Publications-Issues & Studies

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

NCCU Library

Citation Infomation

Related Publications in TAIR

題名 The Institution of Petition and Authoritarian Social Control in Contemporary China
作者 白宇烈
PAIK, WOOYEAL
貢獻者 Issues & Studies
關鍵詞 Social control; petition (xinfang); governance; state-society relation; authoritarianism; China
日期 2018-06
上傳時間 2-Apr-2019 09:34:04 (UTC+8)
摘要 This paper discusses the Xinfang institution of petitions (letters and visits) and explores the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party regime utilizes social control mechanisms to identify, oversee, and suppress socially discontented people with grievances in the post-Mao market reform era. This public-facing institution for managing participation and rightful resistance, which aims to oversee local officials and redress mass grievances, also plays an unexpected role in social control. Unlike the social control exercised by police patrols in police states, Xinfang functions first as a "fire alarm" in this authoritarian regime; then, if necessary, as a selective "police patrol," collecting information on discontented people with grievances, monitoring them, quelling and even preempting their protests, and referring dangerous petitioners to higher levels of government to prevent disruption in politically critical regions. This argument is supported with a detailed institutional analysis of the nationwide structure of Xinfang and several case studies of Xinfang`s multi-layered response to petitioners to Beijing, during the Falun Gong incidents in 1999 and 2000 in particular. Several complementary case studies on the behavior of local petition mechanisms and statistical evidence are also analyzed.
關聯 Issues & Studies, 54(2), 1850005
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251118500054
dc.contributor Issues & Studies
dc.creator (作者) 白宇烈
dc.creator (作者) PAIK, WOOYEAL
dc.date (日期) 2018-06
dc.date.accessioned 2-Apr-2019 09:34:04 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Apr-2019 09:34:04 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Apr-2019 09:34:04 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122865-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper discusses the Xinfang institution of petitions (letters and visits) and explores the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party regime utilizes social control mechanisms to identify, oversee, and suppress socially discontented people with grievances in the post-Mao market reform era. This public-facing institution for managing participation and rightful resistance, which aims to oversee local officials and redress mass grievances, also plays an unexpected role in social control. Unlike the social control exercised by police patrols in police states, Xinfang functions first as a "fire alarm" in this authoritarian regime; then, if necessary, as a selective "police patrol," collecting information on discontented people with grievances, monitoring them, quelling and even preempting their protests, and referring dangerous petitioners to higher levels of government to prevent disruption in politically critical regions. This argument is supported with a detailed institutional analysis of the nationwide structure of Xinfang and several case studies of Xinfang`s multi-layered response to petitioners to Beijing, during the Falun Gong incidents in 1999 and 2000 in particular. Several complementary case studies on the behavior of local petition mechanisms and statistical evidence are also analyzed.
dc.format.extent 180 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Issues & Studies, 54(2), 1850005
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social control; petition (xinfang); governance; state-society relation; authoritarianism; China
dc.title (題名) The Institution of Petition and Authoritarian Social Control in Contemporary China
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1142/S1013251118500054
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251118500054