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題名 公司治理評鑑結果、董事會特性與公司績效關聯性之探討
The research of Corporate governance evaluation results, board characteristics and the relationship with company performance作者 陳有序
Chen, Yu-Hsu貢獻者 林宛瑩
陳有序
Chen, Yu-Hsu關鍵詞 公司治理評鑑結果
獨立董事
董事會獨立性
公司價值
Corporate governance evaluation
Independent director
Independence of board members
Company’s value日期 2019 上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 15:55:20 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究針對我國近年施行的公司治理評鑑結果進行研究,本研究為符合可比較性,僅針對2016與2017兩年的受評鑑上市上櫃公司進行研究,發現獨立董事席次比率(IBR)與公司治理評鑑結果呈顯著正向關係,支持研究假說H1。再者,本研究為了解獨立董事成立後,董事會獨立性與各個公司治理要素將如何影響公司治理評鑑結果。以及用公司治理評鑑結果推斷級距結果與各個公司治理要素如何影響公司價值。本研究發現,獨立董事席次比率提高都有助於公司治理結果的表現,實證結果為顯著。Tobin’s Q(TBQ)表現上,公司治理評鑑結果(RT)與TBQ呈負向關係,不支持研究假說H2。
This study is based on the results of the corporate governance evaluation in recent years. According to the result of the evaluation in the 2016 and 2017 years, it represents that the ratio of independent directors (IBR) has the significant positive relationship with result of corporate governance evaluation, supporting the research hypothesis H1. Furthermore, this study is to understand how the independence of the board of directors and the various corporate governance factors will affect the results of corporate governance evaluation after the establishment of the independent directors. Using results of corporate governance evaluation anaylze the results of the ranking and how the various corporate governance factors affect the company`s value. The study shows that the increase in the ratio of the number of independent directors contributed to augment of the evaluation performance, so that the results are significant. 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國立政治大學
會計學系
106353114資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353114 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 林宛瑩 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 陳有序 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chen, Yu-Hsu en_US dc.creator (作者) 陳有序 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chen, Yu-Hsu en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 15:55:20 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 15:55:20 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 15:55:20 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106353114 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124672 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 會計學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106353114 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究針對我國近年施行的公司治理評鑑結果進行研究,本研究為符合可比較性,僅針對2016與2017兩年的受評鑑上市上櫃公司進行研究,發現獨立董事席次比率(IBR)與公司治理評鑑結果呈顯著正向關係,支持研究假說H1。再者,本研究為了解獨立董事成立後,董事會獨立性與各個公司治理要素將如何影響公司治理評鑑結果。以及用公司治理評鑑結果推斷級距結果與各個公司治理要素如何影響公司價值。本研究發現,獨立董事席次比率提高都有助於公司治理結果的表現,實證結果為顯著。Tobin’s Q(TBQ)表現上,公司治理評鑑結果(RT)與TBQ呈負向關係,不支持研究假說H2。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study is based on the results of the corporate governance evaluation in recent years. According to the result of the evaluation in the 2016 and 2017 years, it represents that the ratio of independent directors (IBR) has the significant positive relationship with result of corporate governance evaluation, supporting the research hypothesis H1. Furthermore, this study is to understand how the independence of the board of directors and the various corporate governance factors will affect the results of corporate governance evaluation after the establishment of the independent directors. Using results of corporate governance evaluation anaylze the results of the ranking and how the various corporate governance factors affect the company`s value. The study shows that the increase in the ratio of the number of independent directors contributed to augment of the evaluation performance, so that the results are significant. Tobin’s Q (TBQ) performance, the corporate governance assessment results (RT) are negatively correlated with TBQ and do not support the research hypothesis H2. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 目錄第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究議題 5第三節 論文架構 6第二章 文獻探討 7第一節 公司治理評鑑評等 7第二節 董事會組成、特性、與公司效益 8第三節 公司治理特性與公司價值 11第三章 研究方法 14第一節 研究假說 14第二節 實證模型及變數定義與衡量 15第三節 研究樣本與資料來源 29第四章 實證結果與分析 32第一節 公司治理評鑑結果與董事會獨立性之關聯性 32第二節 公司治理評鑑表現與公司價值呈正向關聯性 40第三節 額外測試 47第五章 結論與建議 65第一節 研究結論 65第二節 研究限制及研究建議 66附錄 歷年公司治理評鑑指標數與權重 68參考文獻 69 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1938691 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353114 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理評鑑結果 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會獨立性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司價值 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate governance evaluation en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent director en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independence of board members en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Company’s value en_US dc.title (題名) 公司治理評鑑結果、董事會特性與公司績效關聯性之探討 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The research of Corporate governance evaluation results, board characteristics and the relationship with company performance en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 丁秀儀與黃勇達,2010,資訊揭露程度與內涵對機構投資人持股的影響,證券市場發展季刊,第 22 卷,第 3 期:39-74。王文聖、Nur Imamah、吳雅婷與洪榮華,2016,股權結構與權益資金成本-以中國上市公司為例,證券市場發展季刊,第 28 卷,第 2 期:71-106。王祝三、莊雅雪與郭勁甫,2009,公司治理、投資與公司價值之關聯性,東吳經濟商學學報,第66期:69-114。王元章與張椿柏,2011,從核心代理問題的角度探討股權結構,董事會特性對公司價值之影響,證券市場發展季刊,第23卷,第2期:131-174。朱博湧、林裕淩與王筠傑,2015。獨立董事多樣性對於公司價值之研究,管理資訊計算,第4卷,第2期:65-82。邱秀清、汪進揚與魏誌遠,2018,公司治理對企業社會責任資訊揭露之影響:審計監督之調節效果,科際整合管理研討會,第20屆:433-446。邱垂昌與莊清騄,2010,獨立董監事、公司資訊透明度與公司價值之關聯性,中山管理評論,第18卷,第4期:949-1008。林宛瑩與許崇源,2008,台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議,交大管理學報,第28卷,第1期:269-312。林宜勉與陳勝凱,2009,公司所有權結構對承銷價制定與市場評價之影響,證券市場發展季刊,第21卷,第1期,1-50。林俊傑、劉梧柏與黃華瑋,2018,公司治理評鑑與財務績效及公司價值之關聯性探討:以台灣上市櫃企業公司治理評鑑為例,商略學報,第10期:23-46。胥愛琦、李春安與賴秀燕,2015,好消息、壞消息與報酬動能效應-以台灣股市為例,應用經濟論叢,第98期:113-148。高麗萍、鄧歆蓉、白雲婷、古易璇、張雅媛、彭敬傑與簡裕紘,2018,以市場價值觀點評估公司治理評鑑與企業社會責任報告書關聯性之研究。致理學報,第38期:99-134。楊海明、王燕,2002,投資學,台北:五南。洪儒瑤與洪裕琨,2007,Tobin’s Q與內部人持股關係符合展望理論嗎?中華技術學院學報,第36期,213-228。洪榮華、陳香如與林慧珍,2007,公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及公司績效之影響─研發密集產業之實證,中山管理評論,第15卷,第1期:37-60。陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智,2004,應用 Ohlson 會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性-以台灣上市公司電子業為例,臺大管理論叢,第15卷,第 2 期:123-142。陳美華與洪世炳,2005,公司治理、股權結構與公司績效關係之實證研究,企業管理學報,第65期:129-153。陳振遠、張智堯、王蘭芬與李文智,2005,應用Ohlson會計評價模型探究公司治理之價值攸關性―以台灣上市公司電子業為例」,臺大管理論叢,第 15卷,第 2 期:123-142。陳瑞斌、翁慈青與朱全斌,2009,揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響,財務金融學刊,第 17 卷,第 2 期:71-110。陳振遠、王健聰與洪世偉,2017,公司治理對於企業社會責任、公司價值之影響中山管理評論;第25卷,第1期:135-176。張瑞當與方俊儒,2006,資訊揭露評鑑系統對企業盈餘管理行為之影響,會計評論,第42 期:1-22。高蘭芬、盧正壽、黃冠智與陳安琳,2012。公司治理、公司績效與投資策略,中山管理評論,第20卷,第3期:851-880。郭崑謨與江復明,1992,管理經濟學,台北:五南。俞海琴與周本鄂,1994,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q 關係之研究,管理評論,第13卷,第1期:79-98。會計研究月刊,2015,第356期,68-77。溫育芳,2005。國內上市公司最適資本結構之實證研究,企銀季刊,第28卷,第2期,51-69。廖秀梅,李建然與吳祥華,2006,董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究-兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響,東吳經濟商學學報,第54期:117-160。陳宜伶與林宛瑩,2013,獨立董監之設置決策與績效,管理與系統,第20卷,第 4 期:697-725。陳業寧、邱顯比與洪雲萍,2006,獨立董事與公司治理:政府應該要求所有上市上櫃公司聘任獨立董事嗎?證券市場發展季刊,第18卷,第3期,1-36。陳昭蓉,2014,信用評等變動與高階經理人薪酬:董事會獨立性、專業性及參與度之調節效果,經濟論文叢刊,第42卷,第1期:103-155。陳麗宇與賴蓉禾,2013,董事經驗對企業海外直接投資績效之影響— 以美國企業國際併購宣告為例,中山管理評論,第 21 期:199-237。黃俊閎、林鳳儀、吳勝富與黃仁伯,2014,公司治理是否有效減少亞洲新興市場公司之盈餘管理?交大管理學報,第 34 卷,第 2 期:87-111。葉銀華、李存修與柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評等系統,初版,商智文化,臺北。葉銀華與邱顯比,1996,資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論,台大管理叢論,第7卷,第2期:57-90。楊朝旭、蔡柳卿、陳家慧與廖思婷,2012,董事會特性與實質盈餘管理,台大管理論叢,第 23 卷,第 1 期:363-400。劉福運、吳宗翰與林岳喬,2018,公司治理與盈餘品質:公司治理評鑑級距的影響,台灣管理學刊,第 18 卷,第 2 期:29-47。鄭伊婷與王建文,2015,世界公司治理評鑑制度介紹,證券服務,第638期:25-29。薛敏正、葉淑玲、邱彥毅與江璧岑,2018,公司治理評鑑與證券報酬,中華會計學刊,第14卷,第2期:261-289。A.Burak Güner, Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate. 2008. 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