The Economic Journal, Vol. 62, PP. 54-67.
38. Mueller , D. C. (1973), “Constitutional Democracy and Social Welfare,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, PP. 64-70
39.________ (1978), “Voting by Veto,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 10, PP. 57-75.
40. Mueller, E. (1963), “Public Attitudes toward Fiscal programs, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 77. PP. 210-235.
41. Mueller, D. C. ( 1976 ), “Public Choice: A Survey,” The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 64, P. 395.
42. Musgrave , R. A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance, New York: Mcgraw-Hill, Inc., PP. 43-44.
43. Musgrave, R. A. and Musgrave, P. B. (1976), Public Finance in Theory and Practice, New York: Mcgraw- Hill Inc., 2nd. ed.
44. Ng, Y. K. (1971), “The Possibility of Paretian Liberal: Impossiblity Theorems and Cardinal Utility,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 79, PP. 1397-1402.
45. Pommerehne, W. W. and Schneider, F. (1978), “ Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, and Local Public Spending,” Krklos, Vol. 31, PP. 381-408.
46. Pommerehne, W. W. and Frey, B. S. (1976),“Two Approaches To Estimating Public Expenditures,” Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 4. PP. 395-407.
47. Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
48. Riker, W. H. (1961), “Voting and The Summation of Preference: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During The Last Decade, “The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55. P. 908.
49. Riker, W. H. and Brams, S. J. (1973), “The Paradox of Vote Trading, ”American Political Science Review, Vol. 62. PP. 1235-1247.
50. Romer, T. and Rosenthal H. (1979), ”The Elusive Median Voter, “ Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 12,PP. 145-170.
51. Russell, R.R. and Wilkinson, M. (1979), Micro-Economics : A Synthesis of Modern and Neoclassical Theory, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,.
52. Samuelson, P. A. (1954), “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, PP. 387-389
53. ________(1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
54. Sen, A. K, (1974), “Rawls Versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the pure Distribution Problem,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 4, PP. 301-310.
55. ________(1970), Collective Choice and Social Welfare , San Francisco: Holden-Day.
56. Shubik, M. (1970),“ Voting, or Price System in a Competitive Market Structure,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 64. PP. 179-181.
57. Slutsky, S. (1977), “A Voting Model for The Allocation of Public Goods: Existerce of An Equalibrium,” Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 14. PP. 299-325
58. Stokey, E. and Zeckhauser, R. (1978), A Primer for Policy Analysis, New York : W. W. Norton & Co..
59. Tideman, T. N. and Tullock , G. (1976), “A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choice,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 84, PP. 1145-1160.
60. Tullock, G. and Campbell, C. D. (1970), “Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System, ” Economic Journal, Vol. 80, PP. 97-104.
61. Vickrey, W. (1960), “Utility Strategy and Social Decision Rule,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 74,PP. 507-535.
62. Wagner, R. E. (1976), “Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, ”Pullic Choice, Vol. 25, PP. 45-61.
63. West, E. G. and Winer, S. L. (1980), “Optimal Fiscal Illusion and the Size of Government,” Public Choice, Vol. 35. PP. 607-622.
64. Wicksell,K. (1896),“A New Principle of Just Taxation,” reprinted in Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock , A. T. (1958) (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London: Macmillan & Co...
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
70
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002007401
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 劉永憲
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 鄭瓊秋
dc.creator (作者) 鄭瓊秋
dc.date (日期) 1982
dc.date.accessioned 11-Oct-2018 09:31:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 11-Oct-2018 09:31:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 11-Oct-2018 09:31:52 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120484-
dc.description (描述) 碩士
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學
dc.description (描述) 財政研究所
dc.description (描述) 70
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 提要
傳統的經濟理論假設完全競爭市場的存在，市場的價格制度可以充分發揮其功能，而使資源作最有效的配置。然而，在現實社會裡，由於生產成本遞減，邊際成本等於零、集體消費及外部效果等很多情況的存在，致使市場制度無法順利運行；在此種情況下，若任由市場制度自由操作，而不給予外力的協助，則會使經濟資源的配置缺乏「效率 」（efficiency）。因此，當現實社會處於市場機能失去作用（market failure）時，則需要公共部門採取措施以資補救。其次，由於社會上一般人士對於現行價格制度所形成的所得分配狀況不表贊同，政府基於倫理的判斷，也應採取措施予以補救。
制度與思想的產生均源於對問題的設法解決。由於理想的私經濟市場機能可能失效，近年來許多有關政治經濟學（Political Economy）的文獻多集中於分析如何經由投票以從事最適的公共選擇，本文主要的研究動機在於提出各學者所建立的理論模型，分別探討如何利用投票方法，正確地顯示人民對公兵財貨或公共服務的需求，以謀此等問題的合理解決，提高社會全體的福利。
綜合對公共選擇的各種決策原則與規範的檢討，以及檢定相關的實證研究，可以知道欲達成團體共識有諸多困難。例如：循環現象、選票交易、價值判斷、偏好顯示、知識訊息、 … …、 對於上面問題的設法解決，已發展成公共選擇理論（Public Choice Theory），撰寫本文之目的，卽在研討各種有關的理論方法、發掘各項尚待解決的問題，並提出本文作者不成熟的見解。
本文結構計分七章；第一章「前言」； 第二章為「非市場經濟決策的情況與基礎」；第三章為「決策規則與投票行為的探討」；第四章為「規範面的公共選擇」；第五章為「公共選擇的實際應用」；第六章為「偏好顯示、財政認知與公共選擇」；第七章為「結論」。
dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄
提要 頁次
第一章、前言1
壹、研究動機與目的1
貳、本文結構與研究內容4
叁、研究限制
第二章、非市場經濟決策的情況與基礎7
壹、公共財的定義與特質7
貳、非市場經濟決策的情況12
叁、公共財的需求24
肆、非市場經濟決策的政治基礎35
第三章、決策規則與投票行為的探討53
壹、絕對一致的原則54
貳、最適多數理論模型58
叁、多數決投票的矛盾與單峯偏好的限制64
肆、選票互助的現象73
伍、Anthony Downs的競爭模型85
第四章、規範面的公共選擇97
壹、Bergson - Samuelson的社會福利函數97
貳、Rawls 的福利函數99
叁、Arrow的不可能定理107
肆、規範面與實證面公共選擇的比較121
第五章、公共選擇的實際應用133
壹、中位數投票者假說133
貳、公共選擇理論的應用140
第六章、偏好顯示、財政認知與公共選擇157
壹、偏好顯示與租稅誘因的關係158
貳、否決權投票與公共選擇的運用163
叁、財政認知與公共選擇167
第七章、結論177
參考文獻185
撰者簡歷197
dc.format.extent 115 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002007401
dc.title (題名) 公共選擇與投票行爲理論之研究
dc.type (資料類型) thesis
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 參考文獻
一、中文部分
1.林華德，財政理論與政策（台北：東華書局，民國六十六年十月，三版）。
2.馬起華「投票行為之研究」，國立政治大學學報，第十一期（民國五十四年五月，頁三三三～三五四。
3.陳秀良譯，政治學（台北：成文出版社有限公司，民國六十七年三月，初版）。
4.張金鑑，動態政治學（台北：七友出版傳播事業有限公司，民國六十六年九月，初版）。
5.華力進，政治學（台北：經世書局，民國六十九年十一月，初版）。
6.湯絢章譯，公共政策制訂（台北：幼獅文化事業出版公司，民國六十八年八月）。
7.葉賡勛，多數決的理論與實際（台北：世紀書局，民國六十六年三月，初版）。
8.劉永憲，財政學原理（台北：文笙書屆，民國七十年八月，初版）。
9.薛天棟譯，經濟分析本論（台北：協志工業叢書出版股份有限公司，民國六十三年九月，初版）。
二、英文部分
1. Arrow, K. J. (1951, rev. ed. 1963), Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2. Barr, J.L. and Davis , O. A. (1966), “An Elementary Political and Economic Theory of Local Government, “ Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 33, PP.149-165.
3. Bator, F. M. (1958), “ The Anatomy of Market Failure,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, Vol. 72, PP. 376-377
4. Bergson, A. (1938), A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 52, PP. 314-544.
5. Bergstrom, T. C. and Goodman , R. F. (1975), “ Private Demand for Public Goods, “American Economic Review, vol. 63, PP. 280-296.
6. Birdall, W. C., “A Study of the Demand for Public Goods, “in Musgrave, R. A. (1968) (ed.) Essays in Fiscal. Federalism, Washington,D. C.: The Brookings Institution, third printing.
7. Black, D. (1948), On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, PP. 25-34.
8. ________, (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
9. Boadway , R. W. (1979), Public Sector Economics, Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.).
10. Borcherding, T. E. and Deacon, R. T. (1972), “The Demand for the Services of Non- federal Government, “ American Economic Review, vol.62, PP. 842-853.
11. Bowen, H. R. (1943), “The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 58,PP. 27-48.
12. Breton, A. (1966), “A Theory of the Demand for Public Goods,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, PP. 455-467.
13. ________,(1974), The Economic Theory of Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.,.
14. Browning , E. and Browning, J. M. (1978), Public Finance and the Price System, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
15. Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner ,R. E. (1977), Democracy In Deficit : The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
16. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1974), The Calculus of Consent, fifth printing, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
17. Buchanan, J. M. and Flowers, M. R. (1980), The Public Finance, fifth ed., Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
18. Buchanan, J. M. (1972), “Rawls on Justice as Fairness,” Public Choice, Vol. 13, PP. 123-128.
19. ________(1954), “Individual Choice In Voting and the Market, ”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, PP. 334-343.
20.________ (1969), The Demand and Supply of public Goods, 2nd Printing, Chicago: Rand Mcnally.
21. Clarke, E. H (1971),“Multi-part Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, Vol.11, PP. 17-33.
22. Colemen, J. S. (1966),“ The possibility of a Social Welfare Function, ” American Economic Review, Vol. 56, PP. 1105-1122.
23. Colm, G. (1956), “Comment on Samuelson’s Theory of Public Finance, ” Review of Economics and Statistics ,Vol. 38, PP. 408-412.
24. Comanor, W. S. (1976), “The Median voter Rule and the theory of Political Choice, ” Journal of Public Economics, Vol.5. PP. 169-177.
25. Deacon, R, T. (1977), “Private Choice and Collective Outcomes: Evidence from Public Sector Demand Analysis,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 30, PP. 371-386.
26. Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row.
27. Gevers, L. and Proost, S. (1978), “Some Effects of Taxation and Collective Goods in Postwar America: A Tentative Appraisal, Journal of Public Economic, Vol. 9, PP. 115-137.
28. Groves, T. and Loeb, M. (1975), “Incentives and Public Inputs,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 4, PP. 211-226.
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