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題名 董監事責任險對公司經營效率之影響:以台灣上市櫃公司為例
Effects of D&O Liability Insurance on Efficiency:Evidence from Publicly Traded Firms in Taiwan作者 劉昱吟
Liu, Yu-Yin貢獻者 鄭士卿
劉昱吟
Liu, Yu-Yin關鍵詞 董監事責任險
效率
資料包絡法日期 2019 上傳時間 7-Aug-2019 16:15:38 (UTC+8) 摘要 近年來公司治理之議題受到社會高度重視,屢屢傳出因錯誤決策而使投資人利益受侵害之事件,為了降低其影響,主管機關鼓勵上市櫃公司投保董監事責任保險。然而,有關公司投保董監事責任險之意圖,學界持正反兩派不同的看法,認為董監事責任險除了可以加強公司治理外,也可能存在道德風險。為了瞭解董監事責任險對公司之經營效率帶來正面或負面的影響,本文以2010年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象,分析是否投保董監事責任險與投保金額比例高低對公司經營效率分別帶來甚麼影響。本文以Tobit迴歸法進行實證分析。藉由資料包絡分析法(DEA)所求出的純技術效率(PTE)、規模效率(SE)、總技術效率(TE)三個效率值為迴歸式應變數,是否投保董監事責任險及投保比例高低為主要自變數,搭配其他與公司治理及財務相關的控制變數進行分析。研究結果顯示,有投保董監事責任險的公司有較好的純技術效率(PTE)表現,但規模效率(SE)的表現較差,整體而言,是否投保董監事責任險對總技術效率(TE)的影響並不顯著,投保比例高低也得出相同結果。進而探討規模大小與規模效率(SE)的關係後發現,規模小於中位數的族群,有投保董監事責任險者之規模效率顯著高於未投保者,規模大的族群則呈現相反的結果,顯示造成整體規模不效率的原因在於部分規模較大的公司。 參考文獻 黃台心,1998,以隨機成本邊界函數分析本國銀行的規模與多元經濟,經濟論文叢刊,26(2),209-241。黃鏡如、傅祖壇、黃美瑛,2010,績效評估—效率與生產力之理論與應用。台北市 : 新陸書局。陳彩稚、龐嘉慧,2008,董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析,台大管理論叢,18(2),171-196。鄭士卿、霍熾榮、張元晨,2009,員工紅利配股對生產效率的影響:以台灣電子產業為例,台大管理論叢,20(1),331-354。Aigner, D.J. C.A.K. Lovell and P. Schmidt, 1977, Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models, Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37.Bayar, T., M. M. Cornett, O. Erhemjamts, T. Leverty, and H. Tehranian, 2018, An examination of the relation between strategic interaction among industry firms and firm performance, Journal of Banking and Finance, 87, 248-263.Berger, A.N. and R. DeYoung, 1997, Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. J. Bank. Finance 21, 849–870.Bhagat, S., J. A. Brickley, and J. L. Coles, 1987, Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54, 721-736.Bharadwaj, A. S., S. G. Bharadwaj, B. R. Konsynski, 1999, Information technology effects on firm performance as measured by tobin’s q, Management Science, 45, 1008-1024.Bonin, J.P., I. Hasan, and P. Wachtel, 2005, Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 2155-2178.Boubakri, N., N. Ghalleb and M. Boyer , 2008, ‘Managerial Opportunism in AccountingChoice: Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Purchases’,Working Paper, HEC Montreal, pp.1-50.Brook, Y. and K. S. Rao, 1994, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Directors’ Liability Limitation Provisions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29, 481-497.Chalmers, J., L. Dann, and J. Harford, 2002, Managerial opportunism? Evidence from director’s and officers’ insurance purchases, Journal of Finance, 57 (2), 609-636Core, J. E., 1997, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 63-87.Daniels, R. J. and S. M. Hutton, 1993, The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance, Canadian Business Law Journal, 22, 182-230.Demerjian, P., Lev, B., McVay, S., 2012, Quantifying managerial ability: a new measure and validity tests. Manage. Sci. 58 (7), 1229–1248.Erhemjamts, O., Leverty, J.T., 2010, The demise of the mutual organizational form an investigation of the life insurance industry. J. Money, Credit Bank 42 (6), 1011–1036.Gutiérrez, M., 2003, ‘An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors` Fiduciary Duties’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 34(3): 516-535.Holderness, C. G., 1990, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, International Review of Law and Economics, 10,115-129.Holod, D. and H.F. Lewis, 2011, Resolving the deposit dilemma: A new DEA bankefficiency model, Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 2801-2810.Hwang, J. H. and B. Kim, 2018, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Value’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 85: 447-482.Kim, I., 2015, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Opportunism in Accounting Choice’, Accounting and Taxation, 7(1): 51-65.Kesner, I., 1987, Directors` stock ownership and organizational performance: An investigation of fortune 500 companies, Journal of Management, 13 (3): 499-507.Kumbhakar, S.C., G. Lien and J. B. Hardaker, 2014, Technical efficiency in competing panel data models: a study of Norwegian grain farming, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41:321-337.Lang, H. P., and R. M. Stulz, 1994, Tobin`s q, corporate diversification, and firm performance, Journal of Political Economy, 102 (6):1248-1280.Leverty, J.T., Grace, M.F., 2010, The robustness of output measures in property-liability insurance efficiency studies, J. Bank. Finance, 34, 1510–1524.Lundvall, K., and G. E. Battese, 2000, Firm size, age and efficiency: Evidence from Kenyan manufacturing firms, Journal of Development Studies, 36 (3): 146-163.Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Business, 55, 281-296.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (2): 293- 315.O’Sullivan, N., 1997, Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors, and Officers, Insurance in Corporate Governance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64,545-556.Priest, G. L., 1987, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, Yale Law Journal, 96 (7), 1521-1590.Romano, R, 1991, The shareholder suit: Litigation without foundation, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), 55-87.Thore, S., Phillips, F., Rueflis, T. W., and P. Yue, 1996, DEA and the management of the product cycle: The U.S. computer industry, Computers Operations Research, 23 (4): 341-356.Zou, Hong, Sonia Wong, Clement Shum, Jun Xiong, and Jun Yan, 2008, Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China, Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 2636-2645. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
風險管理與保險學系
106358007資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106358007 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 鄭士卿 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 劉昱吟 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Liu, Yu-Yin en_US dc.creator (作者) 劉昱吟 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Liu, Yu-Yin en_US dc.date (日期) 2019 en_US dc.date.accessioned 7-Aug-2019 16:15:38 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 7-Aug-2019 16:15:38 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 7-Aug-2019 16:15:38 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106358007 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124754 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 風險管理與保險學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 106358007 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 近年來公司治理之議題受到社會高度重視,屢屢傳出因錯誤決策而使投資人利益受侵害之事件,為了降低其影響,主管機關鼓勵上市櫃公司投保董監事責任保險。然而,有關公司投保董監事責任險之意圖,學界持正反兩派不同的看法,認為董監事責任險除了可以加強公司治理外,也可能存在道德風險。為了瞭解董監事責任險對公司之經營效率帶來正面或負面的影響,本文以2010年至2017年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象,分析是否投保董監事責任險與投保金額比例高低對公司經營效率分別帶來甚麼影響。本文以Tobit迴歸法進行實證分析。藉由資料包絡分析法(DEA)所求出的純技術效率(PTE)、規模效率(SE)、總技術效率(TE)三個效率值為迴歸式應變數,是否投保董監事責任險及投保比例高低為主要自變數,搭配其他與公司治理及財務相關的控制變數進行分析。研究結果顯示,有投保董監事責任險的公司有較好的純技術效率(PTE)表現,但規模效率(SE)的表現較差,整體而言,是否投保董監事責任險對總技術效率(TE)的影響並不顯著,投保比例高低也得出相同結果。進而探討規模大小與規模效率(SE)的關係後發現,規模小於中位數的族群,有投保董監事責任險者之規模效率顯著高於未投保者,規模大的族群則呈現相反的結果,顯示造成整體規模不效率的原因在於部分規模較大的公司。 zh_TW dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第二節 研究流程 2第二章 董監事責任險市場概況 5第三章 文獻回顧 7第一節 董監事責任險 7第二節 生產效率評估 9第四章 研究方法與資料說明 12第一節 資料包絡法介紹 12第二節 效率意義說明 16第三節 效率投入與產出變數選用 17第四節 研究假說與實證模型 18第五章 實證結果與分析 25第一節 變數敘述統計 25第二節 迴歸實證結果 28第六章 穩健性測試 35第一節 規模大小與規模效率之關係 35第二節 金融海嘯之影響 37第七章 結論與建議 40第一節 結果討論 40第二節 未來研究建議 41參考文獻 42 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1091832 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106358007 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董監事責任險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 效率 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資料包絡法 zh_TW dc.title (題名) 董監事責任險對公司經營效率之影響:以台灣上市櫃公司為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Effects of D&O Liability Insurance on Efficiency:Evidence from Publicly Traded Firms in Taiwan en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 黃台心,1998,以隨機成本邊界函數分析本國銀行的規模與多元經濟,經濟論文叢刊,26(2),209-241。黃鏡如、傅祖壇、黃美瑛,2010,績效評估—效率與生產力之理論與應用。台北市 : 新陸書局。陳彩稚、龐嘉慧,2008,董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析,台大管理論叢,18(2),171-196。鄭士卿、霍熾榮、張元晨,2009,員工紅利配股對生產效率的影響:以台灣電子產業為例,台大管理論叢,20(1),331-354。Aigner, D.J. C.A.K. Lovell and P. Schmidt, 1977, Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models, Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37.Bayar, T., M. M. Cornett, O. Erhemjamts, T. Leverty, and H. Tehranian, 2018, An examination of the relation between strategic interaction among industry firms and firm performance, Journal of Banking and Finance, 87, 248-263.Berger, A.N. and R. DeYoung, 1997, Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. J. Bank. Finance 21, 849–870.Bhagat, S., J. A. Brickley, and J. L. Coles, 1987, Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54, 721-736.Bharadwaj, A. S., S. G. Bharadwaj, B. R. Konsynski, 1999, Information technology effects on firm performance as measured by tobin’s q, Management Science, 45, 1008-1024.Bonin, J.P., I. Hasan, and P. Wachtel, 2005, Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 2155-2178.Boubakri, N., N. Ghalleb and M. Boyer , 2008, ‘Managerial Opportunism in AccountingChoice: Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Purchases’,Working Paper, HEC Montreal, pp.1-50.Brook, Y. and K. S. Rao, 1994, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Directors’ Liability Limitation Provisions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29, 481-497.Chalmers, J., L. Dann, and J. Harford, 2002, Managerial opportunism? Evidence from director’s and officers’ insurance purchases, Journal of Finance, 57 (2), 609-636Core, J. E., 1997, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64, 63-87.Daniels, R. J. and S. M. Hutton, 1993, The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance, Canadian Business Law Journal, 22, 182-230.Demerjian, P., Lev, B., McVay, S., 2012, Quantifying managerial ability: a new measure and validity tests. Manage. Sci. 58 (7), 1229–1248.Erhemjamts, O., Leverty, J.T., 2010, The demise of the mutual organizational form an investigation of the life insurance industry. J. Money, Credit Bank 42 (6), 1011–1036.Gutiérrez, M., 2003, ‘An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors` Fiduciary Duties’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 34(3): 516-535.Holderness, C. G., 1990, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, International Review of Law and Economics, 10,115-129.Holod, D. and H.F. Lewis, 2011, Resolving the deposit dilemma: A new DEA bankefficiency model, Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 2801-2810.Hwang, J. H. and B. Kim, 2018, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Firm Value’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 85: 447-482.Kim, I., 2015, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Opportunism in Accounting Choice’, Accounting and Taxation, 7(1): 51-65.Kesner, I., 1987, Directors` stock ownership and organizational performance: An investigation of fortune 500 companies, Journal of Management, 13 (3): 499-507.Kumbhakar, S.C., G. Lien and J. B. Hardaker, 2014, Technical efficiency in competing panel data models: a study of Norwegian grain farming, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41:321-337.Lang, H. P., and R. M. Stulz, 1994, Tobin`s q, corporate diversification, and firm performance, Journal of Political Economy, 102 (6):1248-1280.Leverty, J.T., Grace, M.F., 2010, The robustness of output measures in property-liability insurance efficiency studies, J. Bank. Finance, 34, 1510–1524.Lundvall, K., and G. E. Battese, 2000, Firm size, age and efficiency: Evidence from Kenyan manufacturing firms, Journal of Development Studies, 36 (3): 146-163.Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Business, 55, 281-296.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (2): 293- 315.O’Sullivan, N., 1997, Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors, and Officers, Insurance in Corporate Governance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64,545-556.Priest, G. L., 1987, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, Yale Law Journal, 96 (7), 1521-1590.Romano, R, 1991, The shareholder suit: Litigation without foundation, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), 55-87.Thore, S., Phillips, F., Rueflis, T. W., and P. Yue, 1996, DEA and the management of the product cycle: The U.S. computer industry, Computers Operations Research, 23 (4): 341-356.Zou, Hong, Sonia Wong, Clement Shum, Jun Xiong, and Jun Yan, 2008, Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China, Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 2636-2645. zh_TW dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6814/NCCU201900512 en_US