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題名 CD&A語調與Say-on-Pay制度之關聯性
Association between CD&A Tone and the Say-on-Pay Provision
作者 李佩儒
Lee, Pei-Ju
貢獻者 陳宇紳
李佩儒
Lee, Pei-Ju
關鍵詞 薪酬發言權制度
語調
薪酬討論及分析
薪酬績效敏感度
Say-on-Pay
Tone
CD&A
Pay-performance sensitivity
日期 2019
上傳時間 1-Jul-2019 10:42:30 (UTC+8)
摘要 薪酬發言權制度(Say-on-Pay)賦予股東可對高階主管的薪酬表示支持或反對意見的權利，該投票的結果會對公司的經營構成壓力。薪酬討論及分析(Compensation Discussion & Analysis, CD&A)對於高階主管薪酬的制定有詳盡的解釋，影響了股東對公司薪酬計畫的認知進而影響投票的結果。\n本篇研究主要探討Say-on-Pay制度對CD&A語調的影響，以及探討Say-on-Pay是否會對CD&A語調和CEO薪酬績效敏感度的關係產生影響。本研究以S&P 500公司作為樣本，樣本期間為2006年至2009年與2012年至2015年。實證結果顯示CD&A語調在Say-on-Pay制度實施後變得更負面，並且發現CD&A語調與薪酬績效敏感度在Say-on-Pay制度後為負向關係，顯示公司在Say-on-Pay後更會操控CD&A的語調以影響股東對薪酬的認知，本研究更進一步發現報酬較低、管理權較強、獨董比率較低以及董事會規模較小的公司有更強的動機操控語調以合理化其薪酬績效關係。
Say-on-Pay provision entitles shareholders to exercise advisory vote on executive compensation program. Either a loss in the Say-on-Pay vote or even a marginal pass is costly to firms because of investor outrage and potential litigation risk. Thus, firms have incentives to manage contents illustrated in Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in order to influence shareholders’ perception about the compensation program with a goal of affecting shareholders’ voting decisions. In this study, I investigate the effect of Say-on-Pay provision on CD&A tone and whether Say-on-Pay affects the relation between CD&A tone and pay performance. I conduct tests using a sample of S&P 500 companies in the pre- and post-Say-on-Pay regimes.\nThe results show that tone in CD&A tends to be more negative after the implementation of Say-on-Pay and is negatively related to pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay period. These findings are consistent with my conjecture that Say-on-Pay provides incentives for firms to manage CD&A tone to manipulate shareholder’s perceptions about the alignment between firm performance and CEO compensation. Furthermore, I find that firms with lower ROA, greater managerial ownership, less independent board, and larger board are more likely to manipulate tone to justify pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay regime. Overall, this study provides some regulatory implications for Say-on-Pay regulation.
參考文獻 Aggarwal, R. K., and A. A. Samwick. 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Finance 54(6): 1999-2043.\nBalsam, S., J. Boone, H. Liu, and J. Yin. 2016. The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 35(2): 162-191.\nBebchuk, L.A., and J. M. Fried. 2003 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3): 71-92\nBizjak, J. M., J. A. Brickley, and J. L.Coles. 1993. Stock-based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1): 349-372\nBurns, N. and K. Minnick. 2013. Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States. Financial Review 48(2): 233-258.\nBrunarski, K. R., T. C. Campbell, and Y. S. Harman. 2015. Evidence on the Outcome of Say-On-Pay Votes: How Managers, Directors, and Shareholders Respond. Journal of Corporate Finance 30: 132-149\nCai, J., and R. A. Walkling. 2011. Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46(02): 299-339.\nChen, H., D. Jeter, and Y. W Yang. 2015. Pay-performance Sensitivity Before and After SOX. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 34(1): 52-73.\nCichello, M. S. 2005. The Impact of Firm Size on Pay–performance Sensitivities. Journal of Corporate Finance 11(4): 609-627\nCore, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3): 371-406\nCuñat, V., M. Giné, and M. Guadalupe. 2016. Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance. Review of Finance 20 (5): 1799–1834\nDavis, A., and I. Tama-Sweet. 2012. Managers’ use of Language Across Alternative Disclosure Outlets: Earnings Press Releases versus MD&A. Contemporary Accounting Research 29: 804–837.\nDavis, A., J. Piger, and L. Sedor. 2012. Beyond the Numbers: Managers’ use of Optimistic and Pessimistic Tone in Earnings Press Releases. Contemporary Accounting Research 29: 845–868.\nErtimur, Y., F. Ferri, and D. Oesch. 2013. Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay. Journal of Accounting Research 51(5): 951-996\nFahlenbrach, R. 2009. Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation. Review of Finance 13(1) 81-113\nFeldman, R., S. Govindaraj, J. Livnat, and B. Segal. 2009. Management’s Tone Change, Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals. Review of Accounting Studies 15: 915–953.\nFinkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes. Strategic Management Journal 10: 121–134.\nFrydman, C. and D. Jenter. 2010. CEO Compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2: 75-102.\nHenry, E. 2008. Are Investors Influenced by How Earnings Press Releases Are Written? Journal of Business Communication 45: 363–407.\nHuang, X., S. H. Teoh, and Y. Zhang. 2014. Tone Management. The Accounting Review 89(3): 1083-1113\nHwang, BH. and S. Kim. 2009. It Pays to Have Friends. Journal of Financial Economics 93(1):138-158\nJackson, S. B., T. J. Lopez, and A. L. Reitenga. 2008. Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus Compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27(5): 374-393.\nJensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360\nJensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-264\nJohn, T. A and K. John. 1993. Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure. Journal of finance 48(3): 949-974\nKimbro, M.B. and D. Xu. 2016. Shareholders Have a Say in Executive Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 35(1): 19-42\nKothari, S., X. Li, and J. Short. 2009. The Effect of Disclosures by Management, Analysts, and Financial Press on the Equity Cost of Capital: A Study Using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review 84: 1639–1670.\nLaksmana, I., W. Tietz, and Y. W. Yang. 2012. Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A): Readability and Management Obfuscation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31(2): 185-203\nLeone, A. J., J. S. Wu, and J. L. Zimmerman. 2006. Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Stock Returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1): 167-192.\nLewellen, W. and B. Huntsman.1970. Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance. American Economic Review 60(4): 710-20.\nLi, F. 2008. Annual Report Readability, Current Earnings, and Earnings Persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(23), 221-247\nLi, F. 2010. The Information Content of Forward‐Looking Statements in Corporate Filings—A Naïve Bayesian Machine Learning Approach. Journal of Accounting Research 48(5): 1049-1102\nLipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance. Business Lawyer 48, 59–77.\nLoughran, T. and B. McDonald. 2011. When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks. Journal of Finance 66: 35–65.\nMangen, C. and M. Magnan. 2012. ‘‘Say on Pay”: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Academy of Management Executive 26 (2), 86–104.\nMehran, H. 1995. Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38(2):163-184\nMurphy, K. J. 1985. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7:11-42\nPrice, S., J. S. Doran, D. R. Peterson, and B. A. Bliss. 2012. Earnings Conference Calls and Stock Returns: The Incremental Informativeness of Textual Tone. Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 992–1011.\nRogers, J., A. Van Buskirk, and S. Zechman. 2011. Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation. The Accounting Review 86(6): 2155-2183\nSchaefer S., 1998.The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm. Review of Economics and Statistics 80(3): 436-443\nSemler Brossy Consulting Group, LLC, 2018. 2018 Say on Pay and Proxy Results. Available at https://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2018-SOP-Report-06-06-2018.pdf\nSmith, C. W. and R. L. Watts. 1992. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32(3): 263-292\nTetlock, P. 2007. Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market. Journal of Finance 62: 1139–1167.\nYermack, D. 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185–211.\nWeisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353106
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353106
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳宇紳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李佩儒zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lee, Pei-Juen_US
dc.creator (作者) 李佩儒zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lee, Pei-Juen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2019 10:42:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2019 10:42:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2019 10:42:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353106en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=142581-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353106zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 薪酬發言權制度(Say-on-Pay)賦予股東可對高階主管的薪酬表示支持或反對意見的權利，該投票的結果會對公司的經營構成壓力。薪酬討論及分析(Compensation Discussion & Analysis, CD&A)對於高階主管薪酬的制定有詳盡的解釋，影響了股東對公司薪酬計畫的認知進而影響投票的結果。\n本篇研究主要探討Say-on-Pay制度對CD&A語調的影響，以及探討Say-on-Pay是否會對CD&A語調和CEO薪酬績效敏感度的關係產生影響。本研究以S&P 500公司作為樣本，樣本期間為2006年至2009年與2012年至2015年。實證結果顯示CD&A語調在Say-on-Pay制度實施後變得更負面，並且發現CD&A語調與薪酬績效敏感度在Say-on-Pay制度後為負向關係，顯示公司在Say-on-Pay後更會操控CD&A的語調以影響股東對薪酬的認知，本研究更進一步發現報酬較低、管理權較強、獨董比率較低以及董事會規模較小的公司有更強的動機操控語調以合理化其薪酬績效關係。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Say-on-Pay provision entitles shareholders to exercise advisory vote on executive compensation program. Either a loss in the Say-on-Pay vote or even a marginal pass is costly to firms because of investor outrage and potential litigation risk. Thus, firms have incentives to manage contents illustrated in Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in order to influence shareholders’ perception about the compensation program with a goal of affecting shareholders’ voting decisions. In this study, I investigate the effect of Say-on-Pay provision on CD&A tone and whether Say-on-Pay affects the relation between CD&A tone and pay performance. I conduct tests using a sample of S&P 500 companies in the pre- and post-Say-on-Pay regimes.\nThe results show that tone in CD&A tends to be more negative after the implementation of Say-on-Pay and is negatively related to pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay period. These findings are consistent with my conjecture that Say-on-Pay provides incentives for firms to manage CD&A tone to manipulate shareholder’s perceptions about the alignment between firm performance and CEO compensation. Furthermore, I find that firms with lower ROA, greater managerial ownership, less independent board, and larger board are more likely to manipulate tone to justify pay performance in the post-Say-on-Pay regime. Overall, this study provides some regulatory implications for Say-on-Pay regulation.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents List of Tables II\n1. Introduction 1\n2. Literature Review 4\n2.1 Executive Compensation 4\n2.2 Institutional Background of Say-on-Pay Provision 5\n2.3 Research on Say-on-Pay Provision 6\n2.4 Literature Review in Textual Analysis 8\n3. Hypothesis Development 10\n4. Data and Research Design 13\n4.1 Sample and Data 13\n4.2 Research Design 14\n4.2.1 Regression Model 1 14\n4.2.2 Regression Model 2 17\n5. Results 20\n5.1 Descriptive Statistics 20\n5.2 Correlation Analysis 20\n5.3 Empirical Results 24\n5.3.1 The Effect of SOP on Tone 24\n5.3.2 The Effect of SOP on the Relation between Tone and Pay Performance 26\n5.4 Additional Analyses 29\n6. Robustness Tests 35\n7. Conclusion 38\nReference 40\nAppendix: Variable Definition 43zh_TW
dc.format.extent 496414 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353106en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬發言權制度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 語調zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬討論及分析zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬績效敏感度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Say-on-Payen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Toneen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CD&Aen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Pay-performance sensitivityen_US
dc.title (題名) CD&A語調與Say-on-Pay制度之關聯性zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Association between CD&A Tone and the Say-on-Pay Provisionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aggarwal, R. K., and A. A. Samwick. 1999. Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Finance 54(6): 1999-2043.\nBalsam, S., J. Boone, H. Liu, and J. Yin. 2016. The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 35(2): 162-191.\nBebchuk, L.A., and J. M. Fried. 2003 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3): 71-92\nBizjak, J. M., J. A. Brickley, and J. L.Coles. 1993. Stock-based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1): 349-372\nBurns, N. and K. Minnick. 2013. Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States. Financial Review 48(2): 233-258.\nBrunarski, K. R., T. C. Campbell, and Y. S. Harman. 2015. Evidence on the Outcome of Say-On-Pay Votes: How Managers, Directors, and Shareholders Respond. Journal of Corporate Finance 30: 132-149\nCai, J., and R. A. Walkling. 2011. Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It Create Value? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46(02): 299-339.\nChen, H., D. Jeter, and Y. W Yang. 2015. Pay-performance Sensitivity Before and After SOX. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 34(1): 52-73.\nCichello, M. S. 2005. The Impact of Firm Size on Pay–performance Sensitivities. Journal of Corporate Finance 11(4): 609-627\nCore, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3): 371-406\nCuñat, V., M. Giné, and M. Guadalupe. 2016. Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance. Review of Finance 20 (5): 1799–1834\nDavis, A., and I. Tama-Sweet. 2012. Managers’ use of Language Across Alternative Disclosure Outlets: Earnings Press Releases versus MD&A. Contemporary Accounting Research 29: 804–837.\nDavis, A., J. Piger, and L. Sedor. 2012. Beyond the Numbers: Managers’ use of Optimistic and Pessimistic Tone in Earnings Press Releases. Contemporary Accounting Research 29: 845–868.\nErtimur, Y., F. Ferri, and D. Oesch. 2013. Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay. Journal of Accounting Research 51(5): 951-996\nFahlenbrach, R. 2009. Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation. Review of Finance 13(1) 81-113\nFeldman, R., S. Govindaraj, J. Livnat, and B. Segal. 2009. Management’s Tone Change, Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals. Review of Accounting Studies 15: 915–953.\nFinkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick. 1989. Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Processes. Strategic Management Journal 10: 121–134.\nFrydman, C. and D. Jenter. 2010. CEO Compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2: 75-102.\nHenry, E. 2008. Are Investors Influenced by How Earnings Press Releases Are Written? Journal of Business Communication 45: 363–407.\nHuang, X., S. H. Teoh, and Y. Zhang. 2014. Tone Management. The Accounting Review 89(3): 1083-1113\nHwang, BH. and S. Kim. 2009. It Pays to Have Friends. Journal of Financial Economics 93(1):138-158\nJackson, S. B., T. J. Lopez, and A. L. Reitenga. 2008. Accounting Fundamentals and CEO Bonus Compensation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27(5): 374-393.\nJensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360\nJensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-264\nJohn, T. A and K. John. 1993. Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure. Journal of finance 48(3): 949-974\nKimbro, M.B. and D. Xu. 2016. Shareholders Have a Say in Executive Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 35(1): 19-42\nKothari, S., X. Li, and J. Short. 2009. The Effect of Disclosures by Management, Analysts, and Financial Press on the Equity Cost of Capital: A Study Using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review 84: 1639–1670.\nLaksmana, I., W. Tietz, and Y. W. Yang. 2012. Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A): Readability and Management Obfuscation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31(2): 185-203\nLeone, A. J., J. S. Wu, and J. L. Zimmerman. 2006. Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Stock Returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(1): 167-192.\nLewellen, W. and B. Huntsman.1970. Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance. American Economic Review 60(4): 710-20.\nLi, F. 2008. Annual Report Readability, Current Earnings, and Earnings Persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45(23), 221-247\nLi, F. 2010. The Information Content of Forward‐Looking Statements in Corporate Filings—A Naïve Bayesian Machine Learning Approach. Journal of Accounting Research 48(5): 1049-1102\nLipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance. Business Lawyer 48, 59–77.\nLoughran, T. and B. McDonald. 2011. When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks. Journal of Finance 66: 35–65.\nMangen, C. and M. Magnan. 2012. ‘‘Say on Pay”: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Academy of Management Executive 26 (2), 86–104.\nMehran, H. 1995. Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38(2):163-184\nMurphy, K. J. 1985. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7:11-42\nPrice, S., J. S. Doran, D. R. Peterson, and B. A. Bliss. 2012. Earnings Conference Calls and Stock Returns: The Incremental Informativeness of Textual Tone. Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 992–1011.\nRogers, J., A. Van Buskirk, and S. Zechman. 2011. Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation. The Accounting Review 86(6): 2155-2183\nSchaefer S., 1998.The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm. Review of Economics and Statistics 80(3): 436-443\nSemler Brossy Consulting Group, LLC, 2018. 2018 Say on Pay and Proxy Results. Available at https://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2018-SOP-Report-06-06-2018.pdf\nSmith, C. W. and R. L. Watts. 1992. The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32(3): 263-292\nTetlock, P. 2007. Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market. Journal of Finance 62: 1139–1167.\nYermack, D. 1996. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: 185–211.\nWeisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900046en_US