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題名 Common Interests and Two-Level Game Theory in the South China Sea Dispute
作者 吳崇涵
Wu, Charles Chong-Han
貢獻者 外交系
關鍵詞 interest ; peace ; cross-Strait relations ; two-level game theory ; South China Sea
日期 2016-07
上傳時間 2-Aug-2019 16:09:12 (UTC+8)
摘要 Previous studies already demonstrate that interest indicators from realists demonstrate significant results between interstate conflict and states’ interests. By investigating cross-Strait relations, this paper suggests that the deepening of both political and economic interests boosts the political will to implement peaceful talks for the China-Taiwan dyad. However, the exchange of opinions and cooperation based on the common interests did not provide the cross-Strait relations any further stability during Ma’s second presidency. In contrast, the social split and contesting politics in Taiwan slowed down the cooperation between Beijing and Taipei. Since international and domestic politics affect each other, we need to apply Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory to investigate if there are any interactions between the power and preferences of the major actors at their domestic level, especially on domestic constituents’ preferences. The author uses the 2014 Sun Flower Movement in Taiwan and the South China Sea issue to illustrate the importance of aggregation of states’ interests between Beijing and Taipei, and argues that the maintenance of status-quo on the South China Sea issue may provide more stability to the cross-Strait relations.
關聯 American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol.23, pp.145-157
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 外交系
dc.creator (作者) 吳崇涵
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Charles Chong-Han
dc.date (日期) 2016-07
dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2019 16:09:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Aug-2019 16:09:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2019 16:09:12 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124583-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Previous studies already demonstrate that interest indicators from realists demonstrate significant results between interstate conflict and states’ interests. By investigating cross-Strait relations, this paper suggests that the deepening of both political and economic interests boosts the political will to implement peaceful talks for the China-Taiwan dyad. However, the exchange of opinions and cooperation based on the common interests did not provide the cross-Strait relations any further stability during Ma’s second presidency. In contrast, the social split and contesting politics in Taiwan slowed down the cooperation between Beijing and Taipei. Since international and domestic politics affect each other, we need to apply Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory to investigate if there are any interactions between the power and preferences of the major actors at their domestic level, especially on domestic constituents’ preferences. The author uses the 2014 Sun Flower Movement in Taiwan and the South China Sea issue to illustrate the importance of aggregation of states’ interests between Beijing and Taipei, and argues that the maintenance of status-quo on the South China Sea issue may provide more stability to the cross-Strait relations.
dc.format.extent 351402 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.relation (關聯) American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol.23, pp.145-157
dc.subject (關鍵詞) interest ; peace ; cross-Strait relations ; two-level game theory ; South China Sea
dc.title (題名) Common Interests and Two-Level Game Theory in the South China Sea Dispute
dc.type (資料類型) article