1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. College of Commerce
  4. Theses
  5. Item

學術產出-Theses

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 高階經理人績效目標之期中衡量對棘輪現象的影響
The impact of interim bonus targets on ratcheting
作者 劉玉筑
Liu, Yu-Zhu
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
劉玉筑
Liu, Yu-Zhu
關鍵詞 棘輪現象
績效目標設定
季度績效目標
半年度績效目標
CEO獎酬
Ratcheting
Target revision
Quarterly bonus
Semi-annual bonus
CEO compensation
日期 2019
上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 15:52:41 (UTC+8)
摘要 過去許多研究皆探討高階經理人年度績效目標中的棘輪現象，但是少有文獻有針對高階經理人季度績效目標或半年度的績效目標做出相關討論。本研究以S&P 1500公司中CEO的季度或半年度績效目標做為樣本進行分析。實證結果發現，CEO季度或半年度的績效目標呈現兩種模式的棘輪現象。薪酬委員會於修訂CEO目標時，會同時將上季(半年)與去年同季(半年)的績效表現納入考量之中。除此之外，CEO季度或半年度績效目標棘輪的程度，會受到公司的季節性與其CEO是否接近退休年齡所影響。總括而言，本研究首次提供了關於高階經理人季度或半年度績效目標棘輪的實證證據。
Research in ratcheting has focused on executives’ annual performance targets. However, little research examine ratcheting in targets that measured quarterly or semi-annually. Using performance target data from CEOs with quarterly or semi-annual bonus plans in S&P 1500 firms, I find that CEOs’ performance information from the last quarter (or half-a-year) and from the same quarter (or half-a-year) last year are both incorporated in their target revision. Furthermore, the extent of target ratcheting varies with the degree of firms’ seasonality and CEO horizon. Overall, this study provides the first empirical evidence of ratcheting in quarterly and semi-annual targets.
參考文獻 Anderson, S. W., H. C. Dekker, and K. L. Sedatole. 2010. An empirical examination of goals and performance-to-goal following the introduction of an incentive bonus plan with participative goal setting. Management Science 56 (1): 90–109.
Aranda, C., J. Arellano, and A. Davila. 2014. Ratcheting and the role of relative target setting. The Accounting Review 89 (July): 1197–226.
Bol, J. C., T. M. Keune, E. M. Matsumura, and J. Y. Shin. 2010. Supervisor discretion in target setting: An empirical investigation. The Accounting Review 85 (November): 1861–86.
Bol, J. C., and J. Lill. 2015. Performance target revisions in incentive contracts: Do information and trust reduce ratcheting and the ratchet effect? The Accounting Review 90 (September): 1755–78.
Bouwens, J., and P. Kroos. 2011. Target ratcheting and effort reduction. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (February): 171-85.
Casas-Arce, P., Holzhacker, M., Mahlendorf, M. D., and Matějka, M. 2018 Relative Performance Evaluation and the Ratchet Effect. Contemporary Accounting Research 35 (Winter) : 1702–1731.
Cheng, S. J. 2004. R&D expenditure and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review 79 (2): 305–28.
Dekker, H. C., T. Groot, and M. Schoute. 2012. Determining performance targets. Behavioral Research in Accounting 24 (July): 21–46.
Huson, M. R., Tian, Y., Wiedman, C. I., & Wier, H. A. 2012. Compensation committees’ treatment of earnings components in CEOs’ terminal years. The Accounting Review 87 (1): 231–259.
Indjejikian, R. J., and D. Nanda. 2002. Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performance standards. The Accounting Review 77 (October): 793–819.
Indjejikian, R. J., M. Matějka, K. A. Merchant, and W. A. Van der Stede. 2014a. Earnings targets and annual bonus incentives. The Accounting Review 89 (February): 1227–58.
Indjejikian, R. J., M. Matějka, and J. D. Schloetzer. 2014b. Target ratcheting and incentives: Theory, evidence, and new opportunities. The Accounting Review 89 (4): 1259–67.
Jensen, M., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98 (April): 225-264.
Kalyta, P. 2009. Accounting discretion, horizon problem, and CEO retirement benefits. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1553–73.
Kim S, Shin J. 2017. Executive bonus target ratcheting: Evidence from the new executive compensation disclosure rules. Contemporary Accounting Research 34 (December): 1843-1879.
Kwon, S., S. Choi, S. Kim, and J. Shin. 2018. The Use of External Performance Expectations in the Target Setting of Executive Annual Bonus Contracts. Working paper, Seoul National University.
Leone, A. J., and S. Rock. 2002. Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers’ discretionary accrual choices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (February): 43-67.
Matsunaga S, Park C (2001) The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review 76(3):313-332.
Merchant, K. A., and W. A. Van der Stede. 2012. Management Control Systems: Performance measurement, Evaluation and Incentives. 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Murphy, K. 2001. Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (December): 245-78.
Salamon, G. L. & Stober, T. L. 1994. Cross-quarter differences in stock price responses to earnings announcements: Fourth-quarter and seasonality influences. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (Fall): 297–330
Smith, C, and R. Watts. 1982. Incentive and tax effects of executive compensation plans. Australian Journal of Management 1 (2): 139-157.
Taylor, L. A. 2013. CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model. Journal of Financial Economics 108 (1): 79–98.
Weitzman, M. L. 1980. The ‘ratchet principle’ and performance incentives. The Bell Journal of Economics 11 (Spring): 302-8.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353004
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353004
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 劉玉筑zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Liu, Yu-Zhuen_US
dc.creator (作者) 劉玉筑zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liu, Yu-Zhuen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 15:52:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 15:52:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 15:52:41 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353004en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124653-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353004zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 過去許多研究皆探討高階經理人年度績效目標中的棘輪現象，但是少有文獻有針對高階經理人季度績效目標或半年度的績效目標做出相關討論。本研究以S&P 1500公司中CEO的季度或半年度績效目標做為樣本進行分析。實證結果發現，CEO季度或半年度的績效目標呈現兩種模式的棘輪現象。薪酬委員會於修訂CEO目標時，會同時將上季(半年)與去年同季(半年)的績效表現納入考量之中。除此之外，CEO季度或半年度績效目標棘輪的程度，會受到公司的季節性與其CEO是否接近退休年齡所影響。總括而言，本研究首次提供了關於高階經理人季度或半年度績效目標棘輪的實證證據。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Research in ratcheting has focused on executives’ annual performance targets. However, little research examine ratcheting in targets that measured quarterly or semi-annually. Using performance target data from CEOs with quarterly or semi-annual bonus plans in S&P 1500 firms, I find that CEOs’ performance information from the last quarter (or half-a-year) and from the same quarter (or half-a-year) last year are both incorporated in their target revision. Furthermore, the extent of target ratcheting varies with the degree of firms’ seasonality and CEO horizon. Overall, this study provides the first empirical evidence of ratcheting in quarterly and semi-annual targets.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 1
2. Background and hypotheses development 4
2.1. Hypotheses 1 and 2: Target ratcheting 6
2.2. Hypotheses 3 and 4: Asymmetric ratcheting 7
3. Research design 10
3.1. Sample selection 10
3.2. Variable measurement 17
3.3. Empirical model 18
4. Research results 21
4.1. Descriptive statistics 21
4.2. Test of target ratcheting: Hypotheses 1 and 2 27
4.3. Test of the asymmetry of target ratcheting: Hypotheses 3 and 4 31
5. Additional analysis: determinants of target ratcheting 37
6. Conclusion 41
Appendix 1. Performance measures 43
Appendix 2. Variable definitions 45
References 47		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1281395 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353004en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 棘輪現象zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 績效目標設定zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 季度績效目標zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 半年度績效目標zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO獎酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Ratchetingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Target revisionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Quarterly bonusen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Semi-annual bonusen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO compensationen_US
dc.title (題名) 高階經理人績效目標之期中衡量對棘輪現象的影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The impact of interim bonus targets on ratchetingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Anderson, S. W., H. C. Dekker, and K. L. Sedatole. 2010. An empirical examination of goals and performance-to-goal following the introduction of an incentive bonus plan with participative goal setting. Management Science 56 (1): 90–109.
Aranda, C., J. Arellano, and A. Davila. 2014. Ratcheting and the role of relative target setting. The Accounting Review 89 (July): 1197–226.
Bol, J. C., T. M. Keune, E. M. Matsumura, and J. Y. Shin. 2010. Supervisor discretion in target setting: An empirical investigation. The Accounting Review 85 (November): 1861–86.
Bol, J. C., and J. Lill. 2015. Performance target revisions in incentive contracts: Do information and trust reduce ratcheting and the ratchet effect? The Accounting Review 90 (September): 1755–78.
Bouwens, J., and P. Kroos. 2011. Target ratcheting and effort reduction. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (February): 171-85.
Casas-Arce, P., Holzhacker, M., Mahlendorf, M. D., and Matějka, M. 2018 Relative Performance Evaluation and the Ratchet Effect. Contemporary Accounting Research 35 (Winter) : 1702–1731.
Cheng, S. J. 2004. R&D expenditure and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review 79 (2): 305–28.
Dekker, H. C., T. Groot, and M. Schoute. 2012. Determining performance targets. Behavioral Research in Accounting 24 (July): 21–46.
Huson, M. R., Tian, Y., Wiedman, C. I., & Wier, H. A. 2012. Compensation committees’ treatment of earnings components in CEOs’ terminal years. The Accounting Review 87 (1): 231–259.
Indjejikian, R. J., and D. Nanda. 2002. Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performance standards. The Accounting Review 77 (October): 793–819.
Indjejikian, R. J., M. Matějka, K. A. Merchant, and W. A. Van der Stede. 2014a. Earnings targets and annual bonus incentives. The Accounting Review 89 (February): 1227–58.
Indjejikian, R. J., M. Matějka, and J. D. Schloetzer. 2014b. Target ratcheting and incentives: Theory, evidence, and new opportunities. The Accounting Review 89 (4): 1259–67.
Jensen, M., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98 (April): 225-264.
Kalyta, P. 2009. Accounting discretion, horizon problem, and CEO retirement benefits. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1553–73.
Kim S, Shin J. 2017. Executive bonus target ratcheting: Evidence from the new executive compensation disclosure rules. Contemporary Accounting Research 34 (December): 1843-1879.
Kwon, S., S. Choi, S. Kim, and J. Shin. 2018. The Use of External Performance Expectations in the Target Setting of Executive Annual Bonus Contracts. Working paper, Seoul National University.
Leone, A. J., and S. Rock. 2002. Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers’ discretionary accrual choices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (February): 43-67.
Matsunaga S, Park C (2001) The effect of missing a quarterly earnings benchmark on the CEO’s annual bonus. Accounting Review 76(3):313-332.
Merchant, K. A., and W. A. Van der Stede. 2012. Management Control Systems: Performance measurement, Evaluation and Incentives. 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Murphy, K. 2001. Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (December): 245-78.
Salamon, G. L. & Stober, T. L. 1994. Cross-quarter differences in stock price responses to earnings announcements: Fourth-quarter and seasonality influences. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (Fall): 297–330
Smith, C, and R. Watts. 1982. Incentive and tax effects of executive compensation plans. Australian Journal of Management 1 (2): 139-157.
Taylor, L. A. 2013. CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model. Journal of Financial Economics 108 (1): 79–98.
Weitzman, M. L. 1980. The ‘ratchet principle’ and performance incentives. The Bell Journal of Economics 11 (Spring): 302-8.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900364en_US