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題名 審計委員會網絡對違規行為的影響
The Association Between Audit Committee Network and Fraud
作者 駱瑤
Luo, Yao
貢獻者 金成隆
Chin, Chen-Lung
駱瑤
Luo, Yao
關鍵詞 審計委員會網絡
違規行為
程度中心性
接近中心性
Audit committee network
Fraud
Degree centrality
Closeness centrality
日期 2019
上傳時間 1-Jul-2019 10:41:42 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文旨在探討審計委員會網絡的中心性是否與發生違規行為的可能性及頻率相關。本文選取2006年至2017年上海證券交易所與深圳證券交易的非ST上市公司的違規樣本及配對樣本3329個作為研究樣本，採用Binary logistic regression（二元邏吉斯回歸）、poisson regression（普瓦松回歸），研究上市公司在審計委員會網絡的中心性對違規行為的影響。研究發現：審計委員會網絡的程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規行為的抑制有著負向的影響，審計委員會網絡的程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規次數的減少亦有著負向的影響。在進一步分析中，本文測試了審計委員會網絡的接近中心性（closeness centrality）對違規行為的影響，得出了與程度中心性（degree centrality）相一致的結果。並且在刪除金融業、刪除金融海嘯年度、刪除資料不全年度之後，回歸結果仍然一致。此外，本文還發現程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規行為的負向影響在非四大審計之樣本中顯著，在四大審計之樣本中不顯著。
The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether audit committee network is associated with fraud likelihood and frequency of its clients. There are two opposite perspectives about this argument. Using a sample of public companies in China during 2006-2017, my primary results can be summarized as follows. First, I find that audit committee network, as measured by its close centrality, is positively associated with client’s fraud likelihood, suggesting the negative perspective of audit committee network. Second, I also find that fraud frequency is also positively related to audit committee’ centrality. Further analyses indicate that when I use degree centrality as alternative proxy for audit committee network, the main results remain qualitatively the same; the results are driven mainly by non-big firms rather than big firms. My findings are robust after exclusion of financial industry and deleting 2008 year (financial crisis).
參考文獻 王躍堂與塗建明，2006，上市公司審計委員會治理有效性的實證研究——來自滬深兩市的經驗證據，管理世界，第11期;135-143。
王麗，2007，中國上市公司資訊披露違規行為處罰效果研究，西南財經大學會計系碩士論文。
田高良、李留闖與齊保壘，2011， 連鎖董事、財務績效和公司價值，管理科學， 第3期: 13-24。
左雪蓮、郝雲宏與王淑賢，2018，董事網絡中心度對大股東掏空的影響:抑制還是加劇? 財經論叢，第11期：85-92。
朱春豔與伍利娜， 2009， 上市公司違規問題的審計後果研究———基於證券監管部門處罰公告的分析，審計研究 ，第4期 : 42－51。
朱雅琴與姚海鑫，2011，獨立董事、審計委員會與資訊透明度—來自深圳證券交易所A股上市公司的經驗證據，東北大學學報，第3期：37-42。
任兵，2005，連鎖董事的企業間網絡與公司治理，首都經濟貿易大學學報，第1期：38-42。
任兵，區玉輝與彭維剛，2007，連鎖董事與公司績效：針對中國的研究，南開管理評論，第1期：8-15
余玉苗與呂凡，2010，財務舞弊風險的識別——基於財務指標增量資訊的研究，經濟評論，第4期：124-130。
吳國萍，2008，上市公司資訊披露違規問題研究，吉林大學企業管理系博士論文。
周峻山，2006，對上市公司大股東違規行為的分析及對策思考，社會科學戰線，第4期：301-302。
馬金城與王磊，2009，系族控制人掏空與支持上市公司的博弈——基於複星系的案例研究，第122期：150-163。
陳關亭，2007，我國上市公司財務報告舞弊因素的實證分析，審計研究，第5期：91- 96。
陳國欣，呂占甲與何峰，2007，財務報告舞弊識別的實證研究——基於中國上市公司的經驗數，審計研究，第3期：88－93。
陳工孟與高寧，2005， 我國證券監管有效性的實證研究，管理世界，第7期: 40-47。
孫敬水與周永強，2008，我國上市公司董事會特徵與資訊披露違規—基於 2004—2006 年資料實證分，工業技術經濟，第1期：138-142。
曹倫與陳維政，2008，獨立董事履職影響影視與上市公司違規行為的關係實證研究，軟科學，第11期：127-132。
楊忠蓮與徐政旦，2004，我國公司成立審計委員會動機的實證研究，審計研究，第1期：19-24。
楊柏，2006，上市公司資訊披露違規動因剖析及啟示，經濟問題探索，第10期：131-136。
鄧可斌與周小丹，2012，獨立董事與公司違規：合謀還是抑制，山西財經大學學報，第11期：84-94。
趙昕，許傑與丁黎黎，2018，董事網絡、獨立董事治理與上市公司過度投資行為研究，審計與經濟研究，第1期：69-79。
潘皓青，2018，董事長權力會影響上市公司資訊披露品質嗎？——基於 2014—2017 年上半年證監會處罰的統計，商業會計，第14期：41-43。
劉秋明，2002，我國上市公司內部控制資訊披露的問題及改進，證券市場導報，第6期：38-43。
謝永珍，2006，中國上市公司審計委員會治理效率的實證研究，南開管理評論，第1期：66-73。
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353048
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353048
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 金成隆zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chin, Chen-Lungen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 駱瑤zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Luo, Yaoen_US
dc.creator (作者) 駱瑤zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Luo, Yaoen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2019 10:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2019 10:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2019 10:41:42 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353048en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124111-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353048zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文旨在探討審計委員會網絡的中心性是否與發生違規行為的可能性及頻率相關。本文選取2006年至2017年上海證券交易所與深圳證券交易的非ST上市公司的違規樣本及配對樣本3329個作為研究樣本，採用Binary logistic regression（二元邏吉斯回歸）、poisson regression（普瓦松回歸），研究上市公司在審計委員會網絡的中心性對違規行為的影響。研究發現：審計委員會網絡的程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規行為的抑制有著負向的影響，審計委員會網絡的程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規次數的減少亦有著負向的影響。在進一步分析中，本文測試了審計委員會網絡的接近中心性（closeness centrality）對違規行為的影響，得出了與程度中心性（degree centrality）相一致的結果。並且在刪除金融業、刪除金融海嘯年度、刪除資料不全年度之後，回歸結果仍然一致。此外，本文還發現程度中心性（degree centrality）對違規行為的負向影響在非四大審計之樣本中顯著，在四大審計之樣本中不顯著。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether audit committee network is associated with fraud likelihood and frequency of its clients. There are two opposite perspectives about this argument. Using a sample of public companies in China during 2006-2017, my primary results can be summarized as follows. First, I find that audit committee network, as measured by its close centrality, is positively associated with client’s fraud likelihood, suggesting the negative perspective of audit committee network. Second, I also find that fraud frequency is also positively related to audit committee’ centrality. Further analyses indicate that when I use degree centrality as alternative proxy for audit committee network, the main results remain qualitatively the same; the results are driven mainly by non-big firms rather than big firms. My findings are robust after exclusion of financial industry and deleting 2008 year (financial crisis).en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1
第一節、研究動機與目的 1
貳、文獻探討與機制背景 5
第一節、審計委員會相關文獻 5
第二節、違規行為相關文獻 8
第三節、社會網絡相關文獻 11
叁、研究設計 13
第一節、理論分析與假說的提出 13
第二節、 研究方法 15
肆、實證結果 24
第一節、 敘述性統計分析 24
第二節、 相關性分析 26
第三節、回歸分析 27
第四節、進一步分析 30
第五節、敏感性分析 32
伍、研究結論與建議 35
第一節、研究結論 35
第二節、研究限制與建議 36
參考文獻 37

表1 樣本篩選狀況表 44
表2 變量定義表 45
表4-1 敘述性統計分析 46
表4-2是否發生違規行為樣本的Pearson 相關係數表 47
表4-3違規次數樣本的Pearson 相關係數表 48
表4-4 程度中心性與發生違規之回歸分析 49
表4-5程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 50
表4-6接近中心性與是否違規之回歸分析 51
表4-7接近中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 52
表4-8剔除金融業後程度中心性與是否違規之回歸分析 53
表4-9剔除金融業後程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 54
表4-10剔除金融海嘯年度後程度中心性與是否違規之回歸分析 55
表4-11剔除金融海嘯年度後程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 56
表4-12剔除資料缺失年度樣本後程度中心性與是否違規之回歸分析 57
表4-13剔除資料缺失年度樣本後程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 58
表4-14剔除未設立審計委員會樣本後程度中心性與是否違規之回歸分析
59
表4-15剔除未設立審計委員會樣本後程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析
60
表4-16四大與非四大樣本程度中心性與是否違規之回歸分析 61
表4-17四大與非四大樣本程度中心性與違規次數之回歸分析 62		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 971297 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353048en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審計委員會網絡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 違規行為zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 程度中心性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 接近中心性zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit committee networken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Frauden_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Degree centralityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Closeness centralityen_US
dc.title (題名) 審計委員會網絡對違規行為的影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Association Between Audit Committee Network and Frauden_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王躍堂與塗建明，2006，上市公司審計委員會治理有效性的實證研究——來自滬深兩市的經驗證據，管理世界，第11期;135-143。
王麗，2007，中國上市公司資訊披露違規行為處罰效果研究，西南財經大學會計系碩士論文。
田高良、李留闖與齊保壘，2011， 連鎖董事、財務績效和公司價值，管理科學， 第3期: 13-24。
左雪蓮、郝雲宏與王淑賢，2018，董事網絡中心度對大股東掏空的影響:抑制還是加劇? 財經論叢，第11期：85-92。
朱春豔與伍利娜， 2009， 上市公司違規問題的審計後果研究———基於證券監管部門處罰公告的分析，審計研究 ，第4期 : 42－51。
朱雅琴與姚海鑫，2011，獨立董事、審計委員會與資訊透明度—來自深圳證券交易所A股上市公司的經驗證據，東北大學學報，第3期：37-42。
任兵，2005，連鎖董事的企業間網絡與公司治理，首都經濟貿易大學學報，第1期：38-42。
任兵，區玉輝與彭維剛，2007，連鎖董事與公司績效：針對中國的研究，南開管理評論，第1期：8-15
余玉苗與呂凡，2010，財務舞弊風險的識別——基於財務指標增量資訊的研究，經濟評論，第4期：124-130。
吳國萍，2008，上市公司資訊披露違規問題研究，吉林大學企業管理系博士論文。
周峻山，2006，對上市公司大股東違規行為的分析及對策思考，社會科學戰線，第4期：301-302。
馬金城與王磊，2009，系族控制人掏空與支持上市公司的博弈——基於複星系的案例研究，第122期：150-163。
陳關亭，2007，我國上市公司財務報告舞弊因素的實證分析，審計研究，第5期：91- 96。
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.010.2019.F07en_US