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題名 寡占競爭、環境管制與利益團體
Three essays on oligopolistic competition, environmental regulation, and interest groups作者 施惠敏
Shih, Hui-Min貢獻者 賴育邦
Lai, Yu-Bong
施惠敏
Shih, Hui-Min關鍵詞 政治捐獻
環境管制
利益團體
Political contributions
Environmental regulation
Interest groups日期 2019 上傳時間 1-Jul-2019 11:03:44 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文建構一個兩國三地的寡占模型，容許兩國廠商的污染減量成本可以不同，且廠商會遊說政府以獲得有利的環境政策。在廠商間進行數量競爭、生產的產品為同質的情況下，我們發現，當兩國廠商為成本同質，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數較高者，制定的污染排放標準將較寬鬆。而在兩國廠商成本為異質的情況下，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，當該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高時，政府會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，只要成本差異較大，或成本差異較小且環境損害係數小於一定值，政府會依然制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準，惟若成本差異較小，但環境損害係數大於一定值，縱使該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高，政府反而會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。而在兩國廠商成本相同，但產品為異質的情況下，我們發現，不論兩國廠商係進行數量競爭或價格競爭，若兩國政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相同，兩國政府制定的污染排放標準相等。若政府對於利益團體給予的權數不同，則政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；而政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。
This dissertation constructs a third-market model with oligopolistic competition. In the model, the firms may have different pollution abatement costs, and they can lobby for the governments to obtain favorable regulations. I find that, in the case with Cournot competition and homogeneous goods, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. The same result occurs, when a country’s firm has higher abatement costs, provided that its government attaches a larger weight to the political contribution. However, when the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, the difference in the abatement costs between firms and a sufficiently large marginal environmental damage will lead the government to select a more severe regulation.In the case with heterogeneous products and same abatement costs, I find that, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. However, if the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, then it will choose a more stringent regulation. The same result holds in both Cournot and Bertrand competition model.參考文獻 林瑞益、孫嘉宏(2017)。整合型市場之下的混合雙占－價格與數量競爭。經濟研究，53:2, 261-294。湯馬斯．佛里曼(2008)。世界又熱、又平、又擠：全球暖化、能源耗竭、人口爆炸危機下的新經濟革命(丘羽先、李欣容、許貴運、童一寧、黃笑如、楊舒琄、蔡菁芳、顧淑馨譯)。台北市：天下遠見出版股份有限公司。賴育邦（2005）。利益團體、工資談判與環境政策。農業與經濟，35，87-115。賴育邦、王嘉慧(2004)。關稅政策、環境政策與福利效果之分析。經濟研究，40:1, 1-31。Barrett, S. (1994).Strategic environmental policy and international trade. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325-338.Bernheim, B., and Whinston, M. (1986). Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.Brander, J. A., and Spencer, B. J. (1985). Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.Cheng, C. C., and Lai, Y. B. (2012). Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective. Resource and Energy Economics, 34, 431-441.Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and List, J. A. (2003). Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 46, 490-512.Dastidar, K. G. (1997). Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market. Journal of Economic Theory, 75(1), 205-212.Dixit, A. (1979). A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 20-32.Eaton, J., and Grossman, G. M. (1986). Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.Fredriksson, P. G. (1997). Environmental policy choice: pollution abatement subsidies. Resource and Energy Economics, 20, 51-63.Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E.(1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 84(4), 833-850.Häckner, J. (2000). A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies. Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233-239.Klemperer, P., and Meyer, M. (1986). Price competition vs. quantity competition: The role of uncertainty. Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 618-638.Klette, T. J. (1994). Strategic trade policy for exporting industries: more general results in the oligopolistic case. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 296-310.Kreps, D. M. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory (325). Princeton University Press.Lai, Y. B. (2007).The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations. Public Choice, 133, 57-72.Qiu, L. D. (1997). On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 213-229.Singh, N., and Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546-54.Sturm, D. M., and Ulph, A. (2002). Environment and trade: the implications of imperfect information and political economy. World Trade Review, 1(3), 235-256.Schleich, J. (1999). Environmental quality with endogenous domestic and trade policies. European Journal of Political Economy, 15, 53-71.Schleich, J., and Orden, D. (2000). Environmental quality and industry protection with noncooperative versus cooperative domestic and trade policies. Review of International Economics, 8(4), 681-697.Tremblay, C. H., and Tremblay, V. J. (2011). The Cournot-Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation. Economics Letters, 111(3), 233-235.Ulph, A. (1996). Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265-281.Walz, U., and Wellisch, D. (1997). Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?. Journal of Public Economics, 66, 275-291. 描述 博士
國立政治大學
財政學系
99255501資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099255501 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 賴育邦 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lai, Yu-Bong en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 施惠敏 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Shih, Hui-Min en_US dc.creator (作者) 施惠敏 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Shih, Hui-Min en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2019 11:03:44 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Jul-2019 11:03:44 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2019 11:03:44 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0099255501 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124216 - dc.description (描述) 博士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 99255501 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文建構一個兩國三地的寡占模型，容許兩國廠商的污染減量成本可以不同，且廠商會遊說政府以獲得有利的環境政策。在廠商間進行數量競爭、生產的產品為同質的情況下，我們發現，當兩國廠商為成本同質，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數較高者，制定的污染排放標準將較寬鬆。而在兩國廠商成本為異質的情況下，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，當該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高時，政府會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，只要成本差異較大，或成本差異較小且環境損害係數小於一定值，政府會依然制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準，惟若成本差異較小，但環境損害係數大於一定值，縱使該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高，政府反而會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。而在兩國廠商成本相同，但產品為異質的情況下，我們發現，不論兩國廠商係進行數量競爭或價格競爭，若兩國政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相同，兩國政府制定的污染排放標準相等。若政府對於利益團體給予的權數不同，則政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；而政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This dissertation constructs a third-market model with oligopolistic competition. In the model, the firms may have different pollution abatement costs, and they can lobby for the governments to obtain favorable regulations. I find that, in the case with Cournot competition and homogeneous goods, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. The same result occurs, when a country’s firm has higher abatement costs, provided that its government attaches a larger weight to the political contribution. However, when the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, the difference in the abatement costs between firms and a sufficiently large marginal environmental damage will lead the government to select a more severe regulation.In the case with heterogeneous products and same abatement costs, I find that, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. However, if the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, then it will choose a more stringent regulation. The same result holds in both Cournot and Bertrand competition model. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究方法 2第三節 本文架構 3第二章 文獻回顧 4第一節 兩國三地模型與政府環境政策 4第二節 利益團體與政府環境政策 6第三章 異質成本廠商、環境管制與利益團體 9第一節 前言 9第二節 基本假設 9第三節 異質成本廠商的最大化行為分析 10第四節 均衡政策 11第五節 廠商成本同質與均衡政策 14第六節 廠商成本異質之均衡政策 16第七節 本章結論 19第四章 價格競爭、環境管制與利益團體 21第一節 前言 21第二節 基本假設 21第三節 廠商行為 22第四節 均衡政策 24第五節 本章結論 28第五章 數量競爭、環境管制與利益團體 30第一節 前言 30第二節 基本假設 30第三節 廠商行為 31第四節 均衡政策 33第五節 本章結論 37第六章 結論、政策意涵與未來研究方向 39第一節 結論 39第二節 政策意涵與未來研究方向 40附錄 44參考文獻 47 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1208038 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099255501 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政治捐獻 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境管制 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 利益團體 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Political contributions en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Environmental regulation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Interest groups en_US dc.title (題名) 寡占競爭、環境管制與利益團體 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Three essays on oligopolistic competition, environmental regulation, and interest groups en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 林瑞益、孫嘉宏(2017)。整合型市場之下的混合雙占－價格與數量競爭。經濟研究，53:2, 261-294。湯馬斯．佛里曼(2008)。世界又熱、又平、又擠：全球暖化、能源耗竭、人口爆炸危機下的新經濟革命(丘羽先、李欣容、許貴運、童一寧、黃笑如、楊舒琄、蔡菁芳、顧淑馨譯)。台北市：天下遠見出版股份有限公司。賴育邦（2005）。利益團體、工資談判與環境政策。農業與經濟，35，87-115。賴育邦、王嘉慧(2004)。關稅政策、環境政策與福利效果之分析。經濟研究，40:1, 1-31。Barrett, S. (1994).Strategic environmental policy and international trade. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325-338.Bernheim, B., and Whinston, M. (1986). Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1-31.Brander, J. A., and Spencer, B. J. (1985). Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.Cheng, C. C., and Lai, Y. B. (2012). Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective. Resource and Energy Economics, 34, 431-441.Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and List, J. A. (2003). Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , 46, 490-512.Dastidar, K. G. (1997). Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a homogeneous product market. Journal of Economic Theory, 75(1), 205-212.Dixit, A. (1979). A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 20-32.Eaton, J., and Grossman, G. M. (1986). Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.Fredriksson, P. G. (1997). Environmental policy choice: pollution abatement subsidies. Resource and Energy Economics, 20, 51-63.Grossman, G. M., and Helpman, E.(1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review, 84(4), 833-850.Häckner, J. (2000). A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies. Journal of Economic Theory, 93, 233-239.Klemperer, P., and Meyer, M. (1986). Price competition vs. quantity competition: The role of uncertainty. Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 618-638.Klette, T. J. (1994). Strategic trade policy for exporting industries: more general results in the oligopolistic case. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 296-310.Kreps, D. M. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory (325). Princeton University Press.Lai, Y. B. (2007).The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations. Public Choice, 133, 57-72.Qiu, L. D. (1997). On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 213-229.Singh, N., and Vives, X. (1984). Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 546-54.Sturm, D. M., and Ulph, A. (2002). Environment and trade: the implications of imperfect information and political economy. World Trade Review, 1(3), 235-256.Schleich, J. (1999). Environmental quality with endogenous domestic and trade policies. European Journal of Political Economy, 15, 53-71.Schleich, J., and Orden, D. (2000). Environmental quality and industry protection with noncooperative versus cooperative domestic and trade policies. Review of International Economics, 8(4), 681-697.Tremblay, C. H., and Tremblay, V. J. (2011). The Cournot-Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation. Economics Letters, 111(3), 233-235.Ulph, A. (1996). Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265-281.Walz, U., and Wellisch, D. (1997). Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?. Journal of Public Economics, 66, 275-291. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/DIS.NCCU.PF.001.2019.F07 en_US
