1. NCCU Academic Hub
  2. 學術產出
  3. 商學院
  4. 學位論文
  5. Item

學術產出-學位論文

文章檢視/開啟

書目匯出

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

引文資訊

TAIR相關學術產出

題名 資訊不對稱下，國家風險與產業環境對子公司併購下市之市場反應影響
If factors related to country risk and industrial characteristics would have impact on the announcement effect of going private under information asymmetry: from the point of signaling theory.
作者 馮書儀
Fong, Shu-Yi
貢獻者 吳啟銘
Wu, Chi-Ming
馮書儀
Fong, Shu-Yi
關鍵詞 併購
併購下市
國家風險
產業環境
訊號發射
merger and acquisition
going private
country risk
industry
signaling
日期 2019
上傳時間 7-八月-2019 16:03:46 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究以子公司併購下市為題，以過去併購下市理論為基礎，再加入訊號發射理論解釋子公司所處國家與產業環境，會如何影響併購下市的市場反應，並討論國家與產業因素將如何與過去併購下市理論中的價值低估因子及交易成本因子產生交互作用。
結果顯示產業環境與國家風險個別的負面訊號效果並不明顯，推測可能是外部環境對市場反應的影響較為薄弱，然而與一般非併購下市案件相較之下，產業環境仍然具備較強負面訊號效果；然而對產業環境、國家風險與價值低估、交易成本因子檢驗交互作用，則能支持研究假說，即產業環境與國家風險因子的負面訊號效果，會加強公司價值低估因子的對市場反應的負面影響顯著性，而交易成本因子(即資訊不對稱程度)會加強國家風險的負面訊號效果，但對產業環境的負面訊號加強效果則不顯著。
然本研究僅針對併購宣告的市場反應進行探討，並未再結合後續併購下市宣告的市場反應進行探討；且在各組樣本中，子公司所屬國家多為美國，因此可能是國家風險影響性不顯著之原因；此外，本研究對產業僅以科技業與非科技業進行劃分，或許即是導致交易成本因子，對產業環境的負面訊號加強效果不顯著之原因。未來若能加入後續併購下市宣告之市場反應進行研究、放寬對主併的國家篩選限制以取得更平均的子公司國家分布抑或是對產業進行更細緻的劃分的方式，都能對此議題進行更進一步的探討。
除了對研究樣本的優化之外，亦可由子公司併購下市後的借款利率變化著手，驗證國家風險與產業環境對子公司的併購下市訊號影響，是否真的會在下市後產生實質的影響，或是驗證市場對訊號的解讀，是否真的能準確反映子公司併購下市的真實情況，未來若有志在此領域進行進一步的研究，此為另一可以努力的方向。
Based on the research discussing the motivation for company to go private, we tried to examine if factors related to country risk and industrial characteristics would have impact on the announcement effect of going private from the point of signaling theory. Furthermore, we also want to explore if the negative signal caused by companies in countries with low risk and high-tech environment would have joint effect with factors of undervaluation and transaction cost.
We found the country risk and industrial characteristics would have insignificant impact on the announcement effect. However, comparing with the non-going private cases, the negative signal caused by companies in high-tech industries is still stronger in the group going private. The negative correlation between the factor of undervaluation and announcement effect would be strengthened if the subsidiaries (targets) are registered in the country with low risk and high-tech industry; the negative correlation between the factor of transaction cost and the announcement effect would be strengthened if the subsidiaries (targets) are in the country with low risk, because of the signal effect strengthened by the high level of information asymmetry, but the characteristic of companies in high-tech industry has the insignificant impact on the negative correlation between the factor of transaction cost and the announcement effect.
In the future, categorizing industries into more types, widening the constraint of acquirers‟ countries on collecting the sample or doing a research form the view of the borrowing interest rate subsidiaries would have after going private to examine whether the signals could forecast the real situation well would be new ways to do in this field.
參考文獻 中文部分
王祝三, 周德瑋, & 陳弘榮. (2006). 企業併購支付方式決定因素與股價反應之探討. 證券市場發展季刊, 18(3), 1-45.
王韻怡, 池祥萱, & 周冠男. (2016). 行為財務學文獻回顧與展望: 台灣市場之研究. 經濟論文叢刊, 44(1), 1-55.
李國榮, 呂素蓮, & 陳維民. (2009). 台灣風險套利績效及併購完成機率預測之研究. 企業管理學報, (83), 33-64.
李善民, 陳玉罡, 曾昭灶, 李珩, & 王彩萍. (2003). 中國上市公司併購與重組的實證研究.
沈鳳儀, & 簡明哲. (2012). 事前不確定性假說, 訊號發射假說及熱潮假說與 IPO 期初報酬率之關聯性分析. 台灣金融財務季刊, 13(1), 87-113.
林宜勉, & 遊淑禎. (2003). 股利訊號與未來盈餘之關聯性研究.
洪榮華, & 雷雅淇. (2002). 公司規模, 股價, 益本比, 淨值市價比與股票報酬關係之實證研究. 管理評論, 21(3), 25-48
祝繼高, 端楊, & 李鑫. (2015). 中概股公司併購下市研究: 動機與經濟後果. 財經研究, 41(04), 110-121.
高見, & 陳歆瑋. (2000). 中國證券市場資產重組效應分析. 經濟科學, 1, 66-77.
淩春華, 樓曉霞 & 廖忠梅. (2005). 並購目標公司財務特徵的實證分析 (Doctoral dissertation).
黃旭輝, & 丁世儒. (2005). 會計師簽證, 法人持股與資訊不對稱對多頭市場股票報酬影響之研究. 輔仁管理評論, 12(2), 99-125.
楊志海, & 趙立彬. (2012). 融資約束, 支付方式與並購績效的關係研究. 證券市場導報, 5, 36-40.
詹錦宏, & 張文榮. (2009). 有拗折點的融資順位元元元模型--台灣地區上市公司資本結構之實證研究. 會計學報, 1(2), 37-61.
蔡怡純, 陳明吉, & 馬黛. (2007). 股票購迴影響因素之理論與實證: 資訊不對稱觀點分析. 中山管理評論, 15(1), 175-195.
 
英文部分
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., & Travlos, N. G. (1990). Corporate control and the choice of investment financing: The case of corporate acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 45(2), 603-616.
Bates, J. H., Wagers, S. S., Norton, R. J., Rinaldi, L. M., & Irvin, C. G. (1976). Hydrolysis of cautions. Inorganic Complexes.
Bradley, D. J., Jordan, B. D., & Ritter, J. R. (2003). The quiet period goes out with a bang. The Journal of Finance, 58(1), 1-36.
Brown, D. T., & Ryngaert, M. D. (1991). The mode of acquisition in takeovers: Taxes and asymmetric information. The Journal of Finance, 46(2), 653-669.
Chan, C. 2004.Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure in Taiwan. The Annuals of Japanese Society for the Economics Studies of Securities 39: 1-17.
Chemmanur, T. J., & Fulghieri, P. (1999). A theory of the going-public decision. The Review of Financial Studies, 12(2), 249-279.
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of management, 37(1), 39-67.
Cortright, J., & Mayer, H. (2001). High tech specialization: a comparison of high technology centers. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy.
Dann, L.Y., 1981, Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Rice, E. M. (1984). Going private: Minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth. The Journal of Law and Economics, 27(2), 367-401.
Donaldson, G. (1961), Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity, Harvard Graduate School of Management, Boston, MA.
Elitzur, R., & Gavious, A. (2003). Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs,‘angels,’and venture capitalists. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(6), 709-725.
Ferry, M. G., and W. H. Jones (1979) Determinants of Financial Structures: A New Methodological Approach. The Journal of Finance 34:3, 631–644.
Gao, W., & Zhu, F. (2015). Information asymmetry and capital structure around the world. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 32, 131-159.
Garfinkel, J. A. (1993). IPO underpricing, insider selling and subsequent equity offerings: Is underpricing a signal of quality?. Financial Management, 74-83.
Global IPO Watch Q1 2019, Retrieved June 15 2019, from: https://reurl.cc/6n88d
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 42-64.
Helou, A., & Park, G. (2001). Is there a signaling effect of underwriter reputation?. Journal of financial research, 24(1), 27-43.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. (1988). Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. Journal of economic perspectives, 2(1), 21-48.
Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. (1989). The experience of nature: A psychological perspective. CUP Archive.
Kaplan, S. (1989). Management buyouts: Evidence on taxes as a source of value. The journal of finance, 44(3), 611-632.
Krishnaswami, S., Spindt, P. A., & Subramaniam, V. (1999). Information asymmetry, monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 407-434.
Maksimovic, V., & Pichler, P. (2001). Technological innovation and initial public offerings. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), 459-494.
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. Journal of economic perspectives, 17(1), 59-82.
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.
Mallette, P., & Fowler, K. L. (1992). Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of “poison pills”. Academy of Management journal, 35(5), 1010-1035.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). Stock repurchase by tender offer: An analysis of the causes of common stock price changes. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 305-319.
Miller, M., & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American, 1, 3.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American economic review, 53(3), 433-443.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 5(2), 147-175.
Pinegar, J. M., & Wilbricht, L. (1989). What managers think of capital structure theory: a survey. Financial Management, 82-91.
Renneboog, L., Simons, T., & Wright, M. (2007). Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(4), 591-628.
Reuer, J. J., Tong, T. W., & Wu, C. W. (2012). A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets. Academy of Management Journal, 55(3), 667-683.
Ross, S. A. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling approach. The bell journal of economics, 23-40.
Shefrin, H. (2002). Beyond greed and fear: Understanding behavioral finance and the psychology of investing. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of accounting and economics, 16(1-3), 167-198.
Simkowitz, M., & Monroe, R. J. (1971). A discriminant analysis function for conglomerate targets. Southern Journal of Business, 6(1), 1-15.
Singh, J. V., & Lumsden, C. J. (1990). Theory and research in organizational ecology. Annual review of sociology, 16(1), 161-195.
Thies, C. F., & Klock, M. S. (1992). Determinants of capital structure. Review of Financial Economics, 1(2), 40-53.
Travlos, N. G. (1987). Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms` stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 42(4), 943-963.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
106357005
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357005
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳啟銘zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Chi-Mingen_US
dc.contributor.author (作者) 馮書儀zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (作者) Fong, Shu-Yien_US
dc.creator (作者) 馮書儀zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Fong, Shu-Yien_US
dc.date (日期) 2019en_US
dc.date.accessioned 7-八月-2019 16:03:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 7-八月-2019 16:03:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-八月-2019 16:03:46 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0106357005en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124694-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106357005zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以子公司併購下市為題，以過去併購下市理論為基礎，再加入訊號發射理論解釋子公司所處國家與產業環境，會如何影響併購下市的市場反應，並討論國家與產業因素將如何與過去併購下市理論中的價值低估因子及交易成本因子產生交互作用。
結果顯示產業環境與國家風險個別的負面訊號效果並不明顯，推測可能是外部環境對市場反應的影響較為薄弱，然而與一般非併購下市案件相較之下，產業環境仍然具備較強負面訊號效果；然而對產業環境、國家風險與價值低估、交易成本因子檢驗交互作用，則能支持研究假說，即產業環境與國家風險因子的負面訊號效果，會加強公司價值低估因子的對市場反應的負面影響顯著性，而交易成本因子(即資訊不對稱程度)會加強國家風險的負面訊號效果，但對產業環境的負面訊號加強效果則不顯著。
然本研究僅針對併購宣告的市場反應進行探討，並未再結合後續併購下市宣告的市場反應進行探討；且在各組樣本中，子公司所屬國家多為美國，因此可能是國家風險影響性不顯著之原因；此外，本研究對產業僅以科技業與非科技業進行劃分，或許即是導致交易成本因子，對產業環境的負面訊號加強效果不顯著之原因。未來若能加入後續併購下市宣告之市場反應進行研究、放寬對主併的國家篩選限制以取得更平均的子公司國家分布抑或是對產業進行更細緻的劃分的方式，都能對此議題進行更進一步的探討。
除了對研究樣本的優化之外，亦可由子公司併購下市後的借款利率變化著手，驗證國家風險與產業環境對子公司的併購下市訊號影響，是否真的會在下市後產生實質的影響，或是驗證市場對訊號的解讀，是否真的能準確反映子公司併購下市的真實情況，未來若有志在此領域進行進一步的研究，此為另一可以努力的方向。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Based on the research discussing the motivation for company to go private, we tried to examine if factors related to country risk and industrial characteristics would have impact on the announcement effect of going private from the point of signaling theory. Furthermore, we also want to explore if the negative signal caused by companies in countries with low risk and high-tech environment would have joint effect with factors of undervaluation and transaction cost.
We found the country risk and industrial characteristics would have insignificant impact on the announcement effect. However, comparing with the non-going private cases, the negative signal caused by companies in high-tech industries is still stronger in the group going private. The negative correlation between the factor of undervaluation and announcement effect would be strengthened if the subsidiaries (targets) are registered in the country with low risk and high-tech industry; the negative correlation between the factor of transaction cost and the announcement effect would be strengthened if the subsidiaries (targets) are in the country with low risk, because of the signal effect strengthened by the high level of information asymmetry, but the characteristic of companies in high-tech industry has the insignificant impact on the negative correlation between the factor of transaction cost and the announcement effect.
In the future, categorizing industries into more types, widening the constraint of acquirers‟ countries on collecting the sample or doing a research form the view of the borrowing interest rate subsidiaries would have after going private to examine whether the signals could forecast the real situation well would be new ways to do in this field.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3

第二章 文獻探討 4
第一節 企業併購下市動機相關文獻 4
第二節 產業及國家環境對企業融資安排影響相關文獻 7
第三節 訊號發射理論相關文獻 9

第三章 研究方法 11
第一節 理論基礎及研究假說發展 11
第二節 研究期間及樣本選取 14
第三節 實證模型 15
第四節 變數定義及數據來源 18

第四章 實證結果 24
第一節 敘述性統計 24
第二節 相關係數分析 30
第三節 迴歸分析 33

第五章 結論與建議 39
第一節 結論與建議 39
第二節 研究貢獻與限制 39

參考文獻 41
中文部分 41
英文部分 43		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 879160 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357005en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購下市zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 國家風險zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 產業環境zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 訊號發射zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) merger and acquisitionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) going privateen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) country risken_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) industryen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) signalingen_US
dc.title (題名) 資訊不對稱下，國家風險與產業環境對子公司併購下市之市場反應影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) If factors related to country risk and industrial characteristics would have impact on the announcement effect of going private under information asymmetry: from the point of signaling theory.en_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分
王祝三, 周德瑋, & 陳弘榮. (2006). 企業併購支付方式決定因素與股價反應之探討. 證券市場發展季刊, 18(3), 1-45.
王韻怡, 池祥萱, & 周冠男. (2016). 行為財務學文獻回顧與展望: 台灣市場之研究. 經濟論文叢刊, 44(1), 1-55.
李國榮, 呂素蓮, & 陳維民. (2009). 台灣風險套利績效及併購完成機率預測之研究. 企業管理學報, (83), 33-64.
李善民, 陳玉罡, 曾昭灶, 李珩, & 王彩萍. (2003). 中國上市公司併購與重組的實證研究.
沈鳳儀, & 簡明哲. (2012). 事前不確定性假說, 訊號發射假說及熱潮假說與 IPO 期初報酬率之關聯性分析. 台灣金融財務季刊, 13(1), 87-113.
林宜勉, & 遊淑禎. (2003). 股利訊號與未來盈餘之關聯性研究.
洪榮華, & 雷雅淇. (2002). 公司規模, 股價, 益本比, 淨值市價比與股票報酬關係之實證研究. 管理評論, 21(3), 25-48
祝繼高, 端楊, & 李鑫. (2015). 中概股公司併購下市研究: 動機與經濟後果. 財經研究, 41(04), 110-121.
高見, & 陳歆瑋. (2000). 中國證券市場資產重組效應分析. 經濟科學, 1, 66-77.
淩春華, 樓曉霞 & 廖忠梅. (2005). 並購目標公司財務特徵的實證分析 (Doctoral dissertation).
黃旭輝, & 丁世儒. (2005). 會計師簽證, 法人持股與資訊不對稱對多頭市場股票報酬影響之研究. 輔仁管理評論, 12(2), 99-125.
楊志海, & 趙立彬. (2012). 融資約束, 支付方式與並購績效的關係研究. 證券市場導報, 5, 36-40.
詹錦宏, & 張文榮. (2009). 有拗折點的融資順位元元元模型--台灣地區上市公司資本結構之實證研究. 會計學報, 1(2), 37-61.
蔡怡純, 陳明吉, & 馬黛. (2007). 股票購迴影響因素之理論與實證: 資訊不對稱觀點分析. 中山管理評論, 15(1), 175-195.
 
英文部分
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., & Travlos, N. G. (1990). Corporate control and the choice of investment financing: The case of corporate acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 45(2), 603-616.
Bates, J. H., Wagers, S. S., Norton, R. J., Rinaldi, L. M., & Irvin, C. G. (1976). Hydrolysis of cautions. Inorganic Complexes.
Bradley, D. J., Jordan, B. D., & Ritter, J. R. (2003). The quiet period goes out with a bang. The Journal of Finance, 58(1), 1-36.
Brown, D. T., & Ryngaert, M. D. (1991). The mode of acquisition in takeovers: Taxes and asymmetric information. The Journal of Finance, 46(2), 653-669.
Chan, C. 2004.Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure in Taiwan. The Annuals of Japanese Society for the Economics Studies of Securities 39: 1-17.
Chemmanur, T. J., & Fulghieri, P. (1999). A theory of the going-public decision. The Review of Financial Studies, 12(2), 249-279.
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of management, 37(1), 39-67.
Cortright, J., & Mayer, H. (2001). High tech specialization: a comparison of high technology centers. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy.
Dann, L.Y., 1981, Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders, Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Rice, E. M. (1984). Going private: Minority freezeouts and stockholder wealth. The Journal of Law and Economics, 27(2), 367-401.
Donaldson, G. (1961), Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity, Harvard Graduate School of Management, Boston, MA.
Elitzur, R., & Gavious, A. (2003). Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs,‘angels,’and venture capitalists. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(6), 709-725.
Ferry, M. G., and W. H. Jones (1979) Determinants of Financial Structures: A New Methodological Approach. The Journal of Finance 34:3, 631–644.
Gao, W., & Zhu, F. (2015). Information asymmetry and capital structure around the world. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 32, 131-159.
Garfinkel, J. A. (1993). IPO underpricing, insider selling and subsequent equity offerings: Is underpricing a signal of quality?. Financial Management, 74-83.
Global IPO Watch Q1 2019, Retrieved June 15 2019, from: https://reurl.cc/6n88d
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 42-64.
Helou, A., & Park, G. (2001). Is there a signaling effect of underwriter reputation?. Journal of financial research, 24(1), 27-43.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. (1988). Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. Journal of economic perspectives, 2(1), 21-48.
Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. (1989). The experience of nature: A psychological perspective. CUP Archive.
Kaplan, S. (1989). Management buyouts: Evidence on taxes as a source of value. The journal of finance, 44(3), 611-632.
Krishnaswami, S., Spindt, P. A., & Subramaniam, V. (1999). Information asymmetry, monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 407-434.
Maksimovic, V., & Pichler, P. (2001). Technological innovation and initial public offerings. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), 459-494.
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. Journal of economic perspectives, 17(1), 59-82.
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.
Mallette, P., & Fowler, K. L. (1992). Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of “poison pills”. Academy of Management journal, 35(5), 1010-1035.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). Stock repurchase by tender offer: An analysis of the causes of common stock price changes. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 305-319.
Miller, M., & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American, 1, 3.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1963). Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American economic review, 53(3), 433-443.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of financial economics, 5(2), 147-175.
Pinegar, J. M., & Wilbricht, L. (1989). What managers think of capital structure theory: a survey. Financial Management, 82-91.
Renneboog, L., Simons, T., & Wright, M. (2007). Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(4), 591-628.
Reuer, J. J., Tong, T. W., & Wu, C. W. (2012). A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets. Academy of Management Journal, 55(3), 667-683.
Ross, S. A. (1977). The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling approach. The bell journal of economics, 23-40.
Shefrin, H. (2002). Beyond greed and fear: Understanding behavioral finance and the psychology of investing. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of accounting and economics, 16(1-3), 167-198.
Simkowitz, M., & Monroe, R. J. (1971). A discriminant analysis function for conglomerate targets. Southern Journal of Business, 6(1), 1-15.
Singh, J. V., & Lumsden, C. J. (1990). Theory and research in organizational ecology. Annual review of sociology, 16(1), 161-195.
Thies, C. F., & Klock, M. S. (1992). Determinants of capital structure. Review of Financial Economics, 1(2), 40-53.
Travlos, N. G. (1987). Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms` stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 42(4), 943-963.		zh_TW
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900406en_US