| dc.contributor | 經濟系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 洪福聲 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hung, Fu-Sheng | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2005-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 21-Nov-2018 16:12:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 21-Nov-2018 16:12:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 21-Nov-2018 16:12:14 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120961 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | A simple model is developed to evaluate the roles of credit rationing and government policies of financial repression in the process of capital accumulation. In the model, credit rationing on both investment and consumption loans decreases as capital accumulates but increases as the government imposes policies of financial repression to a greater extent. While a reduction in credit rationing on consumption loans impedes capital accumulation, such a reduction on investment loans facilitates it. We find that developing countries may be trapped at a low-capital-stock steady state while developed countries converge to a high-capital-stock steady state. Instead of adopting policies of financial liberalization, interestingly, this paper finds that policies of financial repression may enable developing countries to escape the development trap. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 264941 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Development Economics, Volume 78, Issue 2, Pages 322-347 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Asymmetric information; Credit rationing; Adverse selection; Development trap | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | Credit Rationing and Capital Accumulation with Investment and Consumption Loans Revisited | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.007 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.11.007 | |
