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題名 高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數之影響因素
The determinants of the number of executives whose compensation been dislcosed to the publi
作者 陳玟璇
Chen, Wen-Xuan
貢獻者 梁嘉紋
陳玟璇
Chen, Wen-Xuan
關鍵詞 高階經理人薪酬
薪酬揭露
資訊揭露水準
CEO compensation
compensation disclosure
the disclosure level of compensation
日期 2019
上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 15:52:55 (UTC+8)
摘要 近年來我國高階經理人薪酬相關議題受各界高度重視，許多報章媒體紛紛出現「養肥貓」、「高階經理人薪酬資訊不透明」等討論，而我國主管機關為使高階經理人薪酬資訊透明化，亦做出許多法規修訂，然而由於法規制度的不完備，使得高階經理人薪酬資訊模糊不清。本研究以2010至2017共八年上市櫃公司為樣本，參酌過去文獻所提及影響企業資訊揭露之因素，探討影響企業高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數的因素。實證結果發現盈餘分配權、控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度及經理人內部化比率與高階經理人薪酬揭露總數呈顯著負相關，而外國機構投資人持股比率及薪酬委員會品質則與高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數呈顯著正相關。顯示當企業的所有權越集中、控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度越高，其將越傾向隱藏高階經理人薪酬資訊，而外國機構投資人及薪酬委員會等監控力量則傾向促使企業揭露更多位高階經理人薪酬資訊。本研究初步分析過去企業資訊揭露相關研究中所提及之可能影響因素與高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數之關聯性，並歸納出當企業具備何種特質時，傾向於揭露較多或較少位經理人之薪酬資訊，為我國薪酬資訊揭露品質之研究提供不同的思考方向。
The opacity of executive compensation has been a growing public concern in Taiwan and many other countries. In response to that, the authority has amended the laws and disclosure requirements several times to increase the transparency of executive compensation. Yet, the effect is still unclear. Based on a sample of Taiwan listed companies during the 2010 to 2017, This study empirically analyzes the factors that affect the disclosure of executive compensation. The empirical results suggest that the number of executives whose compensation disclosed to the public is negatively associated with the controlling owners’ cash flow rights, the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, and the ratio of insider executive. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the number of executives with compensation disclosed to the public is positively associated with foreign institutional ownership and compensation committee quality.
參考文獻 大紀元，2009.6.4，台去年虧675億 小股東怒批高鐵肥貓。
工商時報，2016.9.16，接軌國際上市櫃董監酬勞 應逐一揭露。
自由時報，2015.11.26，虧損還領高薪 議員批台中快捷巴士養一堆肥貓。
自由時報，2018.6.5，真是年薪250萬元實習生？吳音寧：我月薪14萬。
風傳媒，2018.1.5，大老闆就是這樣賺！英國調查：「肥貓」開年上班3天半，等於你我小員工苦幹一整年。
朱炫璉、陳彥綺、劉乃熒與王慧君，2017，自願性與強制性設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第13卷第2期 (12月): 269-307。
吳幸蓁、謝佳純與梁書瑋，2014，薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第10卷第2期 (12月): 135-188。
林志翔與孫大中，2017，家族企業公司治理實務，會計研究月刊，第384期 (11月): 109-113。
林宛瑩、許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第28卷第1期 (6月): 269-312。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)，貨幣觀測與信用評，第42期 (7月): 15-31。
陳瑞斌、許崇源與翁慈青，2007，公司治理架構與財務報告透明度之關聯性研究，中華管理評論國際學報，第10卷1期 (2月): 1-40。
黃銘傑，2000，公司監控與監察人制度改革論－超越“獨立董事”之迷思，台大法學論叢，第29卷第4期 (7月): 159-208。
張心悌，2006，公開發行公司高階經理人報酬決定與監督之研究，臺北大學法學論叢，第58期 (6月): 1-42。
葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化事業股份有限公司，台北。
廖益均，2014，董事及高管薪酬揭露概況－如何透過級距資料獲得額外資訊，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第108期 (7月): 35-43。
廖益興，2010，董事會組成、股權結構、年報資訊揭露水準，台大管理論叢，第20卷第2期 (6月): 209-250。
劉政准、許永聲、金凱雯，2013，企業生命週期、董事會組成特性對資訊透明度之影響，台灣管理學刊 第13卷第1期 (2月): 73-94。
Adams, R., and H. Mehran. 2003. Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies? Economic Policy Review 9 (April): 123-142.
Aggarwal, R., I. Erel, M. Ferreira, and P. Matos. 2011.Dose governance travel around the world? evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 100 (April): 154-181.
Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August): 488-500.
Ali, A., T.Y. Chen, and S. Radhakrishnan. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (September): 238-286.
Beekes, W., P. Brown, W. Zhan, and Q. Zhang. 2016. Corporate governance, companies` disclosure practices and market transparency: a cross country study. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 43 (April): 263-297.
Ben-Amar, W., D. Zeghal. 2011. Board of directors` independence and executive compensation disclosure transparency: Canadian evidence. Journal of Applied Accounting Research 12 (May): 43-60.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2006. The role of family in family firms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 73-96.
Reuer, J. J., and R. Ragozzino. 2006. Agency hazards and alliance portfolios. Strategic Management Journal 27 (January): 27-43.
Bird, A., S. A. Karolyiy. 2016. Do institutional investors demand public disclosure? The Review of Financial Studies 29 (December): 3245-3277.
Boone, A., and J. T. White. 2015. The effect of institutional ownership on firm transparency and information production. Journal of Financial Economics 117 (September): 508-533.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Ellen, and S. Abbie. 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (February): 167-201.
Chau, G. K., and S. J. Gray. 2002. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting 37: 247-265.
Chung, K. H., and H. Zhang. 2011. Corporate governance and institutional ownership. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (February): 247-273.
Croci, E., H. Gonenc, and N. Ozkan. 2012. CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in continental Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (December): 3318-3335.
Eng, L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (July–August): 325-345.
Ettredge, M., K. Johnstone, M. Stone, and Q. Wang. 2011. The effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on disclosure compliance. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (December): 866-889.
Fan, J. P.H., and T.J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (August): 401–425.
Felo, A. J. 2011. Audit committee composition, compensation committee composition, and compensation transparency. Corporate Ownership and Control 9: 477-487.
Francis, J., K. Schipper, and L. Vincent. 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (June): 329-360.
Gillan, S., and L. Starks. 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57 (August): 275-305.
Huang, R.D., and C. Y. Shiu. 2009. Local effects of foreign ownership in an emerging financial market: evidence from qualified foreign institutional investors in Taiwan. Financial Management 38 (September): 567-602.
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (September): 405-440.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-360.
Jung., K., and S. Y. Kwon. 2002. Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea. The International Journal of Accounting 37: 301-325.
Laksmana, I. 2007. Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (November): 1147-1182.
Liao, G. M., and C. Lu. 2009. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Ownership and Control 6 (January): 128-134.
Liang,J. W., M. F. Lin, and C. L. Chin. 2012. Does foreign institutional ownership motivate firms in an emerging market to increase voluntary disclosure? Evidence from Taiwan. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 39 (July): 55-76.
Liang, J. W., and C. L. Chin. 2016. Stock‐Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 43(January-February): 131-157.
Morck, R., and B. Yeung. 2003. Agency problems in large family business groups. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 27 (October): 367-382.
Sun, J., and S. F. Cahan. 2012. The economic determinants of compensation committee quality. Managerial Finance 38 (February): 188-205.
Pozen, R. C. 2010. The case for professional boards. Harvard Business Review 88 (December): 50-58.
Vafeas, N., and Z. Afxentiou. 1998. The association between the SEC’s 1992 compensation disclosure rule and executive compensation policy changes. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 17 : 27-54.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353007
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353007
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 梁嘉紋zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳玟璇zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Wen-Xuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 陳玟璇zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Chen, Wen-Xuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 15:52:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 15:52:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 15:52:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353007en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124655-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353007zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來我國高階經理人薪酬相關議題受各界高度重視，許多報章媒體紛紛出現「養肥貓」、「高階經理人薪酬資訊不透明」等討論，而我國主管機關為使高階經理人薪酬資訊透明化，亦做出許多法規修訂，然而由於法規制度的不完備，使得高階經理人薪酬資訊模糊不清。本研究以2010至2017共八年上市櫃公司為樣本，參酌過去文獻所提及影響企業資訊揭露之因素，探討影響企業高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數的因素。實證結果發現盈餘分配權、控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度及經理人內部化比率與高階經理人薪酬揭露總數呈顯著負相關，而外國機構投資人持股比率及薪酬委員會品質則與高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數呈顯著正相關。顯示當企業的所有權越集中、控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度越高，其將越傾向隱藏高階經理人薪酬資訊，而外國機構投資人及薪酬委員會等監控力量則傾向促使企業揭露更多位高階經理人薪酬資訊。本研究初步分析過去企業資訊揭露相關研究中所提及之可能影響因素與高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數之關聯性，並歸納出當企業具備何種特質時，傾向於揭露較多或較少位經理人之薪酬資訊，為我國薪酬資訊揭露品質之研究提供不同的思考方向。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The opacity of executive compensation has been a growing public concern in Taiwan and many other countries. In response to that, the authority has amended the laws and disclosure requirements several times to increase the transparency of executive compensation. Yet, the effect is still unclear. Based on a sample of Taiwan listed companies during the 2010 to 2017, This study empirically analyzes the factors that affect the disclosure of executive compensation. The empirical results suggest that the number of executives whose compensation disclosed to the public is negatively associated with the controlling owners’ cash flow rights, the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, and the ratio of insider executive. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the number of executives with compensation disclosed to the public is positively associated with foreign institutional ownership and compensation committee quality.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1
貳、我國高階經理人薪酬揭露規定及現況 4
參、文獻探討 8
肆、研究假說 11
伍、樣本及研究方法 14
陸、實證結果與分析 21
柒、結論與建議 41
參考文獻 43		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1695586 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353007en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高階經理人薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬揭露zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊揭露水準zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) CEO compensationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) compensation disclosureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) the disclosure level of compensationen_US
dc.title (題名) 高階經理人薪酬揭露總人數之影響因素zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The determinants of the number of executives whose compensation been dislcosed to the publien_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 大紀元，2009.6.4，台去年虧675億 小股東怒批高鐵肥貓。
工商時報，2016.9.16，接軌國際上市櫃董監酬勞 應逐一揭露。
自由時報，2015.11.26，虧損還領高薪 議員批台中快捷巴士養一堆肥貓。
自由時報，2018.6.5，真是年薪250萬元實習生？吳音寧：我月薪14萬。
風傳媒，2018.1.5，大老闆就是這樣賺！英國調查：「肥貓」開年上班3天半，等於你我小員工苦幹一整年。
朱炫璉、陳彥綺、劉乃熒與王慧君，2017，自願性與強制性設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第13卷第2期 (12月): 269-307。
吳幸蓁、謝佳純與梁書瑋，2014，薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響，中華會計學刊，第10卷第2期 (12月): 135-188。
林志翔與孫大中，2017，家族企業公司治理實務，會計研究月刊，第384期 (11月): 109-113。
林宛瑩、許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第28卷第1期 (6月): 269-312。
許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙，2003，控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)，貨幣觀測與信用評，第42期 (7月): 15-31。
陳瑞斌、許崇源與翁慈青，2007，公司治理架構與財務報告透明度之關聯性研究，中華管理評論國際學報，第10卷1期 (2月): 1-40。
黃銘傑，2000，公司監控與監察人制度改革論－超越“獨立董事”之迷思，台大法學論叢，第29卷第4期 (7月): 159-208。
張心悌，2006，公開發行公司高階經理人報酬決定與監督之研究，臺北大學法學論叢，第58期 (6月): 1-42。
葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化事業股份有限公司，台北。
廖益均，2014，董事及高管薪酬揭露概況－如何透過級距資料獲得額外資訊，貨幣觀測與信用評等，第108期 (7月): 35-43。
廖益興，2010，董事會組成、股權結構、年報資訊揭露水準，台大管理論叢，第20卷第2期 (6月): 209-250。
劉政准、許永聲、金凱雯，2013，企業生命週期、董事會組成特性對資訊透明度之影響，台灣管理學刊 第13卷第1期 (2月): 73-94。
Adams, R., and H. Mehran. 2003. Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies? Economic Policy Review 9 (April): 123-142.
Aggarwal, R., I. Erel, M. Ferreira, and P. Matos. 2011.Dose governance travel around the world? evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 100 (April): 154-181.
Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (August): 488-500.
Ali, A., T.Y. Chen, and S. Radhakrishnan. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (September): 238-286.
Beekes, W., P. Brown, W. Zhan, and Q. Zhang. 2016. Corporate governance, companies` disclosure practices and market transparency: a cross country study. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 43 (April): 263-297.
Ben-Amar, W., D. Zeghal. 2011. Board of directors` independence and executive compensation disclosure transparency: Canadian evidence. Journal of Applied Accounting Research 12 (May): 43-60.
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2006. The role of family in family firms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 73-96.
Reuer, J. J., and R. Ragozzino. 2006. Agency hazards and alliance portfolios. Strategic Management Journal 27 (January): 27-43.
Bird, A., S. A. Karolyiy. 2016. Do institutional investors demand public disclosure? The Review of Financial Studies 29 (December): 3245-3277.
Boone, A., and J. T. White. 2015. The effect of institutional ownership on firm transparency and information production. Journal of Financial Economics 117 (September): 508-533.
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Ellen, and S. Abbie. 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (February): 167-201.
Chau, G. K., and S. J. Gray. 2002. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting 37: 247-265.
Chung, K. H., and H. Zhang. 2011. Corporate governance and institutional ownership. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46 (February): 247-273.
Croci, E., H. Gonenc, and N. Ozkan. 2012. CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in continental Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance 36 (December): 3318-3335.
Eng, L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (July–August): 325-345.
Ettredge, M., K. Johnstone, M. Stone, and Q. Wang. 2011. The effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on disclosure compliance. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (December): 866-889.
Fan, J. P.H., and T.J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (August): 401–425.
Felo, A. J. 2011. Audit committee composition, compensation committee composition, and compensation transparency. Corporate Ownership and Control 9: 477-487.
Francis, J., K. Schipper, and L. Vincent. 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (June): 329-360.
Gillan, S., and L. Starks. 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57 (August): 275-305.
Huang, R.D., and C. Y. Shiu. 2009. Local effects of foreign ownership in an emerging financial market: evidence from qualified foreign institutional investors in Taiwan. Financial Management 38 (September): 567-602.
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (September): 405-440.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-360.
Jung., K., and S. Y. Kwon. 2002. Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea. The International Journal of Accounting 37: 301-325.
Laksmana, I. 2007. Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (November): 1147-1182.
Liao, G. M., and C. Lu. 2009. Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Ownership and Control 6 (January): 128-134.
Liang,J. W., M. F. Lin, and C. L. Chin. 2012. Does foreign institutional ownership motivate firms in an emerging market to increase voluntary disclosure? Evidence from Taiwan. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 39 (July): 55-76.
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dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900603en_US