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題名 微型保險對保險市場的衝擊
The Impacts of Microinsurance on Insurance Market
作者 許修豪
Hsu, Hsiu-Hao
貢獻者 何靜嫺
許修豪
Hsu, Hsiu-Hao
關鍵詞 微型保險
保險市場
競爭
Microinsurance
Insurance market
Competition
日期 2018
上傳時間 9-Nov-2018 15:50:37 (UTC+8)
摘要 微型保險常被許多人稱為"金字塔底層的財富"，但這些低所得消費者過去多被傳統保險市場所拒絕；保險人是否真的可以從提供服務給這群額外的消費者中獲益呢?本論文試圖藉由探討一個存在兩個保險人的完整保險市場來回答這個問題。我們由理論分析結果得知，當保險市場只有傳統保險時，在考慮垂直面的財富效果下，則均衡保費會下降、均衡利潤卻會上升。而在引進微型保險商品後，保險人的垂直需求會減少。然而，當不存在財富效果時，提供微型保險對傳統保險市場的均衡保費不會有影響，且在第二章節中，我們也得到在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價下，保險人的利潤會相同。當我們考慮財富效果後，提供微型保險會使均衡保費和利潤都降低，但傳統保險的均衡保費會因為競爭效果而隨著微型保險保費的提高而上升。最後，因為許多國家政策雖鼓勵保險人提供微型保險卻不強制性要求，而針對這樣的情況，我們也得到當保險人 1提供微型保險時:(1)保險人1傳統保險的均衡保費會比不提供微型保險時的均衡保費低。(2)保險人1的均衡保費會比保險人2的均衡保費低。(3)保險人1的均衡利潤會小於保險人2的均衡利潤。(4)保險人1的均衡利潤會隨著微型保險價格的增加而上升。最後實證對我們理論分析的結果得到一個強烈的證實:在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價時，微型保險所 帶來額外的利潤為0，那麼微型保險商品的引進會增加市場競爭的程度，同時降低均衡保費及垂直需求，因而導致保險人的利潤下降。
Microinsurance has been articulated as "the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid", but these low income customers were previously precluded by conventional insurance, will insurers really benefit from serving a larger amount of customers? This current paper attempts to provide answers to these questions by examining a completive insurance market with two insurers. Our analytical results show that when there are only conventional insurance, the equilibrium premiums are smaller but the equilibrium profits will increase after considering the wealth effect on vertical demands. After introducing the microinsurance product, insurer`s vertical demand will reduce. However, if there is no wealth effect, adding microinsurance has no impact on the premiums of conventional insurance, and given marginal cost pricing for microinsurance, the insurers` total profits are the same as in Section 2. If the wealth effect is considered, after providing microinsurance, both the equilibrium prices and profits are lower, but the equilibrium premiums of conventional insurance will increase with the premiums of microinsurance, due to the competition effect. Finally, any countries encourage insurers to provide microinsurance products but not compulsorily. We show that when only insurer 1 provides microinsurance, (i) insurer 1`s equilibrium premium of conventional insurance is lower than when not providing micorinsurance. (ii) Insurer 1`s premium for conventional insurance is lower than insurer 2`s premium. (iii) Insurer 1`s profit is also smaller than insurer 2`s. (iv) Insurer 1`s profit will increase with the premium of microinsurance products. Finally, our empirical results provide strong support for our analytical results that even if microsinsurance is marginal pricing so that the additional profit from microinsurance is zero, then the introduction of microinsurance will increase the degree of competition, lowering the equilibrium prices and vertical demand, which result in a decrease in insurers` profits.
參考文獻 Arrow, K. J. (1971). The theory of risk aversion. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing, 90-120.
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., & Thisse, J. F. (1992). Discrete choice theory of product differentiation. MIT press.
Ackerberg, D. A., & Botticini, M. (2002). Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy, 110(3), 564-591.
Banker, R. D., Charnes, A., & Cooper, W. W. (1984). Some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis. Management science, 30(9), 1078-1092.
Berger, A. N., Cummins, J. D., Weiss, M. A., & Zi, H. (2000). Conglomeration versus strategic focus: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(4), 323-362.
Becker, B. (2006). Wealth and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance, 61(1), 379-397.
Bellemare, M. F., & Brown, Z. S. (2010). On the (mis) use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92(1), 273-282.
Biener, C., & Eling, M. (2011). The performance of microinsurance programs: A data envelopment analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(1), 83-115.
Biener, C., & Eling, M. (2012). Insurability in microinsurance markets: An analysis of problems and potential solutions. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 37(1), 77-107.
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Ma, Y., Seade, J., & Song, F. M. (2013). Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2879-2892.
Biener, C. (2013). Pricing in microinsurance markets. World Development, 41, 132-144.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., & Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. European journal of operational research, 2(6), 429-444.
Caplin, A., & Nalebuff, B. (1991). Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of equilibrium. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 25-59.
Coelli, T. (1996). A guide to DEAP version 2.1: a data envelopment analysis (computer) program. Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, University of New England, Australia.
Canoy, M., & Peitz, M. (1997). The differentiation triangle. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(3), 305-328.
Coelli, T. J., & Rao, D. P. (2005). Total factor productivity growth in agriculture: a Malmquist index analysis of 93 countries, 1980--2000. Agricultural Economics, 32, 115-134.
Churchill, C. (2007). Insuring the low-income market: Challenges and solutions for commercial insurers. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 32(3), 401-412.
d`Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). On Hotelling`s" Stability in competition". Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1145-1150.
Dubois, P. (2002). Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines. Journal of Development Economics, 68(1), 35-64.
Drake, L., Hall, M. J., & Simper, R. (2006). The impact of macroeconomic and regulatory factors on bank efficiency: A non-parametric analysis of Hong Kong`s banking system. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(5), 1443-1466.
Ennsfellner, K. C., Lewis, D., & Anderson, R. I. (2004). Production efficiency in the Austrian insurance industry: a Bayesian examination. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71(1), 135-159.
Eichner, T., & Wagener, A. (2009). Multiple risks and mean-variance preferences. Operations Research, 57(5), 1142-1154.
Eling, M., & Luhnen, M. (2010). Frontier efficiency methodologies to measure performance in the insurance industry: Overview, systematization, and recent developments. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 35(2), 217-265.
Fenn, P., Vencappa, D., Diacon, S., Klumpes, P., & O`Brien, C. (2008). Market structure and the efficiency of European insurance companies: A stochastic frontier analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(1), 86-100.
Fukunaga, K., & Huffman, W. E. (2009). The role of risk and transaction costs in contract design: evidence from farmland lease contracts in us agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(1), 237-249.
Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). Price competition, quality and income disparities. Journal of economic theory, 20(3), 340-359.
Grace, M. F., & Timme, S. G. (1992). An examination of cost economies in the United States life insurance industry. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72-103.
Gilbert, R. J., & Matutes, C. (1993). Product line rivalry with brand differentiation. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 223-240.
Gabszewicz, J. J., & Wauthy, X. Y. (2012). Nesting horizontal and vertical differentiation. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42(6), 998-1002.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review, 92(5), 1644-1655.
Hu, J. L., Chen, C. P., & Su, Y. Y. (2006). Ownership reform and efficiency of nationwide banks in China. In A paper presented at an international conference, WTO, China and the Asian Economies, IV: Economic Integration and Economic Development`, held at University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China, June 24th-25th.
Hoff, A. (2007). Second stage DEA: Comparison of approaches for modelling the DEA score. European Journal of Operational Research, 181(1), 425-435.
Hu, X., Zhang, C., Hu, J. L., & Zhu, N. (2009). Analyzing efficiency in the Chinese life insurance industry. Management Research News, 32(10), 905-920.
Ireland, N. J. (1987). Product differentiation and non-price competition. Blackwell.
Kumar, S., & Gulati, R. (2008). An examination of technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies in Indian public sector banks using data envelopment analysis. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 1(2), 33-69.
Laffont, J. J., & Matoussi, M. S. (1995). Moral hazard, financial constraints and sharecropping in El Oulja. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(3), 381-399.
Landsberger, M., & Meilijson, I. (1999). A general model of insurance under adverse selection. Economic Theory, 14(2), 331-352.
Liu, Y., & Myers, R. J. (2016). The dynamics of microinsurance demand in developing countries under liquidity constraints and insurer default risk. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 83(1), 121-138.
Neven, D., & Thisse, J. F. (1989). On quality and variety competition (No. 1989020). Universite catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Neven, D.J. & Thisse, J.F. (1990). On Quality and Variety Competition, in J.J. Gabszewicz, J.F. Richard and L.A. Wolsey (eds.), Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimization. Contributions in honour of Jacques H. Dreze, NorthHolland, 175-199.
Okura, M. (2010). The vertical differentiation model in the insurance market. International Journal of Economics and Business Modeling, 1(2), 12-14.
Parker, D. (1999). The performance of BAA before and after privatisation: A DEA study. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 133-145.
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1978). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. In Uncertainty in economics (pp. 257-280).
Roth, J., McCord, M. J., & Liber, D. (2007). The landscape of microinsurance in the world`s 100 poorest countries.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1977). Monopoly, non-linear pricing and imperfect information: the insurance market. The Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), 407-430.
Schlesinger, H., & Von der Schulenburg, J. M. G. (1991). Search costs, switching costs and product heterogeneity in an insurance market. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 109-119.
Schlesinger, H., & von der Schulenburg, J. M. G. (1993). Consumer information and decisions to switch insurers. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 591-615.
Siegel, P., Alwang, J., & Canagarajah, S. (2001). Viewing microinsurance as a social risk management instrument (Vol. 116, pp. 17-25). Social Protection Discussion Paper Series.
Wilson, C. (1976). A model of insurance markets with asymmetric information (No. 432). Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Wilson, C. (1977). A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. Journal of Economic theory, 16(2), 167-207.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
1002580182
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002580182
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 何靜嫺zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 許修豪zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsu, Hsiu-Haoen_US
dc.creator (作者) 許修豪zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsu, Hsiu-Haoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2018en_US
dc.date.accessioned 9-Nov-2018 15:50:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 9-Nov-2018 15:50:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 9-Nov-2018 15:50:37 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1002580182en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120893-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 1002580182zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 微型保險常被許多人稱為"金字塔底層的財富"，但這些低所得消費者過去多被傳統保險市場所拒絕；保險人是否真的可以從提供服務給這群額外的消費者中獲益呢?本論文試圖藉由探討一個存在兩個保險人的完整保險市場來回答這個問題。我們由理論分析結果得知，當保險市場只有傳統保險時，在考慮垂直面的財富效果下，則均衡保費會下降、均衡利潤卻會上升。而在引進微型保險商品後，保險人的垂直需求會減少。然而，當不存在財富效果時，提供微型保險對傳統保險市場的均衡保費不會有影響，且在第二章節中，我們也得到在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價下，保險人的利潤會相同。當我們考慮財富效果後，提供微型保險會使均衡保費和利潤都降低，但傳統保險的均衡保費會因為競爭效果而隨著微型保險保費的提高而上升。最後，因為許多國家政策雖鼓勵保險人提供微型保險卻不強制性要求，而針對這樣的情況，我們也得到當保險人 1提供微型保險時:(1)保險人1傳統保險的均衡保費會比不提供微型保險時的均衡保費低。(2)保險人1的均衡保費會比保險人2的均衡保費低。(3)保險人1的均衡利潤會小於保險人2的均衡利潤。(4)保險人1的均衡利潤會隨著微型保險價格的增加而上升。最後實證對我們理論分析的結果得到一個強烈的證實:在微型保險採取邊際成本訂價時，微型保險所 帶來額外的利潤為0，那麼微型保險商品的引進會增加市場競爭的程度，同時降低均衡保費及垂直需求，因而導致保險人的利潤下降。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Microinsurance has been articulated as "the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid", but these low income customers were previously precluded by conventional insurance, will insurers really benefit from serving a larger amount of customers? This current paper attempts to provide answers to these questions by examining a completive insurance market with two insurers. Our analytical results show that when there are only conventional insurance, the equilibrium premiums are smaller but the equilibrium profits will increase after considering the wealth effect on vertical demands. After introducing the microinsurance product, insurer`s vertical demand will reduce. However, if there is no wealth effect, adding microinsurance has no impact on the premiums of conventional insurance, and given marginal cost pricing for microinsurance, the insurers` total profits are the same as in Section 2. If the wealth effect is considered, after providing microinsurance, both the equilibrium prices and profits are lower, but the equilibrium premiums of conventional insurance will increase with the premiums of microinsurance, due to the competition effect. Finally, any countries encourage insurers to provide microinsurance products but not compulsorily. We show that when only insurer 1 provides microinsurance, (i) insurer 1`s equilibrium premium of conventional insurance is lower than when not providing micorinsurance. (ii) Insurer 1`s premium for conventional insurance is lower than insurer 2`s premium. (iii) Insurer 1`s profit is also smaller than insurer 2`s. (iv) Insurer 1`s profit will increase with the premium of microinsurance products. Finally, our empirical results provide strong support for our analytical results that even if microsinsurance is marginal pricing so that the additional profit from microinsurance is zero, then the introduction of microinsurance will increase the degree of competition, lowering the equilibrium prices and vertical demand, which result in a decrease in insurers` profits.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1.Introduction 1
1.1 Related Literature 3

2.Differentiated Market with Only Conventional Insurance 5
2.1 Price Equilibrium with Only Conventional Insurance 10 2.1.1 No Wealth Effect 10
2.1.2 Endogenous Wealth Effect 12
2.1.3 Comparative Statics 14

3.Multiproduct Competition (2 vs 2) 16
3.1 Multiproduct Equilibrium (2 vs 2) 20
3.1.1 No Wealth Effect 21
3.1.2 Endogenous Wealth Effect 22
3.1.3 Comparisons 26

4.Multiproduct Competition (2 vs 1) 28
4.1 Multiproduct Equilibrium (2vs 1) 29
4.1.1 Comparisons 30

5.Empirical Studies 34
5.1 Data and Variables 35
5.1.1 Performance Variables 35
5.1.2 Microinsurance Variables 37
5.1.3 Control Variables 38
5.2 Empirical Results 39

6.Concluding Remarks 43

Appendix 44

References 48		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1179829 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1002580182en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 微型保險zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 保險市場zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 競爭zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Microinsuranceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Insurance marketen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Competitionen_US
dc.title (題名) 微型保險對保險市場的衝擊zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Impacts of Microinsurance on Insurance Marketen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Arrow, K. J. (1971). The theory of risk aversion. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing, 90-120.
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., & Thisse, J. F. (1992). Discrete choice theory of product differentiation. MIT press.
Ackerberg, D. A., & Botticini, M. (2002). Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy, 110(3), 564-591.
Banker, R. D., Charnes, A., & Cooper, W. W. (1984). Some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis. Management science, 30(9), 1078-1092.
Berger, A. N., Cummins, J. D., Weiss, M. A., & Zi, H. (2000). Conglomeration versus strategic focus: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(4), 323-362.
Becker, B. (2006). Wealth and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance, 61(1), 379-397.
Bellemare, M. F., & Brown, Z. S. (2010). On the (mis) use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92(1), 273-282.
Biener, C., & Eling, M. (2011). The performance of microinsurance programs: A data envelopment analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(1), 83-115.
Biener, C., & Eling, M. (2012). Insurability in microinsurance markets: An analysis of problems and potential solutions. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 37(1), 77-107.
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Ma, Y., Seade, J., & Song, F. M. (2013). Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), 2879-2892.
Biener, C. (2013). Pricing in microinsurance markets. World Development, 41, 132-144.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W. W., & Rhodes, E. (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. European journal of operational research, 2(6), 429-444.
Caplin, A., & Nalebuff, B. (1991). Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of equilibrium. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 25-59.
Coelli, T. (1996). A guide to DEAP version 2.1: a data envelopment analysis (computer) program. Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, University of New England, Australia.
Canoy, M., & Peitz, M. (1997). The differentiation triangle. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 45(3), 305-328.
Coelli, T. J., & Rao, D. P. (2005). Total factor productivity growth in agriculture: a Malmquist index analysis of 93 countries, 1980--2000. Agricultural Economics, 32, 115-134.
Churchill, C. (2007). Insuring the low-income market: Challenges and solutions for commercial insurers. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 32(3), 401-412.
d`Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). On Hotelling`s" Stability in competition". Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1145-1150.
Dubois, P. (2002). Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines. Journal of Development Economics, 68(1), 35-64.
Drake, L., Hall, M. J., & Simper, R. (2006). The impact of macroeconomic and regulatory factors on bank efficiency: A non-parametric analysis of Hong Kong`s banking system. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(5), 1443-1466.
Ennsfellner, K. C., Lewis, D., & Anderson, R. I. (2004). Production efficiency in the Austrian insurance industry: a Bayesian examination. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 71(1), 135-159.
Eichner, T., & Wagener, A. (2009). Multiple risks and mean-variance preferences. Operations Research, 57(5), 1142-1154.
Eling, M., & Luhnen, M. (2010). Frontier efficiency methodologies to measure performance in the insurance industry: Overview, systematization, and recent developments. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 35(2), 217-265.
Fenn, P., Vencappa, D., Diacon, S., Klumpes, P., & O`Brien, C. (2008). Market structure and the efficiency of European insurance companies: A stochastic frontier analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(1), 86-100.
Fukunaga, K., & Huffman, W. E. (2009). The role of risk and transaction costs in contract design: evidence from farmland lease contracts in us agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(1), 237-249.
Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). Price competition, quality and income disparities. Journal of economic theory, 20(3), 340-359.
Grace, M. F., & Timme, S. G. (1992). An examination of cost economies in the United States life insurance industry. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 72-103.
Gilbert, R. J., & Matutes, C. (1993). Product line rivalry with brand differentiation. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 223-240.
Gabszewicz, J. J., & Wauthy, X. Y. (2012). Nesting horizontal and vertical differentiation. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42(6), 998-1002.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic review, 92(5), 1644-1655.
Hu, J. L., Chen, C. P., & Su, Y. Y. (2006). Ownership reform and efficiency of nationwide banks in China. In A paper presented at an international conference, WTO, China and the Asian Economies, IV: Economic Integration and Economic Development`, held at University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China, June 24th-25th.
Hoff, A. (2007). Second stage DEA: Comparison of approaches for modelling the DEA score. European Journal of Operational Research, 181(1), 425-435.
Hu, X., Zhang, C., Hu, J. L., & Zhu, N. (2009). Analyzing efficiency in the Chinese life insurance industry. Management Research News, 32(10), 905-920.
Ireland, N. J. (1987). Product differentiation and non-price competition. Blackwell.
Kumar, S., & Gulati, R. (2008). An examination of technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies in Indian public sector banks using data envelopment analysis. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 1(2), 33-69.
Laffont, J. J., & Matoussi, M. S. (1995). Moral hazard, financial constraints and sharecropping in El Oulja. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(3), 381-399.
Landsberger, M., & Meilijson, I. (1999). A general model of insurance under adverse selection. Economic Theory, 14(2), 331-352.
Liu, Y., & Myers, R. J. (2016). The dynamics of microinsurance demand in developing countries under liquidity constraints and insurer default risk. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 83(1), 121-138.
Neven, D., & Thisse, J. F. (1989). On quality and variety competition (No. 1989020). Universite catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Neven, D.J. & Thisse, J.F. (1990). On Quality and Variety Competition, in J.J. Gabszewicz, J.F. Richard and L.A. Wolsey (eds.), Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimization. Contributions in honour of Jacques H. Dreze, NorthHolland, 175-199.
Okura, M. (2010). The vertical differentiation model in the insurance market. International Journal of Economics and Business Modeling, 1(2), 12-14.
Parker, D. (1999). The performance of BAA before and after privatisation: A DEA study. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 133-145.
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1978). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. In Uncertainty in economics (pp. 257-280).
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ECONO.023.2018.F06en_US