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題名 獨立董事辭職與市場反應之研究
Does the Market React to the Resignation of Independent Directors?
作者 高上洋
Kao, Shang-Yang
貢獻者 陳宇紳
高上洋
Kao, Shang-Yang
關鍵詞 獨立董事辭職
專業背景
市場反應
事件研究法
Independent director turnover
Professional background
Market reaction
Event study
日期 2019
上傳時間 4-Mar-2019 18:41:02 (UTC+8)
摘要 自從獨立董事制度引進我國以來，獨立董事是否能夠監督公司管理階層及保障股東權益，一直都是眾所矚目的焦點，近年來多個上市櫃公司發生弊案，引發投資人對於獨立董事監督功能的懷疑，由於獨立董事具有資訊不對稱之優勢，較投資人了解公司之營運情況，因此獨立董事的辭職，可能是向投資人傳達公司內部有舞弊情事的警訊。樂陞案後，在輿論關注下，獨立董事被大眾以高標準檢視，再加以主管機關要求增加獨立董事的法律責任的情況下，有些獨立董事選擇辭職，進而掀起一波獨立董事的辭職潮，因此獨立董事辭職所造成的負面訊息效果可能更強。

本研究從市場投資人的角度出發，以2007年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司獨立董事辭職宣告為樣本，探討市場對獨立董事辭職的反應，並進一步探討獨立董事專業背景是否會影響獨立董事辭職與市場反應的關聯性。實證結果發現：(1)獨立董事辭職，市場投資人的反應雖為負面但並不顯著。(2)具有財務或法律背景之獨立董事辭職時，市場為負向反應並顯著。從實證結果來看，財務或法律背景獨立董事之辭職可能暗示公司在財務或法律層面出現問題，市場投資人因而給予負面反應。
Since the introduction of the independent director system, whether independent directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duty by overseeing company management and protecting shareholders’ interests has caught shareholders’ and general public’s attentions. In recent years, several corporate fraud cases have raised investor suspicions about the role played by independent directors in monitoring company management. Independent directors hold more information about firms they serve than investors. The resignation of independent directors may serve as a red flag of corporate misconduct that can convey useful information to investors. After the XPEC saga, under heightened investor scrutiny and greater litigation risk imposed by regulatory authorities, some independent directors decided to tender, which subsequently led to a wave of resignations of independent directors. The signaling effect of independent director resignation, therefore, may be amplified after the saga.

Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms in 2007-2017, this study examines whether the market reacts to the resignation of independent director and whether the professional background of independent directors is associated with market reactions to such independent director turnover. The empirical results show that: (1) the market`s response to the resignation of independent directors is negative but insignificant; (2) the market reactions tend to be negative when independent directors with finance or legal background resign. The finding suggests that investors perceive the resignation of an independent director with finance or legal background as a red flag of corporate governance issue for the firm in which he or she served as a director.
參考文獻 丁秀儀與陳于欣，2010，公司獨立董事為何忙碌？，管理學報，第27卷，第3期：291-318。
朱博湧、林裕淩與王筠傑，2015，獨立董事多樣性對於公司價值之研究，管理資訊計算，第4卷，第2期：65-82。
______、______與林峻宇，2015，獨立董事組成、資訊透明度與組織績效─以2008全球金融風暴為例，評價學報，第9期：1-20。
李伶珠、劉俊儒與劉毅馨，2016，獨立董事具有監督效果或僅是花瓶？，東海管理評論，第18卷，第1期：219-267。
李淑華、林昆民與蔡彥卿，2010，力霸案引發之董監事離職潮與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，財務金融學刊，第18卷，第4期：37-72。
李金龍，2007，我國上市(櫃)獨立董監事自願性離職因素之探討，國立臺北大學會計學系碩士論文。
沈中華與李建然，2000，事件研究法：財務與會計實證研究必備，華泰文化。
余淑瑛，2011，設置獨立董事比例影響因素及其宣告效果研究，私立東吳大學企業管理學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。
邱秀清、李慕萱與劉仲凱，2009，董監事專業性與財務報表重編，文大商管學報，第14卷，第1期：1-17。
邱垂昌與莊清騄，2004，獨立董監事、公司資訊透明度與公司價值之關聯性，中山管理評論，第18卷，第4期：949-1008。
林孟璇，2014，我國審計委員會之會計、法律專家對債務條款及債務信用評等之影響，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
柯承恩，2000，消除代理問題 保障委託人權益 我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)，會計研究月刊，第173期：75-81。
______，2000，外部董事積極俾益內控 內神易防難保不通外鬼 我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議（下），會計研究月刊，第174期：79-83。
林冠醇，2009，獨立董監事專業背景與盈餘管理之關聯性，國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。
林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第48期：1-33。
林霈菱，2012，探討獨立董事異動宣告對股東財富之影響，國立彰化師範大學商業教育學系碩士論文。
陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智，2004，應用Ohlson會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性─以台灣上市公司電子業為例，臺大管理論叢，第15卷，第2期：123-141。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第42卷：15-31。
______、______、______與______，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(下)，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第43卷：11-26。
莊逸文，2017，董事異動與財務報告重編，私立元智大學財務金融暨會計碩士班碩士論文。
張幸惠與姚名麗，2015，董事會組成、財報品質與財務主管異動宣告效果，兩岸金融季刊，第3卷，第2期：27-67。
張瑞當、方俊儒與曾玉琦，2007，核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報，第24卷，第1期：17-39。
葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化。
廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究─兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期：117-160。
薛敏正、林嬋娟與林秀鳳，2008，董事會特性與財務報告重編，交大管理學報，第28卷，第2期：73-103。
簡妃良，2015，審計委員會學者董事與應計品質，國立成功大學會計學系博士論文。
蘇泉仲，2010，台灣獨立董事制度實證研究，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文。
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
1053530213
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1053530213
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳宇紳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 高上洋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Kao, Shang-Yangen_US
dc.creator (作者) 高上洋zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Kao, Shang-Yangen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Mar-2019 18:41:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Mar-2019 18:41:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Mar-2019 18:41:02 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G1053530213en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122375-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 1053530213zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 自從獨立董事制度引進我國以來，獨立董事是否能夠監督公司管理階層及保障股東權益，一直都是眾所矚目的焦點，近年來多個上市櫃公司發生弊案，引發投資人對於獨立董事監督功能的懷疑，由於獨立董事具有資訊不對稱之優勢，較投資人了解公司之營運情況，因此獨立董事的辭職，可能是向投資人傳達公司內部有舞弊情事的警訊。樂陞案後，在輿論關注下，獨立董事被大眾以高標準檢視，再加以主管機關要求增加獨立董事的法律責任的情況下，有些獨立董事選擇辭職，進而掀起一波獨立董事的辭職潮，因此獨立董事辭職所造成的負面訊息效果可能更強。

本研究從市場投資人的角度出發，以2007年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司獨立董事辭職宣告為樣本，探討市場對獨立董事辭職的反應，並進一步探討獨立董事專業背景是否會影響獨立董事辭職與市場反應的關聯性。實證結果發現：(1)獨立董事辭職，市場投資人的反應雖為負面但並不顯著。(2)具有財務或法律背景之獨立董事辭職時，市場為負向反應並顯著。從實證結果來看，財務或法律背景獨立董事之辭職可能暗示公司在財務或法律層面出現問題，市場投資人因而給予負面反應。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Since the introduction of the independent director system, whether independent directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duty by overseeing company management and protecting shareholders’ interests has caught shareholders’ and general public’s attentions. In recent years, several corporate fraud cases have raised investor suspicions about the role played by independent directors in monitoring company management. Independent directors hold more information about firms they serve than investors. The resignation of independent directors may serve as a red flag of corporate misconduct that can convey useful information to investors. After the XPEC saga, under heightened investor scrutiny and greater litigation risk imposed by regulatory authorities, some independent directors decided to tender, which subsequently led to a wave of resignations of independent directors. The signaling effect of independent director resignation, therefore, may be amplified after the saga.

Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms in 2007-2017, this study examines whether the market reacts to the resignation of independent director and whether the professional background of independent directors is associated with market reactions to such independent director turnover. The empirical results show that: (1) the market`s response to the resignation of independent directors is negative but insignificant; (2) the market reactions tend to be negative when independent directors with finance or legal background resign. The finding suggests that investors perceive the resignation of an independent director with finance or legal background as a red flag of corporate governance issue for the firm in which he or she served as a director.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 表目錄 II
圖目錄 II
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景及動機 1
第二節 研究問題 4
第三節 研究貢獻 5
第四節 研究架構 6
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 獨立董事之重要性 7
第二節 獨立董事異常離職與市場反應 11
第三節 獨立董事專業背景 12
第參章 研究假說與研究設計 14
第一節 研究假說 14
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 15
第三節 模型設計與變數定義 16
第肆章 實證結果分析 23
第一節 事件研究法分析 23
第二節 敘述性統計 25
第三節 相關係數分析 25
第四節 迴歸分析 25
第五節 進一步分析 27
第六節 敏感性分析 33
第伍章 結論與建議 36
第一節 研究結論 36
第二節 研究限制 37
第三節 研究建議 38
參考文獻 39		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1492016 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1053530213en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事辭職zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專業背景zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 市場反應zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 事件研究法zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent director turnoveren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Professional backgrounden_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Market reactionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Event studyen_US
dc.title (題名) 獨立董事辭職與市場反應之研究zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Does the Market React to the Resignation of Independent Directors?en_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 丁秀儀與陳于欣，2010，公司獨立董事為何忙碌？，管理學報，第27卷，第3期：291-318。
朱博湧、林裕淩與王筠傑，2015，獨立董事多樣性對於公司價值之研究，管理資訊計算，第4卷，第2期：65-82。
______、______與林峻宇，2015，獨立董事組成、資訊透明度與組織績效─以2008全球金融風暴為例，評價學報，第9期：1-20。
李伶珠、劉俊儒與劉毅馨，2016，獨立董事具有監督效果或僅是花瓶？，東海管理評論，第18卷，第1期：219-267。
李淑華、林昆民與蔡彥卿，2010，力霸案引發之董監事離職潮與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，財務金融學刊，第18卷，第4期：37-72。
李金龍，2007，我國上市(櫃)獨立董監事自願性離職因素之探討，國立臺北大學會計學系碩士論文。
沈中華與李建然，2000，事件研究法：財務與會計實證研究必備，華泰文化。
余淑瑛，2011，設置獨立董事比例影響因素及其宣告效果研究，私立東吳大學企業管理學系碩士在職專班碩士論文。
邱秀清、李慕萱與劉仲凱，2009，董監事專業性與財務報表重編，文大商管學報，第14卷，第1期：1-17。
邱垂昌與莊清騄，2004，獨立董監事、公司資訊透明度與公司價值之關聯性，中山管理評論，第18卷，第4期：949-1008。
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柯承恩，2000，消除代理問題 保障委託人權益 我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)，會計研究月刊，第173期：75-81。
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.003.2019.F07en_US