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題名 Fichte`s critique of physicalism - towards an idealist alternative
作者 謝昭銳
Tse, Plato
貢獻者 哲學系
關鍵詞 Fichte; post-Kantian idealism; physicalism; mind
日期 2018-06
上傳時間 12-Dec-2018 16:37:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 Though the perennial problem of consciousness has outlasted the idealists, the reductivist turn in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of mind and the non-reductivist reactions to it provoke us to re-think post-Kantian idealism. Fichte`s Wissenschaftslehre makes for a classical case of non-reductivist (and probably even non-naturalist) approach to mind and his critique of ‘dogmatism’ is all the more relevant in this context. This article contains four sections. The first section is an introduction that explains why post-Kantian idealism is relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind. The second section pinpoints the placement issue that confronts not only current philosophers but also partially motivated Fichte`s own philosophy. The third section is a short but essential remark about the normative and practical valence of ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ in Fichte`s traditional understanding of them. In the fourth section, I provide a reconstructive analysis of Fichte`s understanding and critique of physicalism. Fichte`s argument can be analyzed into two horns with each targeting reductivism and epiphenomenalism respectively. The final section is a brief but positive exposition on a necessary feature, namely reflexivity, of mind and the first-person perspective. Fichte`s appropriation of intellectual intuition exemplifies a non-representationalist picture that connects content transparency with the active nature of mind.
關聯 Inquiry, Vol.62, No.5, pp.527-545
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484003
dc.contributor 哲學系-
dc.creator (作者) 謝昭銳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Tse, Platoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2018-06-
dc.date.accessioned 12-Dec-2018 16:37:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 12-Dec-2018 16:37:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 12-Dec-2018 16:37:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/121371-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Though the perennial problem of consciousness has outlasted the idealists, the reductivist turn in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of mind and the non-reductivist reactions to it provoke us to re-think post-Kantian idealism. Fichte`s Wissenschaftslehre makes for a classical case of non-reductivist (and probably even non-naturalist) approach to mind and his critique of ‘dogmatism’ is all the more relevant in this context. This article contains four sections. The first section is an introduction that explains why post-Kantian idealism is relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind. The second section pinpoints the placement issue that confronts not only current philosophers but also partially motivated Fichte`s own philosophy. The third section is a short but essential remark about the normative and practical valence of ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ in Fichte`s traditional understanding of them. In the fourth section, I provide a reconstructive analysis of Fichte`s understanding and critique of physicalism. Fichte`s argument can be analyzed into two horns with each targeting reductivism and epiphenomenalism respectively. The final section is a brief but positive exposition on a necessary feature, namely reflexivity, of mind and the first-person perspective. Fichte`s appropriation of intellectual intuition exemplifies a non-representationalist picture that connects content transparency with the active nature of mind.en_US
dc.format.extent 130 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Inquiry, Vol.62, No.5, pp.527-545-
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Fichte; post-Kantian idealism; physicalism; mind-
dc.title (題名) Fichte`s critique of physicalism - towards an idealist alternativeen_US
dc.type (資料類型) article-
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484003-
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1484003-