An Asymmetric View of Franchise Contracts | Publication

Title	An Asymmetric View of Franchise Contracts
Creator	郭曉玲 Guo, Shiau-Ling Lumineau, Fabrice
Contributor	企管系
Date	2017-01
Date Issued	11-Oct-2018 15:15:20 (UTC+8)
Summary	We extend the literature on contractual governance with an asymmetric view of contractual design. Specifically, we distinguish between the absolute and relative levels of contractual complexity. We suggest that when facing exchange hazards, firms may fortify their own protection not only by bolstering contractual provisions in their favor but also by reducing contractual provisions in favor of the partner. In this regard, the relative level of contractual complexity, as opposed to the absolute level of contractual complexity, can better reflect the contracting choices that firms make to protect themselves against exchange hazards. The results from a study of disclosed documents and contracts on 136 franchise systems in the U.S. largely support our arguments.
Relation	Academy of Management Proceedings, Academy of Management Academy of Management Proceedings, Vol. 2017, No. 1
Type	conference

dc.contributor	企管系
dc.creator (作者)	郭曉玲
dc.creator (作者)	Guo, Shiau-Ling
dc.creator (作者)	Lumineau, Fabrice
dc.date (日期)	2017-01
dc.date.accessioned	11-Oct-2018 15:15:20 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.available	11-Oct-2018 15:15:20 (UTC+8)	-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間)	11-Oct-2018 15:15:20 (UTC+8)	-
dc.identifier.uri (URI)	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120526	-
dc.description.abstract (摘要)	We extend the literature on contractual governance with an asymmetric view of contractual design. Specifically, we distinguish between the absolute and relative levels of contractual complexity. We suggest that when facing exchange hazards, firms may fortify their own protection not only by bolstering contractual provisions in their favor but also by reducing contractual provisions in favor of the partner. In this regard, the relative level of contractual complexity, as opposed to the absolute level of contractual complexity, can better reflect the contracting choices that firms make to protect themselves against exchange hazards. The results from a study of disclosed documents and contracts on 136 franchise systems in the U.S. largely support our arguments.	en_US
dc.format.extent	129 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	text/html	-
dc.relation (關聯)	Academy of Management Proceedings, Academy of Management
dc.relation (關聯)	Academy of Management Proceedings, Vol. 2017, No. 1
dc.title (題名)	An Asymmetric View of Franchise Contracts	en_US
dc.type (資料類型)	conference