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題名 企業現金持有與租稅成本之關連: 以海外營收為例
Association between Corporate Cash Holdings and Tax Costs: Evidence from Overseas Sales
作者 廖嘉怡
貢獻者 潘健民
廖嘉怡
關鍵詞 海外營收
現金持有
Overseas sales
Cash holdings
日期 2019
上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 15:54:55 (UTC+8)
摘要 日本對於日本企業之所得係針對全球所得課稅，且其法人所得稅率在OECD國家中亦是名列前茅，課徵時點係海外盈餘匯回本國時，讓日本跨國企業為降低租稅成本，有誘因將盈餘保留在境外，進而持有較多現金。本研究主要探討日本企業之超額現金的多寡是否會受到租稅成本影響。本研究檢驗海外營收的多寡與企業超額現金持有的關係。結果發現，當日本企業海外營收規模越大時，其持有的超額現金越多。
The government of Japan taxes firms’ worldwide income. Income tax rate to the Japanese firms is top compared to its counterparts other OECD countries. Thus, Japanese firms have incentive to retain their revenue overseas instead of repatriating to Japan. With this tax system, Japanese firms would have incentive to hold more cash in other countries. This study aims to investigate whether tax costs of firms influences their cash holding decisions. Using Japanese firm level data, I examine the association between overseas sales and firms’ cash holding. The empirical results show that if firms have more overseas sales, they hold more excess cash. However, I find no association between excess cash holdings and existence of overseas sales.
參考文獻 Altshuler, R., and H. Grubert. 2001. Where will they go if we go territorial? Dividend exemption and the location decisions of US multinational corporations. National Tax Journal 54(4): 787-809.\nAman, H., and P. Nguyen. 2012. The size and composition of corporate boards in Japan. Asian Business & Management 11(4): 425-444.\nAmihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. 1986. Liquidity and stock returns. Financial Analyst Journal 42(3): 43-48.\nAntunovich, P. 1996. Optimal slack policy under asymmetric information. Unpublished manuscript. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.\nBertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoy the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111(5): 1043-1075.\nBushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73(3): 305-333.\nCheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87(1): 157-176\nColes, J. N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87(2): 329-356.\nDe Simone, L., J. D. Piotroski, and R. E. Tomy. 2017. Repatriation taxes and foreign cash holdings: The impact of anticipated tax policy. Working Paper.\nDesai, M. A., and J. R. Hines Jr. 2004. Old rules and new realities: Corporate tax policy in a global setting. National Tax Journal 920: 937-960.\nDore, R. 2005. Deviant or different? Corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13(3): 437-446.\nEgger, P., V. Merlo, M. Ruf, and G. Wamser. 2015. Consequences of the new UK tax exemption system: evidence from micro‐level data. The Economic Journal 125(589):1764-1789.\nFoley, C. F., J. Hartzell, S. Titman, and G. Twite. 2007. Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86(3): 579-607\nGraetz, M. J., and P. W. Oosterhuis. 2001. Structuring an exemption system for foreign income of US corporations. National Tax Journal 54(4): 771-786.\nGordon, R. H., and J. R. Hines Jr. 2002. International taxation Working Paper\nGuo, J., P. Huang, Y. Zhang, and N. Zhou. 2015. Foreign ownership and real earnings management: Evidence from Japan. Journal of International Accounting Research 14 (2): 185-213.\nHasegawa, M., and K. Kiyota. 2017. The Effect of Moving to a Territorial Tax System on Profit Repatriation: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Public Economics 153: 92-110.\nJensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.\nKeynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Macmillan.\nKrull, L. 2004. Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings, Taxes, and Earnings Management. Accounting Review 79(3): 745-767.\nLang, L., A. Poulsen, and R. Stulz. 1995. Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Journal of Financial Economics 37(1): 3-37.\nLinck, J. S., J. M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of Fnancial Economics 87(2): 308-328.\nLow, A. 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 92(3): 470-490.\nMiller, M.H., and D. Orr. 1966. A model of the demand for money by firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 80(3): 413-435.\nModigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American economic review 53(3): 433-443.\nMullins, P. 2006. Moving to Territoriality? Implications for the United States and\n　　the Rest of the World. IMF Working Paper.\nMyers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5(2): 147-175.\nMyers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. The Journal of Finance 39(3): 574-592.\nMyers, S.C., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firm have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-221.\nNakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387\nOfek, E., and D. Yermack. 2000. Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership. Journal of Finance 55(3): 1367–84.\nOpler, T.C., and S. Titman. 1994. Financial Distress and Corporate Performance. Journal of Finance 49(3): 1015-1040.\nOpler, T.C., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1):\n3-46.\nPalazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104(1): 162-185.\nPerry, T., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring. The Journal of Business 78(4): 1403-1432.\nPinkowitz, L., and R. Williamson. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. The Review of Financial Studies 14(4): 1059-1082.\nSanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50(5): 1055-1078.\nShleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1992. Liquidation vales and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47(4): 1343-1366.\nShyam-Sunder, L., and S. C. Myers. 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51(2): 219-244.\nTajika, E., and R. Nakatani. 2008. Welcome Home to Japan: Repatriation of Foreign Profits by Japanese Multinationals. Discussion Papers 2008-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.\nViner, A. 1993. The coming revolution in Japan`s board rooms. Corporate Governance: An International Review 1(3): 112-112.\nYermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40(2): 185-211.\nZeff, S. A. 2007. The Membership of the Accounting Principles Board. Research in Accounting Regulation 19: 207-214.\nZenner, M., E. Junek, and R. Chivukula. 2016. Are US Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So, Why?. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 28(1): 95-103.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353111
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353111
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 廖嘉怡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) 廖嘉怡zh_TW
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 15:54:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 15:54:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 15:54:55 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353111en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=143132-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106353111zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 日本對於日本企業之所得係針對全球所得課稅，且其法人所得稅率在OECD國家中亦是名列前茅，課徵時點係海外盈餘匯回本國時，讓日本跨國企業為降低租稅成本，有誘因將盈餘保留在境外，進而持有較多現金。本研究主要探討日本企業之超額現金的多寡是否會受到租稅成本影響。本研究檢驗海外營收的多寡與企業超額現金持有的關係。結果發現，當日本企業海外營收規模越大時，其持有的超額現金越多。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The government of Japan taxes firms’ worldwide income. Income tax rate to the Japanese firms is top compared to its counterparts other OECD countries. Thus, Japanese firms have incentive to retain their revenue overseas instead of repatriating to Japan. With this tax system, Japanese firms would have incentive to hold more cash in other countries. This study aims to investigate whether tax costs of firms influences their cash holding decisions. Using Japanese firm level data, I examine the association between overseas sales and firms’ cash holding. The empirical results show that if firms have more overseas sales, they hold more excess cash. However, I find no association between excess cash holdings and existence of overseas sales.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1\n第一節　研究動機和目的 1\n第二節　研究架構 5\n貳、文獻探討 6\n第一節 現金持有 6\n第二節 海外營收 11\n第三節 結論與假說 15\n參、研究方法 16\n第一節　資料來源與樣本之選取 16\n第二節　變數定義與衡量 19\n肆、實證結果與分析 28\n第一節　敘述性統計 28\n第二節　樣本相關 34\n第三節　現金持有與海外營收的實證結果 39\n伍、結論 45\n參考文獻 46zh_TW
dc.format.extent 930172 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353111en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 海外營收zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 現金持有zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Overseas salesen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Cash holdingsen_US
dc.title (題名) 企業現金持有與租稅成本之關連: 以海外營收為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Association between Corporate Cash Holdings and Tax Costs: Evidence from Overseas Salesen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Altshuler, R., and H. Grubert. 2001. Where will they go if we go territorial? Dividend exemption and the location decisions of US multinational corporations. National Tax Journal 54(4): 787-809.\nAman, H., and P. Nguyen. 2012. The size and composition of corporate boards in Japan. Asian Business & Management 11(4): 425-444.\nAmihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. 1986. Liquidity and stock returns. Financial Analyst Journal 42(3): 43-48.\nAntunovich, P. 1996. Optimal slack policy under asymmetric information. Unpublished manuscript. Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.\nBertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoy the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111(5): 1043-1075.\nBushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73(3): 305-333.\nCheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87(1): 157-176\nColes, J. N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics 87(2): 329-356.\nDe Simone, L., J. D. Piotroski, and R. E. Tomy. 2017. Repatriation taxes and foreign cash holdings: The impact of anticipated tax policy. Working Paper.\nDesai, M. A., and J. R. Hines Jr. 2004. Old rules and new realities: Corporate tax policy in a global setting. National Tax Journal 920: 937-960.\nDore, R. 2005. Deviant or different? Corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13(3): 437-446.\nEgger, P., V. Merlo, M. Ruf, and G. Wamser. 2015. Consequences of the new UK tax exemption system: evidence from micro‐level data. The Economic Journal 125(589):1764-1789.\nFoley, C. F., J. Hartzell, S. Titman, and G. Twite. 2007. Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A Tax-Based Explanation. Journal of Financial Economics 86(3): 579-607\nGraetz, M. J., and P. W. Oosterhuis. 2001. Structuring an exemption system for foreign income of US corporations. National Tax Journal 54(4): 771-786.\nGordon, R. H., and J. R. Hines Jr. 2002. International taxation Working Paper\nGuo, J., P. Huang, Y. Zhang, and N. Zhou. 2015. Foreign ownership and real earnings management: Evidence from Japan. Journal of International Accounting Research 14 (2): 185-213.\nHasegawa, M., and K. Kiyota. 2017. The Effect of Moving to a Territorial Tax System on Profit Repatriation: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Public Economics 153: 92-110.\nJensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.\nKeynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Macmillan.\nKrull, L. 2004. Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings, Taxes, and Earnings Management. Accounting Review 79(3): 745-767.\nLang, L., A. Poulsen, and R. Stulz. 1995. Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Journal of Financial Economics 37(1): 3-37.\nLinck, J. S., J. M. Netter, and T. Yang. 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal of Fnancial Economics 87(2): 308-328.\nLow, A. 2009. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 92(3): 470-490.\nMiller, M.H., and D. Orr. 1966. A model of the demand for money by firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 80(3): 413-435.\nModigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American economic review 53(3): 433-443.\nMullins, P. 2006. Moving to Territoriality? Implications for the United States and\n　　the Rest of the World. IMF Working Paper.\nMyers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5(2): 147-175.\nMyers, S. C. 1984. The capital structure puzzle. The Journal of Finance 39(3): 574-592.\nMyers, S.C., and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firm have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-221.\nNakano, M., and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369-387\nOfek, E., and D. Yermack. 2000. Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership. Journal of Finance 55(3): 1367–84.\nOpler, T.C., and S. Titman. 1994. Financial Distress and Corporate Performance. Journal of Finance 49(3): 1015-1040.\nOpler, T.C., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1):\n3-46.\nPalazzo, B. 2012. Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 104(1): 162-185.\nPerry, T., and A. Shivdasani. 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring. The Journal of Business 78(4): 1403-1432.\nPinkowitz, L., and R. Williamson. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. The Review of Financial Studies 14(4): 1059-1082.\nSanders, W. G., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50(5): 1055-1078.\nShleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1992. Liquidation vales and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47(4): 1343-1366.\nShyam-Sunder, L., and S. C. Myers. 1999. Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51(2): 219-244.\nTajika, E., and R. Nakatani. 2008. Welcome Home to Japan: Repatriation of Foreign Profits by Japanese Multinationals. Discussion Papers 2008-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.\nViner, A. 1993. The coming revolution in Japan`s board rooms. Corporate Governance: An International Review 1(3): 112-112.\nYermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40(2): 185-211.\nZeff, S. A. 2007. The Membership of the Accounting Principles Board. Research in Accounting Regulation 19: 207-214.\nZenner, M., E. Junek, and R. Chivukula. 2016. Are US Companies Really Holding That Much Cash—And If So, Why?. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 28(1): 95-103.zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900152en_US